Title: B40.2302 Course Review
1B40.2302 Course Review
- Modified 12/5/2001 by Jeffrey Wurgler
2Topics Covered
- Course overview
- Key slides from Classes 1-11
3Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Finance and the Financial Manager
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 1
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
4Role of The Financial Manager
(1)
(2)
Financial
Firm's
Financial
(4a)
manager
operations
markets
(4b)
(3)
(1) Cash raised from investors (external finance)
(2) Cash invested in firm
(3) Cash generated by operations
(4a) Cash reinvested (internal finance)
(4b) Cash returned to investors
5Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Present Value and The Opportunity Cost of
Capital
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 2
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
6Net Present Value
7Risk and Present Value
- Higher-risk projects require higher discount
rates. - Higher discount rates cause lower PVs.
8A Fundamental Result
- Investors with free and equal access to borrowing
and lending markets will always invest in
positive NPV projects, no matter what their
preferred time pattern of consumption. - Corollary Shareholders A and G both agree that
firm should maximize its NPV.
9Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- How to Calculate Present Values
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 3
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
10Short Cuts
- Perpetuity - A constant cash flow is received
forever, starting at the end of the first period.
11Short Cuts
- Growing perpetuity - A cash flow growing at rate
g is received forever. The first cash flow,
arriving at the end of the first period, is C1.
12Short Cuts
- Annuity A constant cash flow that arrives only
for t periods. The first cash flow arrives at end
of first period.
13Discount nominal cash with nominal rate, real
cash with real rate
- NPV rule gives same answer whether discounting
nominal cash by nominal rate or real cash by real
rate. - Just dont mix them up!
14Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- The Value of Common Stocks
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 4
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
15Valuing Common Stocks
- Dividend Discount Model - Model of todays stock
price which states that share value equals the
present value of all expected future dividends. - H - Time horizon for your investment. Can be
infinity.
16Valuing Common Stocks
- Constant Growth DDM - A version of the dividend
growth model in which dividends grow at a
constant rate g. -
-
- When you use the growing perpetuity formula to
value a stock, you are using the Gordon Growth
Model.
17EPS, P/E, and share price
- Rearranging,
- Growth stocks sell at high P/E ratios because
PVGO is high. - But utilities sell at high P/E ratios because r
is low
18FCF and PV
- Valuing a Business
- The value of a business is often computed as the
present value of FCF out to a valuation horizon
(H). - The value at H is sometimes called the terminal
value or horizon value
19Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Why Net Present Value Leads to Better
Investment Decisions than Other Criteria
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 5
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
20Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Making Investment Decisions with the Net
Present Value Rule
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 6
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
21Topics Covered
- What To Discount
- IMC Project
- Project Interaction
- Timing
- Equivalent Annual Cost
- Replacement
- Cost of Excess Capacity
- Fluctuating Load Factors
22Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Introduction to Risk, Return, and the
Opportunity Cost of Capital
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 7
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
23Measuring Risk
24Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 8
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
25Security Market Line / CAPM
Expected return
SML
rf
Beta
1.0
SML/CAPM Eri rf Bi (Erm - rf )
26Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Capital Budgeting and Risk
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 9
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
27Company Cost of Capitalsimple approach
- The overall company cost of capital is based on
the weighted-average beta of the individual asset
/ project betas. - The weights in the weighted average are
determined by the of firm value attached to
each asset / project. - Example Say firm value is split as
- 1/3 New ventures investment (B2.0)
- 1/3 Expand existing business investment (B1.3)
- 1/3 Plant efficiency investment (B0.6)
- Average asset beta (1/3)2.0 (1/3)1.3
(1/3)0.6 1.3 - This average beta determines the company cost of
capital.
28Risk and DCFPutting it all together
- Example
- Project A is expected to produce CF 100 mil
for each of three years. Given a risk free rate
of 6, a market risk premium of 8, and an asset
beta of .75, what is the PV of the project?
29Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Spotting and Valuing Options
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 20
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
30Option Value
- Determinants of Call Option Price
- 1 - Underlying stock price ()
- 2 - Exercise (strike) price (-)
- 3 - Standard deviation of stock returns ()
- 4 - Time to option expiration ()
- 5 - Interest rate ()
31Black-Scholes
- Our examples have just been simple up-or-down
movements - In these cases, the binomial method is perfect
- In reality, there may be a continuum of outcomes
- Black-Scholes formula uses a replicating
portfolio - argument to derive European call option value
under these circumstances
VCall N(d1)P- N(d2)PV(S)
32Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 21
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
33Topics Covered
- Real Options
- Follow-on investments
- Abandon
- Wait (and learn)
- Vary output or production methods
- Valuation examples mixed in
34Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- An Overview of Corporate Financing
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 14.1-14.3
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
35Patterns of Corporate Financing
- Two ways to finance investment
- Raise equity or debt (external finance)
- Plow back profits rather than distribute them to
shareholders (internal finance)
36Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- An Overview of Corporate Financing
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 14.4
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
37Corporate Debt
- General features of debt
- Borrower (stockholder) promises a certain stream
of interest and principal payments - But borrower may choose to default
- Lender doesnt usually have voting rights, but in
case of default lender gets assets - Asset administration handled by bankruptcy court
38Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- The Many Different Kinds of Debt
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 24
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
39Topics Covered
- Domestic Bonds and International Bonds
- The Bond Contract
- Interest, Security, Seniority
- Asset-Backed Securities
- Repayment/Retirement Provisions
- Covenants
- Private Placements and Project Finance
40Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Warrants and Convertibles
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 22.1-22.3
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
41Warrants
- Warrant - Right to buy a security (usually
shares) from a company at a stipulated price, on
or before a stipulated date. - - A call option!
42Convertible Bonds
- Convertible Bond - Bond that the holder may
exchange for a specified amount of another
security (usually shares). - Convertibles are thus a combined security,
combining a straight bond and a call option - Like bond-warrant combo, except in bond-warrant
combo you dont have to surrender one to get the
other you have both - Example to understand terms ALZA
- 5 Convertible 2006, face value 1000
- Convertible into 26.2 shares
- Conversion ratio 26.2
- Conversion price 1000/26.2 38.17
- Market price of shares 28
43Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 23
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
44Topics Covered
- The Term Structure
- Term Structure Theories
- Risk Duration and Volatility
- Risk Default
45Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- How Corporations Issue Securities
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 15.2-15.6
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
46Topics Covered
- The Initial Public Offering
- The Underwriters
- Underpricing and The Winners Curse
- General Cash Offers
47Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 16.1-16.4
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
48MM Dividend irrelevance
- Modigliani Miller dividend proposition
- Dividend policy is irrelevant in perfect capital
markets
49MM Dividend irrelevance
- Some key assumptions
- Investment policy held constant
- No transaction costs (e.g. repurchasing premium
for company, cost of mailing dividend checks) - Dividends and capital gains taxed at same rate
-
- If you claim dividends do matter, one or more of
these assumptions must be violated. That is the
power of the theorem it clarifies how dividends
could matter.
50Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 17
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
51MM Debt Policy Proposition I
- Modigliani Miller debt policy proposition
- The market value of a company is independent of
its capital structure.
52MM Debt Policy Irrelevance
r
rE
rA
rD
D E
Risk free debt
Risky debt
53Corporate Taxes
- Taxes dont change the total size of the pretax
pizza. - But now the government gets a slice.
- Governments slice is smaller (and investors
slices are bigger) when debt is used. - MM proposition I with corporate taxes
- Firm Value Value of All Equity Firm
- PV(Tax Shield)
-
- and in special case where debt is permanent
- Firm Value Value of All Equity Firm TcD
54Costs of Financial Distress
- Costs of Financial Distress - Costs arising from
bankruptcy or distorted business decisions on the
brink of bankruptcy. - Firm value Value of All Equity Firm
- PV(Tax Shield)
- - PV(Costs of Financial Distress)
55Trade-off Theory
Costs of financial distress
PV of interest tax shields
Market Value
Value of levered firm
Value if All Equity
Debt ratio
Optimal amount of debt
56Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 19
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
57After-Tax WACC vs. APV
- With consistent assumptions, get same answer.
- WACC assumes constant debt ratio ?, but then
dont have to value tax shield explicitly ? - APV lets tax shields vary over time ?, but have
to calculate them yourself ?. - APV more flexible can handle other financing
effects besides interest tax shields ?
58Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 25.2-25.6
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
59Operating Leases
- Bottom line for lessee Operating lease or buy?
