Title: ISSS LORIS 2004 Conference
1ISSS / LORIS 2004 Conference
Gerald.Santucci_at_cec.eu.int
ISSS / LORIS 2004 eSecurity How is Europe
Facing the New Challenges?
2Agenda
- ICT in the Future
- Two Alternate Futures
- e-Security Vision 2015
- e-Security 2015 Four Big Challenges
- Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks
- Trustworthy Societal Applications
- Quantitative Risk Management
- Security and Privacy
- Trust and Security in FP6 IST - Call 1 Year 2003
- MEDSI
- FIDIS
- SECOQC
- Conclusions
3ICT in the Future
- Smaller, cheaper, embedded computing
- Ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous communication,
intelligent interfaces (Ambient Intelligence) - Global reach and global participation
- Growing volumes of data
- Growing population of user-centric services
- Internet commerce
- eGovernment
- On-demand services
- Telework
- Individualised entertainment
4Two Alternate Futures
- Overwhelming unsolicited, junk emails
- Rampant ID theft
- Frequent network outages
- Frequent manual intervention
- Largely unchecked abuses of laws and rights
- No spam or viruses
- User-controlled privacy
- Uninterrupted communications
- Hassle-Free computing
- Balanced regulation and law-enforcement
5e-Security Vision 2015
- Intuitive, controllable computing
- Reliable and predictable
- Supports a range of reasonable policies
- Adapts to changing environment
- Enables rather than constrains
- Supports personal privacy choices
- Security not as an afterthought, but as an
integral property
6e-Security 2015 Four Big Challenges
- Eliminate epidemic-style attacks within the next
decade - Develop tools and principles that enable
development of large-scale systems for highly
trustworthy societal applications - Quantitative risk management of
information-systems - An Ambient Intelligence Space that gives
end-users security they can understand and
privacy they can control
7Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks (1)
- Viruses and worms
- SPAM
- Denial of Service attacks (DOS)
8Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks (2)
- Epidemic-style attacks can be fast
- Price of entry is low for adversaries
- Unpredictable attack techniques and sources
- Polymorphic worms and viruses
- Anonymous attackers
- No organised active defence
- Poor visibility into global Internet operations
- No emergency global control
9Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks (3)
- Cost of attacks are tremendous
- Costs to enterprise operations
- Decreased productivity
- Loss of confidence in information infrastructure
- Internet is being used today for critical
infrastructure - Hospitals, ATM networks, utilities, Air Traffic
Control - Eliminating malicious software will
- Support emerging applications in areas of general
interest (e.g. telemedicine) - Increase trust and confidence
10Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks (4)
- Nobody owns the problem
- Finger-pointing among developers, network
operators, system administrators, and users - Lack of Internet-scale data
- Lack of Internet-sized testbeds
- Lack of legislative support
- Conflicting economic interests
11Elimination of Epidemic-style Attacks (5)
- No more
- Internet worms
- Internet-wide service interruptions
- Massive spam attacks against ISPs, email
providers, and businesses - Internet protection
- Supplied standard on all new computers, routers,
large small appliances - A mitigation strategy is available for existing
infrastructure
12Trustworthy Societal Applications (1)
- Patient medical record databases
- Fully supported electronic elections
- Law enforcement databases, ...
13Trustworthy Societal Applications (2)
- Ambient intelligence pervades all aspects of
society - Systems are being built and deployed now that may
not be fully trustworthy - Critical applications must be trustworthy
14Trustworthy Societal Applications (3)
- Reconciling various legal regimes with
technological capabilities - Provision with acceptable cost
- Achieving balance of privacy with security in
record-keeping - Integration/replacement of legacy applications
having lesser (or no) protections
15Trustworthy Societal Applications (4)
- e.g., create online medical databases that
survive severe disasters and attacks without
human intervention - Confidentiality no authorised disclosure of
records - Integrity no unauthorised alteration of records
- Auditability record all attempts to access
online info - Availability maximum downtime less that 2
minutes per day, and an average of less that 5
minutes per month - Accessible globally
16Quantitative Risk Management (1)
- There is no sound and efficient management
without measure if you dont have a measure,
either you under-protect or you over-spend - What you measure is what you get
- Measuring the wrong thing is as bad or worse as
not measuring anything at all - The measures ultimately need to be consistent,
unbiased, and unambiguous
17Quantitative Risk Management (2)
- Getting the model right, picking the right
measures, gathering the right data - No one wants to be first to disclose information
- Data sharing and common terminology are required
- Legal, cultural, business, and scientific issues
- The I dont want to know mentality
18Quantitative Risk Management (3)
- Ability to predict outcomes
- Ability to titrate choosing our point on the
cost vs. risk curve - Businesses and governments can take more risk and
gain more reward - Ability to communicate across the boundaries of
shareholders, suppliers, regulators, the market - Risk transfer for information security can
achieve liquidity
19Security and Privacy (1)
- Technology can easily outrun comprehensibility
- Security implementation must not make this worse
- End-user should not lose control of his/her
information, privacy, location
20Security and Privacy (2)
- The looming future
- Instant access to information
- Exploiting the benefits of ICT everywhere
- Convenience, safety, empowerment
- Why a challenge for this community?
