JURGEN HABERMAS

1
JURGEN HABERMAS

• Life
• born 1929, in Gummersbach, Germany
• father, pastor director of local seminary, head
  of Bureau of Industry Trade
• dates his intellectual development from 1945,
  Nuremberg trials realized he had been reared
  under politically criminal system became
  critical of German elite.

2

• 1949-1954, studied philosophy at University of
  Gottingen, alarmed at finding no self-criticism
  in his professors philosophical views.
• 1st article critique of Heideggers Introduction
  to Metaphysics, focusing on Heideggers failure
  to repudiate ideas under Hitler.
• Also became interested in Marxist theory, read
  Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, but
  concluded it impossible to apply to postwar
  period.

3

• Instead got attracted to Horkheimer and Adornos
  Dialectic of Enlightenment, first exposure to the
  critical school.
• After teaching for some time at Heidelberg, took
  the chair in Philosophy Sociology at University
  of Frankfurt in 1964.
• 1971, joined Max Plank Institute in Starnberg,
  gained attention as theorist of student protest
  movement.

4

• Movement gave him hope that critical theory could
  have an impact on politics and helped sharpen his
  own views in relation to forebears in Frankfurt
  school.
• Habermas began his intellectual career with
  attempt to rediscover, reconstruct, rethink
  development of German thought from Kant through
  Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, to Marx.

5

• Thinks of himself as reconstructing
  Hegelian-Marxist tradition in the light of new
  cultural, scientific, social political
  challenges of contemporary world. Thus,
  incorporates Weber, Durkheim, Parsons in
  sociology Anglo-American linguistic, analytic
  philosophies psychoanalysis theories of
  cognitive moral development and American
  pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey and Mead.

6
Theory and Practice in Our Scientific Civilization

• Recall Gadamer Hermeneutics as a practical
  philosophy, practice as conducting oneself and
  acting in solidarity in tradition.
• Classical constellation
• episteme--theoria
• phronesis--praxis (ethics-politics continuous)
• techne--productive, based on acquired skills,
  appropriateness.

7

• Both phronesis techne were preconditions of
  life of polis to pursue contemplative ideal
  (episteme) but neither could be derived or
  justified by theory.
• Classical constellation of theoretical, practical
  productive altered by modern science.

8
Modern

• technological with scientific theory
• social science free from the normative
• practical transferred into technical due to
  positivism and enlightenment --
• positivism separation of is ought
  scientific study of social reality must avoid
  value considerations insertions of normative
  leads to dogmatism ideology.

9

• Enlightenment emphasis on reason vs.. ignorance,
  dogmatism, superstition.
• Habermass Critique
• Positivism has transformed inherent relation of
  critical reason to enlightened praxis in terms of
  potential for prognosis technology proper to
  empirical theory.

10

• Positivist cannot justify his own interest if
  values are subjective, then positivists
  commitment to science technology itself is
  subjective and rationally unjustifiable.
• If interest in enlightenment is itself rational,
  then reason has a practical interest and cannot
  be exhaustively defined in in terms of science
  technology.

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• Socially effective theory is no longer directed
  toward the consciousness of human beings who live
  together and discuss matters with each other, but
  to the behavior of human beings who
  manipulate.we are no longer able to distinguish
  between practical and technical power.

12

• Habermass proposal model of dialectic of
  enlightened (political) will and self-conscious
  potential
• Fundamental problem of scientific civilization
  how can relation between technical progress and
  social life-world be reflected upon and brought
  under control of rational discussion?

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• Rational discussion cannot be focused exclusively
  on technical means, nor on application of
  traditional norms of behavior.
• Rather, reflection must bring social potential
  constituted by technical knowledge ability into
  rational connection with practical orientations
  that determine conduct of life.

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• With use of hermeneutics critique of ideology
  (unmasking of ideologically sanctioned
  suppression of common interests), critique of
  instrumental action, totalization,
  unversalization of technology.
• Critique similar to Kant (theoretical, practical,
  judgment) but with politics continuous with
  ethics (communicative)

15

• Dialectic related to democracy as the
  institutionally secured forms of general and
  public communication that deal with the practical
  question of how men can and want to live under
  objective conditions of their ever-expanding
  power of control.

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Knowledge and Human Interests

• Aim to understand dissolution of epistemology
  which has left philosophy of science in its
  place.
• Central thesis the specific viewpoints from
  which we apprehend reality, the general
  cognitive strategies have their basis in the
  natural history of the human species.