- Buy if the lessees equivalent annual cost of
ownership and operation is less than the best
available operating lease rate - Otherwise lease
- Complication If operating lease includes option
to cancel/abandon, need to factor that in
60Financial Leases
- Bottom line for lessee Financial lease or
buy-and-borrow? - Buy-and-borrow if can devise a borrowing plan
that gives same cash flow as lease in every
future period, but higher immediate cash flow
(equivalently, buy-and-borrow if incremental
lease cash flows are NPVlt0) - Otherwise lease
61Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 26
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
62Topics Covered
- Insurance
- Futures contracts
- Forward contracts
- Swaps
- How to set up a hedge
63Hedging
- Hedging
- Taking on one risk to offset another
- Some basic tools for hedging
- Futures
- Forwards
- Swaps
-
64Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Managing International Risk
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 27
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
65Exchange Rate Relationships
- In simplest world (people are risk-neutral and
face no transaction costs for international
trade), they are all equal (!) -
66International Capital Budgeting
Equivalent Intl. Capital Budgeting Techniques
- 1) (Easy) Discount foreign CFs at foreign cost of
capital. (Can then convert this present value to
using spot exchange rate.) - 2) (Hard) Convert to assuming all currency risk
was hedged (use forward exchange rates), and then
discount with cost of capital. - These techniques are equivalent (verify BM6 p.
806-807) - Thus, hedging allows you to separate the
investment decision from decision to take on
currency risk
67Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Corporate Financing and the Six Lessons
of Market Efficiency
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 13
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
68Return to NPV
- How does market efficiency affect financing?
- But in inefficient markets, maybe NPV(financing)
gt0 - Financing may be relevant if firm can find
ways to finance at below-market costs, i.e.
ways to finance below its rational cost of
capital - So market efficiency is central to MM conclusion
- Are markets efficient or not?
- A controversial issue in finance
- Evidence that markets are approximately efficient
- However, can find exceptions if one looks
carefully at the data - These may be important enough to affect financing
decisions
69Market Efficiency 3 versions
- Weak Form Efficiency
- Market prices reflect past price information.
- Prices move as a random walk
- Semi-Strong Form Efficiency
- Market prices reflect all publicly available
information, not just past prices - Strong Form Efficiency
- Market prices reflect all information, both
public and private.
70Pecking Order Theory
- Pecking Order Theory of Incremental Financing
Decisions - Theory that uses asymmetric
information to argue that firms prefer to fund
their investments using internal finance, then
(if internal finance is insufficient) by debt
issues, then (as a last resort) by equity issues. - Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure
- Theory in which capital structure evolves as the
cumulative outcome of past incremental financing
decisions, each of which is taken using the above
rule.
71Market Timing Theory
- Market timing theory of financing decisions
- Financing theory when markets are not semi-strong
efficient, e.g. when investors underreact to the
bad news in equity issue or the good news in a
repurchase - Says raise whatever form of finance is currently
available at the lowest risk-adjusted cost. (In
MM efficient markets, this makes no sense, since
all forms of finance are efficiently priced at
the same risk-adjusted cost.) - For example, issue equity if it is relatively
overpriced, or long-term debt if it is relatively
overpriced, or short-term debt if it is
relatively overpriced - Consistent with empirical evidence that firms can
time the market
72Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Making Sure Managers Maximize NPV
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 12.3
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
73The Principal-Agent Problem
The problem How do owners get managers to act
in their interests? (i.e. to maximize NPV)
Shareholders Owners Principals
Managers Control Shareholders agents
74The Principal-Agent Problem
How might managers interests differ from
shareholders interests?
- Low effort (slacking/shirking)
- Expensive perks (corporate jets)
- Empire building (overinvestment)
- Entrenching investment (to keep job)
- Avoiding risk (so as not to lose job)
75Potential solutions
- Incentives
- Monitoring
- Debt finance
- Takeover pressure
- Managerial outside labor market
- Proxy fights
76Principles of Corporate Finance Brealey and Myers
Sixth Edition
- Slides by
- Matthew Will, Jeffrey Wurgler
Chapter 33
- The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2000
Irwin/McGraw Hill
77Topics Covered
- Sensible Motives for Mergers
- Some Dubious Reasons for Mergers
- Estimating Merger Gains and Costs
- Takeovers Unsolicited/hostile mergers