- Avoid the high pain of leaving these concerns for
later - Product-makers should not be the only
stakeholders in the design process - Threats to privacy are a critical concern
- Multicultural issues
21Security and Privacy (3)
- Its important to get in at the beginning
- The Internet experience informs us
- Its also a social system, not simply a
technology - Once we give up privacy or security, we may not
be able to regain it - Important to assert a leadership role while we can
22Security and Privacy (4)
- User needs are much broader than traditional
security models - Dynamic environments and device heterogeneity are
challenging - Multiple competing stakeholders
- Difficulty to make things usable
- Real-life user security requirements and policies
are hard to express in terms of current mechanisms
23Security and Privacy (5)
- Societal acceptance
- Does the user feel in control of this world she
now lives in? - Has the user in fact lost control of his
information, his privacy? - Emergence of a ubiquitous cyber space that is
- Simple and easy to use
- Dependable, reliable
- Trustworthy
- Not overly intrusive
24IST in FP6 - Call 1 Year 2003
- CZ Participation in Proposals
- 12 participations (out of 1127, i.e. 1.06)
- No co-ordination (PL 2, BG HU 1)
- CZ Participation in Projects
- MEDSI (STREP) 2
- FIDIS (NoE) 1
- SECOQC (IP) 1
25MEDSI
- Management Decision Support for Critical
Infrastructures - 18 months - 11 participants
- Rationale
- Asymmetric threats gt it is necessary to provide
a new open framework for data sources fusion and
interpretation - Objectives
- An innovative system providing an integrated set
of services to crisis managers and planners in
order to protect critical infrastructures - Main innovations
- A tool to define and manage crisis scenarios for
CIP - A scalable system inter-operating with other
existing or under development systems gt huge
quantities of information accessible - A new concept of GIS and simulation integration
- Czech Contractors
- T-SOFT spol. s.r.o. (crisis management)
- GISAT s.r.o. (remote sensing and geoinformation
service)
26FIDIS
- The Future of Identity in the Information
Society - 60 months - 24 participants
- Rationale
- New concepts of identity emerge with the
development of e-Society, e.g. multiple identity,
pseudonymity, anonymity - At the same time, needs for identification and
authentication are growing, in particular for
official activities - Objectives
- Shaping the requirements for the future
management of identity - contributing to the technologies and
infrastructures needed - Main innovations
- overcome the fragmentation of research into the
future of identity - durable integration of the implementation of
research efforts - Czech Contractor
- Masaryk University Brno (cryptography, privacy,
biometrics)
27SECOQC
- Development of a Global Network for Secure
Communication based on Quantum Crytography - 48 months - 42 participants
- Rationale
- Currently used encryption systems are vulnerable
(e.g., increasing power of computing technology,
emergence of new code-breaking algorithms,
imperfections of PKIs) gt quantum cryptography - Objectives
- To specify, design and validate the feasibility
of an open Quantum Key Distribution
infrastructure dedicated to secure communication - Main innovations
- Novel and reliable methods for secure long-range
communication - Increased trust in applications (e.g., e-vote,
e-commerce) - Czech Contractor
- Palacky University (Department of Optics), Olomouc
28Conclusions
- Europe is confronted with major challenges in the
field of Security - Immediacy of threat has led so far to excessive
focus on short-term RD - Lack of a culture of security across Europe
- Enlargement represents both another challenge and
an opportunity to devise European solutions - Policy lags innovation
- Problems include yet go beyond national defence
29More Information
- http//europa.eu.int/index-en.htm
- http//europa.eu.int/information_society
- http//eeurope-smartcards.org
- http//www.cordis.lu/ist/
- http//www.cordis.lu/ist/ka2/smartcards.html
- Jacques.Bus_at_cec.eu.int (new Head of Security
Research Unit)
30