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Classification of inquiry and corresponding
interest

• empirical-analytic (natural social sciences
  aiming at knowledge of physical and logical
  laws)gttechnical (purposive-rational action)
• historical-hermeneutic (humanities, historical
  social sciences aiming at interpretative
  understandinggtpractical (communicative action)
• Critically-oriented sciences (psychoanalysis,
  critique of ideology, philosophy as reflective
  and critical)gtemancipatory

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• Cognitive interests general orientations that
  guide various models of inquiry, therefore have
  quasi-transcendental status but have their
  basis in the natural history of human species
  rooted in definite means of social organization
  work, language, power.

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Towards a Methodology of Critical Theory

• Principal loss in the transition from classical
  doctrine of politics to modern political science
  replacement of direct access to practice with a
  technological understanding of theory-practice
  relationship.
• Therefore, task of methodology of social science
  combine access to practice with methodological
  rigor--marriage of scientific empirical with
  practical critical.

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• Critique of Max Weber, Behaviorism, Husserl
  Schutz, and Wittgenstein Winch (language games)
• Two ways to proceed from here
• 1. Develop universal theory of language
  (universal pragmatics)
• 2. Further radicalization of reflection on the
  conditions of interpretative understanding-Gadamer
  s hermeneutics.

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• Gadamer
• intertranslatability of natural languages
• fusion of horizons
• emphasis on history and tradition
• practical attitude of hermeneutic appropriation

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Habermass critique of Gadamer

• G fails to appreciate power of reflection
  developed in understanding one-sided in
  understanding
• hermeneutic interpretation must be conjoined with
  critique of ideology
• critique of ideology requires systems of
  reference beyond tradition--analysis of social
  systems.
• Hermeneutics must be conjoined with philosophy of
  history

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Habermass Philosophy of History

• Danto history, a narrative narrative
  organization always relative to some judgment of
  significance. If we cannot anticipate future
  course of events, then there can be no philosophy
  of history. No philosophy of history means
  judgment of significance involves an
  inexpugnable subjective factor. Account of the
  past essentially incomplete and relative to
  topical interests of historian.

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• Habermas if any account of the past implicitly
  presupposes a philosophy of history, then every
  historian is implicitly a philosopher of history.
• From the viewpoint of practice he (historian)
  anticipates end-states from which the
  multiplicity of events is structured without
  force into action-orienting histories. Precisely
  the openness of history, that is,the situation of
  the actor, permits the hypothetical anticipation
  of history as a whole without which the
  retrospective significance of the parts would not
  emerge.

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• Dantos arguments leads to skepticism only if we
  accept idea of complete description of history as
  purely theoretical undertaking.
• Complete description, an illegitimate ideal.
• Philosophy of history possible as practical
  enterprise, a necessity.
• As actor I anticipate a future, which I can also
  bring about.

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• Practical projections of the future, not
  arbitrary, but based on analysis of real
  determinants of social processes and in the light
  of real possibilities of development in the
  present.
• What Danto sees as impossible is what every
  historian must do reconstruct past from
  viewpoint of judgments of significance based on
  anticipation of the future.

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• Only because we project the provisional closure
  of a system of reference out of the horizon of
  life-practice, can interpretations of events
  (which can be organized into a history from the
  point of view of the projected end) as well as
  interpretations of parts ( which can be described
  as fragments from the point of view of the
  anticipated totality) have any information
  content at all for that life-practice.

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Gadamers response to Habermas

• H attributes false power to reflection,
  reflection historically situated.
• H wants to get behind language to real
  conditions, but language is not one aspect among
  others but universal medium
• Ideology, not inaccessible to hermeneutic
  understanding.
• Claims of critical reflection excessive, cannot
  be sole possessor of truth.

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Habermass response to Gadamer

• from methodological point of view, hermeneutic
  understanding is not the sole and adequate basis
  of social inquiry.
• Ontologizing of hermeneutics results in
  aprioristic devaluation of methods of social
  analysis with a theoretical basis that go beyond
  linguistic competence (e.g. Piaget, Kohlberg,
  Freud).

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Differences of G H spring from different
attitudes towards tradition

• Gadamer
• source of insights values
• dialogue that we are
• respect

• Habermas
• source of domination, repression distortion
• dialogue that is not yet but ought to be
• anticipation of emancipation

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• Habermas attempts to mitigate situational
  character of understanding with the introduction
  of theoretical elements.

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Foundation A Theory of Communication

• Idea of Universal Pragmatics
• provide an account of communication that is both
  theoretical and normative, going beyond
  hermeneutics without being an empirical-analytic
  science.
• Aim expanded notion of rationality
• goal of critical theory form of life free from
  domination

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• Truth of statements linked to intention of good
  and true life
• life free from domination inherent in the notion
  of truth and anticipated in every act of
  communication.
• Theory of communicative competence crucial for
  critical social theory.

