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Sequencing Chinas financial reform: Risks and Options

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Title: Sequencing Chinas financial reform: Risks and Options


1
Sequencing Chinas financial reform Risks and
Options



  • Yanqing Yang
  • Visiting Scholar
  • China Studies
  • Johns Hopkins University-SAIS
  • yanqingyang_at_hotmail.com


2
Outline
  • Introduction
  • NPLs and bank restructuring
  • Institutional building
  • Domestic financial liberalization
  • International financial liberalization
  • Concluding remarks

3
Introduction
  • pro forma economic growth
  • Incremental/ Gradualist reform approach
  • Pros avoidance of economic turmoil and resultant
    social unrest
  • Cons delay of seemingly most difficult reforms,
    the inconsistency of reform paces in different
    sectors, and the incompatibility of different
    aspects of reform
  • WTO entry financial system is receiving
    increasing pressure to step up its reform

4
Financial reform in China
  • most attention has been given to the
    organization-building the process of market
    developmentincluding financial liberalization---
    has received the least attention

5
Sequencing matters
  • Approach 1 Learning by doing
  • Approach2 Get ready then go
  • Country experiences highlight the importance of
    addressing early problems in financial system
    soundness
  • Interest rate deregulation or NPLs?

6
Step1 NPLs and bank restructuring
  • Official data average NPL/ Loan portfolio ratio
    of the four SOCBs has been edging down for the
    past two years
  • Some argue that the official data is
    underestimated (Lardy, 1998 SP, 2001 Bonin and
    Huang, 2002)
  • My estimate system-wide loan losses (ex-AMCs)
    could range 40-44 of 2001 GDP (recovery rate
    15)

7
Step1(contd.) contingent liabilities of the
central government
  • (Source Huang, 2002 and authors estimation)

8
Step1(contd.) Sustainable?
  • municipal government debt does not necessarily
    translate into central government debt
  • estimated cost of pension funds is not, however,
    a sunk cost
  • standard fiscal sustainability conditions
  • If Chinas economy can maintaining its growth in
    the future, the ratio of fiscal revenues to GDP
    can very likely maintain its increasing trend.

9
Step1(contd.) Growing out ?
  • Politically attractive cut NPL ratios by
    2-3ppts every year in the next five years in
    order to lower the average NPL ratio to below 15
    by 2005.
  • Dangers delaying the process of strengthening
    banking supervision
  • Managers may become very conservative and tend
    to contract loans, a negative impact on banking
    profitability and economic growth.
  • Assuming that new NPLs do not emerge in the
    short-run, Managers may tend to increase lending
    to lower NPL ratio, which risks financial
    overheating.

10
Step1(contd.) Radical approach full transfer
and recapitalization
  • Purchasing the debt
  • Convertible bonds
  • Printing money
  • Sale of Equity in SOE and land use rights or ABS
    (Asset-backed-securitization)
  • Strategic investors or IPO
  • Capital injection bond-bad-debt swap
  • Tier-2 issuance

11
Step1(Contd.) Institutional building
  • Internal governance and reforms
  • Prudential supervision
  • Building bank profitability
  • Assortative macroeconomic environment
  • Legal and accounting reform
  • Financial deepening SOE restructuring

12
Step2 Domestic financial reform
  • Target limit government intervention in the
    determination of interest, reduce barriers to
    competition in the financial sector, scale back
    government ownership of financial intermediaries,
    allow new financial products to appear, etc.
  • Major opponents in this paper
  • ------Interest rate deregulation
  • ------Entry opening

13
Step2 (contd.) Big bang vs. Gradualism
  • Big bang Chile and New Zealand
  • Gradualist approach Malaysia and Korea
  • Literatures suggest a gradualist approach because
    the most needed institutional building takes time
    to establish
  • Gradualist approach should not take too long
    because the existing beneficiary may permanently
    capture the rent and rent seeking could create
    more distortions

14
Step2(Contd.)Preconditions
  • Fiscal control
  • A minimal system of prudential regulation,
    including enforcement
  • Recapitalization of the banking system
  • Key monetary control reforms and support for
    changes in the money market
  • Reasonably stable macroeconomy
  • Checks in place to limit collusive behavior among
    banks in the determination of interest rates

15
Step2(Contd.) Koreas is a good model for China
  • To ensure the stabilization, Korea liberalized
    loan rates first before embarking on a gradual
    freeing of deposit rates long-term deposit and
    larger deposits were freed, before moving on to
    shorter rates and smaller deposits
  • A more harsh condition has been set by Chinas
    commitment to the WTO entry. Thus the sequencing
    and the timing have to be in line with the
    timetable of Chinas financial opening up.

