Beyond Visual Range BVR AirtoAir Combat

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OVERPROMISED TECHNOLOGY A HISTORICAL CASE
STUDY Col Patrick Higby, USAF 28 Nov 07
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Fortezza
TSAT
LMST
CAC
AF Portal
ERM
Milstar
GCCS
DMS
E4LS
TDC-ICAP
MilMod
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And its not just the technology/system, but also
how we organize plan to use it
BVR HADPB Tac Nuke Strike Composite Wings GS
CONOPS QAF AFCyber?
Technology
Need to keep this Trinity in balance
Organization
Doctrine/CONOPS
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Beyond Visual Range (BVR)Air-to-Air Combat

• Promise vs Reality
• Col Patrick Higby, USAF

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Disclaimers

• Higby is not a fighter pilot nor has he been
  engaged in any aerial combat.
• Higby is not a Luddite.
• The research for this presentation was done for
  elective classes at Naval War College and Air War
  Collegeit was not a full-up research effort.
• These are Higbys views, not those of the USAF or
  DOD.

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BVR Theory

• Kill the bad guy as far away as possible
• Pros
• less danger to shooter
• evens the odds before/if low-tech enemy closes
  for dogfight (quality vs. quantity)
• all-aspect
• Cons
• fratricide may increase
• requires robust target detection/ID and weapons
  guidance (i.e. radar IFF)

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BVR Implementation

• Start with 3 ft radar dish and big radar/avionics
  suite
• More dragnow you need more/bigger engines...and
  more gas for less range
• In addition to higher procurement costs, this
  approach also means higher OM cost
• F-5E940/Flight hr
• F-16A1734/Flight hr
• F-4E2733/Flight hr
• F-15A3305/Flight hr

Cold War (1980) data
Final Result big, expensive, sophisticated
fighters (F-4, F-14, F-15) but thats OK if BVR
and radar missiles work as advertised...
Source Stevenson, p242
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Big Fighter Counterargument

• F-15 is big not for radar/BVR capability, but
  for speed...

Comparative Speeds (Mach) in Combat
Configuration at Altitudes
F-15 with 4 Sparrows 4 Sidewinders F-5 with
2 Sidewinders
According to Pratt Whitney engine data
recorders, F-15s fly subsonic 99 of the time
(ltMach-1)
Source Stevenson, p21, via USAF Test Reports
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What got Me Interested in BVR? 5 Jan 99,
Southern No-Fly Zone

• Using AWACS-assisted BVR,
• 2 F-15s fire 3 Sparrows and 1 AMRAAM at 2
  MiG-25sall miss!
• 15 minutes later, 2 F-14s try with 2 Phoenix
  missilesboth miss!

_at_, I missed again!
Lets get closer see what were shooting at
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So What Range is BVR?

• Visual range depends on eyesight, target size,
  weather, visual enhanements, visual inhibitors,
  light, etc
• Col Burton used 5nm limit for his 1985
  BVR/missile study (daytime only)
• GWAPS used whether or not shooter visually IDed
  target (includes night)

does not count engine smoke Source (used for
approximation) Stevenson, p34
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Cursory Look at Air-to-Air Kills
Notes 1. AIM-9B thru AIM-9M Sidewinder 2.
Primarily AIM-7D thru AIM-7M Sparrow, but also
some AIM-4D Falcons in Vietnam 3. Israel claims
85 (with 0 losses) 4. US only 2 additional
coalition kills were made with AIM-9s from RSAF
F-15C (US lost 1 F-18 air-to-air) 5. No data
found 6. 3 crashed, 1 ejected and 1 kill with
GBU Sources Burton, GWAPS, ACSC
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Radar Missile Data
Notes 1. Range of possibilities was 1-3, so
average was used 2. Range of possibilities was
2-5, so average was usedalso, Israeli AF does
not claim this as BVR kill 3. GWAPS not clear on
thisin one engagement it had a single F-15
launching 5 Sparrowsbut an F-15 can only carry
4! In another case, it had an F-18 scoring a
kill with an AIM-9, but only showed it launching
an AIM-7 Sources Burton, GWAPS
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BVR in Practice

• Recall the purpose for procuring big, expensive
  fighters housing large radars and armed with
  radar missiles was to attain BVR kills
• But in these 5 campaigns,
• only 17 (97 of 569) of the total kills were with
  radar missiles
• only 3.5 (20 of 569) of the total kills were BVR
• 79 (77 of 97) of the radar missile kills were
  within visual range
• only 13 (97 of 720) of the radar missiles hit
  anything
• only 2.8 (20 of 720) of the radar missiles hit
  anything BVR
• The pre-Desert Storm numbers are so low, Im
  surprised we still bothered with BVR
• pre-DS, only 0.8 (4 of 528) of the total kills
  were BVR
• pre-DS, only 0.6 (4 of 632) of the radar
  missiles hit anything BVR

