Title: Topic 15: Fisheries Economics
1Topic 15 Fisheries Economics
- David Letson
- Marine Affairs/Economics
- University of Miami
2The Basics
- Fisheries are renewable resources, like forests.
- Unlike forests, we harvest the growth each year.
- Open access and ill-advised public policies.
- We will consider
- efficient management and
- reasons for spectacular counterexamples.
3Concerns
- Bycatch
- Uncontrolled access
- Technological advances
- Globalization
- Habitat destruction
- Allocation commercial recreational
- Transboundary stocks
4Tragedy of the Commons
- Garrett Hardin Science 1968
- Resource accessible to all but belonging to none.
- Individual motivation versus public well being.
- Resource characteristic or a human institution?
5Why do they keep fishing?
- Economic motivation
- capture of benefits
- costs of depleted stocks
- subsidies
- Overfishing is rational but inefficient.
- Identity as fishers.
6Descriptive Statistics
- UN/FAO marine species over-exploited
- US is sixth largest producer
- Recreational fishing also important
- Flat growth since 1989 understates real decline
- Economic losses.
7ExampleUS Groundfish
- Edwards and Murawski
- Multi-species groundfishery off New England
- 70 reduction in effort would maximize value
- Seven-fold increase in stocks
- Three-fold increase in sustainable yield
- Add value 150M/year.
- Realization depends critically on property rights.
8What is a fishery?
- Stock of fish
- initial size
- growth rate
- recruitment
- growth of individuals
- mortality
- Fishing enterprises
- fishing effort
- catch
- costs and revenues
9Fishing effort
- A composite input
- inputs besides fish stocks.
- Measure of inefficiency.
- Includes
- boats, nets, traps
- crew
- spatial distribution of stocks, fishers,
consumers - time spent fishing.
10A few words aboutBiology
11Biological Assumptions
- Growth of fish stocks is a function of the
initial stock (Schaefer logistical growth). - We focus on recruitment, individual growth, and
natural mortality. - We dont consider salinity, temperature,
currents, weather, predator/prey relationships,
pollution, loss of habitat, etc.
12Static Economic Model Simplifying Assumptions
- Simple, Schaefer bell-shaped curve
- Fish sizes and prices are constant
- Homogeneous fleet Cost of effort per vessel is
constant - No significant barriers to entry (e.g. no
limitation on fishing permits, cost of purchasing
a boat is not significant, etc.)
13Economics of an open-access fishery
- Total sustainable revenue
- Total cost of harvest
- Maximum Sustainable Yield
- Maximum economic yield
14Maximum Economic Yield (MEY)
- Maximum economic yield effect level, occurs where
MC MR - Total (aggregate) profit maximized for the entire
fishery - Optimal allocation of effort
- Societys inputs (capital, labor, etc.) used
efficiently relative to other alternatives and
opportunities. - Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is not the same
as MEY.
15The Problem Open-Access (Tragedy of the
Commons)
- Fisheries are common-property resources
- Users cannot exclude others from harvesting
- More enter the fishery and compete for a
declining share - No incentive to limit effort because someone else
would benefit
16Technological Improvements Solve Problem?
- Catch (revenue) per unit of effort (cost)
increases and/or - Cost per unit of effort decreases, BUT
- More vessels are attracted to the fishery
- Revenue and/or cost savings per vessel are
dissipated - Open access equilibrium shifts to lower yield
level - Increase risk of recruitment over-fishing and
stock collapse.
17Improved Technology Only Rotates the Total
Cost Line
Max Yield
Total Cost of Effort
Max Econ. Yield
New MEY
TechnologyLowers Cost of Effort
Yield in lbs or Cost in
Yield or Revenue
Biomass
OAE
MSY
MEY
New OAE
Effective Fishing Effort (Boats, Nets, Days, Etc.)
OAE - Open Access Equilibrium
18Other Factors Contributing to Inefficiencies of
Open Access Fisheries
- Asset fixity Specialized vessels and gear may
hinder exit from fishery - Special tax incentives, e.g. Capital Construction
Fund. - Subsidized fishery loans, e.g. Fisheries
Obligation Guarantee Program (FOG). - Anticipations (expectations) of future limited
entry controls by government.
19Extensions
- Fishers not homogeneous.
- Time lags Slow, painful adjustments.
- Multi-species. Multi-nation.
- Individuals sometimes do cooperate.
- Regulators do not always act in social interest.
20Management Considerations
- Traditional commercial fishery regulations (e.g.
catch limits, fishing season) may reduce risk of
over-fishing, but only increase cost of fishing - Simple limited entry approaches may still lead to
capital stuffing (e.g. increases in vessel
fishing power) - Assigning pseudo-property rights Individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) - Catch a specific amount fish sizes
- Total of quotas equal to efficient total catch
for fishery - Transferable among fishers
21Fisheries Management (I)
- Will future catches compensate for todays
restraint? - Facilitate transfer of resources to beneficial
use? - How will regime affect prices and harvest costs?
- Will improved stocks attract additional effort?
22Fisheries Management (II)
- Usual approaches
- catch quotas,
- trip limits,
- bag limits,
- gear restrictions,
- limits on fish size, and
- seasonal and area closures.
23Fisheries Management (III)
- Usual ways Raise harvest costs, with profits
still zero. - Effort increases to take advantage of the
improved stocks and catch rates. - Need use rights for fish stocks.
24Individual transferable quotas (ITQs)
- Allocates shares of TAC to individuals.
- Fishers still decide who, when and how.
- Design issues
- eligibility, duration, transferability
- Initial allocation.
25ITQ Programs Some Pros and Cons
- Pros
- Ownership (property rights) expected to foster
proactive conservation management (Core
assumption) - Buying/selling of shares promotes an efficient
(market oriented) approach to down-sizing fleet - Allows producers flexibility to harvest fish for
high quality market segments (Consumers may
benefit, too). - Cons (Mainly equitability concerns)
- May encourage concentration of shares (supply)
and marketing power - Arbitrariness of initial allocation creates
windfall wealth for vessel owners - Crews and/or others in the fishing community
ignored in allocation process. - In neoclassic economics, market-oriented
solution usually require some type of ownership
rights for sellers and buyers.
26A Few Words About...Recreational Fishing
27Management Review
- Restrictiveness correlated with success.
- Complexity of fishery, success inversely related.
- Unpopular programs do not succeed.
- Failure necessary before restrictions accepted.
- Success creates pressure to increase access.
28Summary and Conclusions Commercial Fishery
Economics
- Simple bioeconomic models can demonstrate the
societal inefficiencies of open access, common
property commercial fisheries and related
over-fishing risks. - Improvements in fishing technology have only
amplified commercial fishing effort in open
access situations. - Regulations only focusing on MSY are second
best compared to MEY. - ITQ systems attempt to address the problem via
ownership incentives, but the equity of ITQ
systems have been criticized.
29Conclusions
- World fisheries in decline.
- Open access encourages over-harvest.
- Subsidies worsen problems.
- Management must reduce effort, protect habitat.