16
Step2(contd.) A dilemma
  • Empirical evidence has shown that interest rate
    liberalization combined with entry requirement
    relaxation can be a deadly dose resulting in bank
    failures and possible systemic crisis

17
Step2(contd.)Two possible timings
  • Timing1 Free Rmb loan interest rates before 2004
    and free deposit interest rate before 2006
  • Timing2 (second best, but more likely) a
    gradualist foreign entry under some implementing
    rules that does not conflict with WTO spirit,
    with a combination of restriction on domestic
    entry, which will help to maintain the franchise
    value

18
Step3 International financial reform
  • Target capital account liberalization and
    exchange rate regime choice.
  • A liberalized or open capital market is defined
    as one in which individuals and firms can access
    international financial markets freely, not just
    one in which the government intermediates between
    international capital flows to balance
    differences in private savings and investment

19
Step3(contd.)Costs and Benefits
  • Costs capital outflows reduce policy
    effectiveness (Mundell, 1968)
  • Benefit capital inflow and larger capital stock
    fiscal policy more effective beneficial to
    individuals
  • Empirical results the ambiguous nexus between
    economic growth and free capital flows
  • Empirical results controversial conclusions on
    the link between capital account openness and
    crises

20
Step3(contd.) Sequencing
  • Conventional view follow the opening of the
    current account and the domestic financial system
    (McKinnon, 1973, and 1991 Frenkel,1982and
    Edwards, 1984)
  • Simultaneous liberalization of the current and
    capital account (Little, Scitovsky, and Scott,
    1970 Michaely, 1986 and Krueger, 1984)
  • Endogenous view capital account
    liberalization could precede domestic financial
    market liberalization

21
Step3(contd.)Country experiences
  • Chile and Korea a gradual approach, financial
    sector reforms tended to precede capital account
    liberalization,
  • Indonesia liberalized capital outflows early in
    the reform process quickly, capital account
    opening helped to promote restructuring and to
    improve the competitiveness of the domestic
    financial system.
  • Thailand opened its economy to capital inflows,
    especially portfolio investment inflows much more
    rapidly than other countries

22
Step3(contd.) Chinas story
  • Sizeable dollar deposits
  • Foreign currency liquidity flows
  • Significant leakage in foreign exchange
    (illustrated by errors and omissions in Chinas
    balance of payments )
  • Increasing cross-border capital flows after the
    WTO

23
Step3(cont.) Preconditions for China
  • Stable macroeconomy, a sound fiscal position and
    current account surplus or ample foreign exchange
    reserves
  • Reformed and healthy real sector
  • Significant domestic financial reform after NPLs
    problems have been solved and strengthened
    financial supervision
  • Well-structured money market and indirect
    monetary instruments
  • More flexible exchange rate regime

24
Step3(contd.) Chinas sequencing
  • Japans gradualist approach in opening the
    capital account is a good example for China. The
    sequence has been generally from long-term
    investment to short-term investment, from direct
    investment to indirect investment, and from
    portfolio investment to bank transactions

25
Step3(Contd.) Timetable
  • Emphasis should be stressed on its coordination
    with domestic reform, particularly domestic
    financial liberalization
  • it is more likely that domestic financial reform/
    interest rate liberalization will start around
    2006. In this case, capital account
    liberalization should begin around 2008-2010,
    when Chinas economy is more integrated into the
    world economy and capital mobility has increased

26
Step3(contd.) Some issues on Capital account
convertibility
  • Temporary and selective capital account controls
    still in place
  • Precautions should be taken to monitor
    short-term capital (capital inflows may be
    managed or channeled with measures like the
    Chilean reserve requirements against short-term
    flows).

27
Conclusions
  • Step1 NPLs resolution and institutional building
  • Step2 Domestic financial reform
  • Step3 International financial reform
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