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BVR in Desert Storm

• So what changed?
• AWACS!
• very accurate real-time air picture
• situational awareness
• Iraqi pilots did not respond to radar lock-ons or
  missile launches
• mth generation radar missile plus 2nd
  generation F-15C
• Still had restrictive ROE due to fratricide
  concerns
• hostile target, no friendlies
• generally, only F-15Cs (with NCTR and AWACS
  guidance) met criteria
• GWAPS seems shaky on validity of 16 BVR kills
• v2/p113 says sixteen involved missiles that
  were fired BVR and more than 40 of
  engagements resulting in kills involved BVR
  shots
• Why the quotation marks? Why the vague language?
• I found 5 for sure (16nm (night), 8.5nm (night),
  and 3 at 13nm)

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BVR Thoughts

• Biggest determiner in air combat is still pilot
  skillhoned by realistic training and combat
• Most victims in these 5 campaigns (60-70) were
  unaware of shooter, who was usually behind them
• Same lesson as WW-I and WW-II
• Active sensors (radar) give up element of
  surprise if enemy knows how to use warning
  receivers
• BVR works best in situations its needed least
• Most of our shots are not BVR, so why not go for
  cheaper, smaller, easier to operate/maintain
  fighters?
• Faster recapitalization
• US air supremacy faces asymmetric challenges in
  the futureARMs, CNA, directed energy EMP
  weapons, and/or geopolitical legal constraints
• Incrementally improved BVR capability does not
  help counter any of these challenges.

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• Visual-range kills make for better/instantaneous
  BDA

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So What?

• - Overpromising to sell
• - Recapitalization PBD 720
• - People vs Systems
• - Future viability of
• Airmen!

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• BACKUP SLIDES

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Eagles Reign Supreme

• F-15 aerial combat record is 103 0
• over half the kills made by Israelis
• at least 84 w/i visual range

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Desert Storm Sidebars

• USAF F-15s fired 67 Sparrows (225,700/ea)
  resulting in 23 killsPK34...657,474 per kill
• USAF F-15s also fired 12 Sidewinders (70,600/ea)
  resulting in 8 killsPK67...105,900 per kill
• USAF F-16s fired 36 Sidewindersno hits! (20 were
  accidental launches)
• Navy fighters fired 14 Sparrows and 26
  Sidewinders F-18s got 1 kill with each
  (MiG-21s) an F-14 got an Mi-8 with a Sidewinder
• for Sparrows PK73,159,800 per kill
• for Sidewinders PK8917,800 per kill
• USMC fired 7 Sparrows and 12 Sidewindersno hits!

Source GWAPS
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Desert Storm Sidebars (Warfare on the Cheap)

• An EF-111A (unarmed) caused a Mirage F-1 to crash
  during pursuitnot credited in GWAPS but by ACSC
• An F-15E got an airborne Hughes 500 helicopter
  with a 22,000 GBU-10 (laser guided
  Mk-84)witnessed by nearby SOF team
• A-10s got 2 airborne kills with GAU-8Bo-105 and
  Mi-8 helicopters (oink, oink)
• F-15s got a Mirage F1 and MiG-29 to crash during
  dogfights
• A PC-9 (small prop trainer) pilot ejected after
  he saw an F-15 down an accompanying Su-22the
  F-15s wingman was credited with the PC-9 kill

Sources GWAPS, ACSC
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Desert Storm Sidebars

• Relative to other munitions costs in Desert
  Storm, air-to-air played a small part in the
  total tab

and none of this takes into account what effect
youre having on the target and how thats
helping achieve your policy objectives...
Source GWAPS
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Sources

• ACSC/DED, Gulf War Toolbook, ACSC Distance
  Learning, Multimedia Edition Ver 2.1, Maxwell
  AFB, 1998
• Burton, James G., Letting Combat Results Shape
  the Next Air-to-Air Missile, Slide Presentation,
  1985 (includes comments from Barry Watts,
  Northrop Analysis Center)facsimile received by
  Maj Higby on 12 Oct 99
• Christie, Thomas P., et al, Desert Shield/Desert
  Storm Air-to-Air Performance Study, Institute for
  Defense Analysis, 1992 (classified)
• Cohen, Eliot A., et al, Gulf War Air Power
  Survey, US Government Printing Office, 1993
  (unclassified version, volumes 2 and 5)
• Goartz, Robert D, An Analysis of Air-to-Air
  Missile Capability in Southeast Asia, Maxwell
  AFB, 1968
• Spinney, Franklin C., phone conversations and
  email traffic, Oct 99
• Stevenson, James P., The Pentagon Paradox, Naval
  Institute Press, 1993