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• Past approaches focused on syntactic (the way
  words are put together to form phrases
  sentences) and semantic (linguistic competence)
  aspects of language, and linguistic performance
  is left to empirical analysis.
• Habermas linguistic performance in universal
  terms

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• Pt. of departure J.R. Searles speech acts as
  elementary units of linguistic communication, the
  employment of a sentence in an utterance.
• Surface structure of utterence
• a) propositional content connection with world
  of objects
• b) illocutionary force pragmatic situation (e.g.
  I promise.)

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• Universal pragmatics deep, general structures
  that appear in every possible speech situation
  rules for situating sentences in any speech act
  that form infrastructure of speech situations.
• Infrastructure relations to reality of
  sentence in a particular situation

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• Keystone to theory of speech acts is the
  explanation of illocutionary force proper to
  performative uterrances.
• 1. External world of objects events about which
  one can make true or false statements.
• 2) internal world of speaker intentional
  experiences that can be truthful or untruthful
• 3) normative reality of society social
  life-world of shared values, norms, rules , roles
  that can fit or unfit, legitimate or wrong.

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• Speaker makes validity claims of different types
  (communicative competence requires different
  abilities).
• 1. Representative, so hearer can share knowledge
  of speaker.
• 2. Expressive, so hearer can trust speaker
• 3. Interactive, so hearer can agree with speaker
  in these values.

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• Functions, precondition to
• 1) make distinction between what is and what
  seems to be
• 2) make distinction between individuated self and
  appearance
• 3) make distinction between what is and what
  ought to be
• Because Hs concern is theory of social action,
  third aspect (interactive) is central.

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• Double structure of communication in ordinary
  language
• a) level of intersubjectivity between speaker and
  hearer
• b) level of experiences states of affairs about
  which they want to reach understanding.

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• Keystone to theory of speech acts is explanation
  of illocutionary force proper to performative
  utterances.
• Following Austin Searle, Hs analysis is an
  inquiry into necessary condition for success of
  coming to be of interpersonal relations. Austin
  institutionally bound cases (e.g. marriage) H
  institutionally unbound , variety of settings.

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• Searles types of conditions if speaker is to
  perform a speech act successfully
• a) propositional content
• b) preparatory rules general context
  restrictions
• c)sincerity rules particular, psychological
  state
• d) essential rules paraphrase of meaning
• b, c d constitute the illocutionary force.

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• In institutionally unbound speech acts,
  illocutionary force derives from recognizable
  sincere willingness of speaker to enter into
  indicated relation and to accept obligations.
• Hearers confidence can have rational basis
  because speech-act typical obligations are tied
  to cognitively testable validity claims.

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Obligations met at 2 levels

• A) immediately
• 1) experiential certainty
• 2) assurance of what is evident to oneself
• 3) relevant normative background

• B) mediately
• 1) theoretical discourse
• 2) sequences of consistent action
• 3) practical discourse

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Logic of Theoretical Discourse Truth

• Logic of theoretical discourse logic of how
  claims about the world can be rationally settled.
• Revised version of Peirce consensus theory The
  opinion which is fated to be agreed upon by all
  who investigate is meant by the truth.

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• Hs I may ascribe a predicate to an object if
  and only if every other person who could enter
  into a dialogue with me would ascribe the same
  predicate to the same object. In order to
  distinguish true from false statements, I make
  reference to the judgment of others--in fact to
  the judgment of all others with whom I could ever
  hold a dialogue (among whom I counterfactually
  include all the dialogue partners I could find if
  my life history were coextensive with the history
  of mankind). The condition of the truth of
  statements is the potential agreement of all
  others.

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• Truth claims can be decided only through critical
  discussion and not through direct appeal to sense
  certainty.
• If agreement is to provide warrant for truth
  claims, it must be a rational consensus, not
  merely a de facto consensus.
• Consensus that warrants truth claim is
  rationally motivateddue solely to force of
  argumentation, not to contingent extraneous
  factors.

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• The only possible force is the unforced force of
  the better argument and the only permissible
  motive is cooperative search for truth.

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Logic of Practical Discourse Morality

• Aim to come to a rationally motivated agreement
  about problematic rightness claims.
• Differs from theoretical discourse
• a) problem if an act is right or appropriate
• b) data reasons for doing or judging things in
  this way in this situation.
• c) backing required not observational
  experiential evidence but consequences
  side-effects of application of proposed norm.

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• Principle universalizability
• Principle of universalization a norm is valid if
  all affected can accept the consequences and the
  side effects its general observance can be
  anticipated to have for the satisfaction of
  everyones interests ( and these consequences are
  preferred to those of known alternative
  possibilities for regulation.

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• Principle of Discourse Ethics Only those norms
  can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet)
  with the approval of all affected in their
  capacity as participants in a practical
  discourse.
• Intersubjective interpretation of the Kantian
  categorical imperative.
• Like Hegel, insistence on internal relation
  between justice and solidarity

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Rules of discourse

• 1. Every subject with the competence to speak and
  act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
• 2. A. Everyone is allowed to question any
  assertion whatever.
• B. Everyone is allowed to introduce any
  assertion whatever into the discourse.
• C. Everyone is allowed to express his
  attitudes, desires, and needs.
• 3. No speaker may be prevented by internal or
  external coercion, from exercising his rights as
  laid down in 1 2.

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• To the extent that action conflicts are
  regulated not with force or strategic means, but
  on a consensual basis, there comes into play
  structures which stamp the moral consciousness of
  individuals and the moral and legal systems of
  societies.

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On the Employments of Practical Reason

• Three kinds
• Pragmatic
• Ethical
• Moral

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Pragmatic Discourse

• Pragmatic Discourse uses purposive rationality
• Action strategic, to discover techniques to
  achieve goal.
• Determined in part by what one wants or value
  preferences.
• Once the values themselves become problematic,
  the question What should I do points beyond
  purposive rationality.

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Ethical Discourse

• Ethical Discourse deals with value decisions
• What should I do becomes a matter of what life
  one would like to lead, based on
  self-understanding Who am I, and who would I
  like to be.
• Calls for appropriation of ones own life history
  and the traditions circumstances that have
  shaped ones process of development.
• Ethical questions answered by unconditional
  imperatives. Ought not dependent on subjective
  purposes and preferences and yet not absolute
• What is good for me in the long run, that will
  make me happy.

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Moral Discourse

• Examination of our maxims as to their
  compatibility with the maxims of others.
• Not only what is good for me but what is good for
  all.
• Categorical or unconditional imperative what one
  ought to do has the sense of what is just.
• Moral judgment of action and maxims serve to
  clarify legitimate behavioral expectations in
  response to interpersonal conflicts resulting
  from disruption of orderly co-existence by
  conflicts of interests.

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Terminus ad quem of discourses

• Pragmatic
• Ethical
• Moral

• Recommendation concerning suitable technology or
  realizable program of action
• Advice concerning conduct of life realization
  of personal life project
• Agreement concerning just resolution of a
  conflict in realm of norm-regulated action.

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The Will of the Discourses

• Pragmatic
• Ethical
• Moral

• Arbitrary choice
• Resoluteness
• Free will that is autonomous because guided by
  moral insight motivational force of good reasons
  outweighs power of other motives.

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Moral Discourse vs. Ethical Discourse

• Participants in ethical discourse cannot distance
  themselves from the life histories and forms of
  life in which they actually find themselves.
• Moral discourse requires a break with all the
  unquestioned truths of an established, concrete
  ethical life, including the context of ones
  identity.

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Moral-practical Discourse

• The higher-level intersubjectivity characterized
  by an intermeshing of the perspective of each
  with the perspectives of all is constituted only
  under the communicative presuppositions of a
  universal discourse in which all those possibly
  affected could take part and could adopt a
  hypothetical, argumentative stance toward the
  validity claims of norms and modes of action that
  have become problematic.

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• Moral-practical discourse represents the
  ideal extension of each individual communication
  community from within. In this forum, only those
  norms proposed that express a common interest of
  all affected can win justified assent.
• Moral-practical discourse detaches itself
  from the orientation to personal success and
  ones own life to which both pragmatic and
  ethical reflection remain tied.

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Collective Will Formation

• Norm-testing reason encounters the other as an
  opponent in an imaginary process of
  argumentation. Once the other appears as real
  individual, then we have the primary condition
  for collective will formation.
• Plurality of agents and encounter of other
  generate problem of communal pursuit of
  collective goals and the regulation of communal
  existence.

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• Pragmatic discourses point to the necessity of
  compromise as soon as ones own interests have to
  be brought into harmony with those of others.
• Ethical-political discourses have as their goal
  the clarification of a collective identity that
  must leave room for the pursuit of diverse
  individual life projects.
• The problem of the conditions under which moral
  commands are reasonable motivates the transition
  from morality to law. And, finally, the
  implementation of goals and programs gives rise
  to the questions of the transfer and neutral
  exercise of power.

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