ProblemSolving Courts: The Latest Results

1
Problem-Solving Courts The Latest Results

• Michael Rempel
• Center for Court Innovation
• (mrempel_at_courts.state.ny.us)
• Presented at the 2008 NACM Annual Conference,
  Anaheim, CA, July 14, 2008

2
Aims of This Presentation

• Participants will gain information concerning
• Whether problem-solving courts work
• Why problem-solving courts work (which practices
  are most effective)
• How to critically assess current and future
  problem-solving experiments

3
Rise of Problem-Solving Courts

• 1989 First drug court opens in Miami (FL)
• 1998 347 drug courts
• 2008 2,000 drug courts
• 1,000 other problem-solving courts
• Source Huddleston et al. (2008)

4
Problem-Solving Models (USA)

• Drug Courts adult, juvenile, family, DWI 2,147
• Mental Health Courts 219
• Domestic Violence Courts criminal, juvenile,
  and integrated 323
• Community Courts 32
• Other Models e.g., homelessness, reentry,
  truancy, sex offense, child support, and youth
  courts 500
• Sources Drug courts, mental health courts, and
  other models Huddleston et al. (2008)
  domestic violence courts
• Bradley et al. (2008) and community courts
  Karafin (2008).

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Unifying Themes

• Focus on Underlying Problems
• Focus on Outcomes
• Rise of the Proactive Court
• Staffing Meetings
• Ongoing Judicial Supervision
• Intermediate Sanctions and Rewards
• Case Management
• Drug Testing

6
Alternative Models

• Rehabilitative e.g., drug courts and mental
  health courts
• Accountability e.g., domestic violence courts
  and sex offense courts
• Community Justice e.g., community courts,
  truancy courts, and youth courts

7
The Problem-Solving Space
8
Todays Focus

• Rehabilitative Models
• The Case of Adult Drug Courts
• Accountability Models
• The Case of Domestic Violence Courts
• The Future of Problem-Solving Courts
• Community Justice and Other Directions

9
Part One.Rehabilitative ModelsThe Case of
Adult Drug Courts
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Retention in Treatment

• Conclusion Drug court retention rates far exceed
• those for the general treatment population.
• Treatment Generally
• 10-30 one-year retention (e.g., Condelli and
  DeLeon 1993 Lewis and Ross 1994)
• Adult Drug Courts
• National average 60 one-year retention
  (Belenko 1998)
• Likely Explanation The Proactive Court
• Legal coercion ongoing oversight

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Recidivism

• Conclusion Drug courts reduce recidivism when
• compared with conventional case processing.
• Forty-eight of 55 drug courts reduced recidivism
  (Wilson et al. 2006)
• Average reduction was 26 (Wilson et al. 2006)
• Impacts exceed three years duration (e.g., Aos et
  al. 2001 Finigan et al. 2007 GAO 2005
  Gottfredson et al. 2002 Rempel et al. 2003)
• Magnitude of impact varies by site (from zero to
  more than 50)

12
New York State Impacts
p Note Percentages are re-conviction
rates. Source Rempel et al. (2003).
13
The Role of Graduation
Note Percentages are re-conviction
rates. Source Rempel et al. (2003).
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Cost-Benefit Results

• Conclusion Studies consistently show net
  savings.
• Washington State Six sites 3,892 saved per
  participant (or 1.74 saved per 1 invested) (Aos
  et al. 2001)
• California Nine sites (Carey et al. 2002, 2006)
• Results by agency (1) court, (2) pub. defender,
  (3) prosecutor, (4) law enforcement, (5)
  treatment, (6) probation, and (7) corrections.
• Bottom-line For every 1 invested, 8 of 9 sites
  produced savings.
• Impact at median site 3.50 in savings for every
  1 invested.
• Main explanation Lower recidivism rates
• Victimization Savings (Portland, OR Carey and
  Finigan 2003 Maryland Crumpton et al. 2003)

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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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Substance Abuse Treatment

• Conclusion Treatment generally works if
• participants are retained.
• More time in treatment predicts better
  post-treatment outcomes (less drug use, lower
  recidivism, etc.)
• At least 90 days of treatment is critical
• Long-term heroin users will probably require
  residential treatment and/or methadone to succeed
• Caveats
• Drug court graduation may be pre-condition
• Many programs do not follow evidence-based
  practices (NIJ 2006, reporting on Anspach and
  Ferguson)

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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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Legal Coercion Leverage
Source Rempel and DeStefano (2001).
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Legal Coercion Perceptions

• Information
• Number of criminal justice agents (CJAs) who
  explained program rules
• Number of CJAs who explained consequences of
  failure to the client
• Number of times client made promises to CJAs to
  complete treatment
• Monitoring
• A CJA would learn within a week if client
  absconded from the program
• Number of CJAs who would learn if client
  absconded from the program
• Enforcement
• Warrant is issued if the client absconds from the
  program
• Client would be returned to custody in a month or
  less of leaving treatment
• Severity
• CJA has told client s/he will serve severe
  penalty for absconding or failing
• Length of time client expects to serve in jail or
  prison for program failure
• ( p

Source Young and Belenko (2002)
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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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Measures of Supervision
Source The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court
Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
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Judicial Supervision

• 1. Judicial Supervision with Drug-Involved
  Offenders (not Drug Court) The Washington, D.C.
  Study
• Sanctions docket drug testing plus regular
  judicial supervision and sanctions in the event
  of noncompliance
• Standard docket drug testing without regular
  judicial supervision or sanctions
• Both dockets treatment not required
• One-year post-program Sanctions docket had
• Lower re-arrest rate (19 vs. 27)
• Lower rate of serious drug use (35 vs. 48)

Source Harrell et al. (1998)
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Judicial Supervision (Cont.)
2. For Whom Does Judicial Supervision Work Best?
The Doug Marlowe Experiments

• High risk participants (anti-social personality
  disorder and/or previous failed treatment)
  benefit from biweekly judicial monitoring
• Low risk participants perform as well with as
  needed monitoring

• Source Marlowe et al. 2003.

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Judicial Supervision (Cont.)
3. Role of the Judge

• Qualitative Evidence Focus group participants
  consistently point to the impact of the judge
  (Farole and Cissner 2005 Goldkamp et al. 2002)
• General Supervision Finding Engaging offenders
  in an individualized process of change is more
  effective than simple surveillance (e.g., Farole
  et al. 2004 Petersilia 1999 Taxman 2002)

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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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Sanctions

• Key Behavior-Modification Principles
• Certainty Each infraction receives a response.
• Celerity Responses imposed soon after the
  infraction.
• Severity Responses severe enough to deter
  noncompliance but do not foreclose more severe
  future responses
• Consistency Comparable responses always result
  from comparable infractions.
• Drug court significance Many do not apply these
  principles rigorously (e.g., Marlowe 2004 Rempel
  et al. 2003 Roman 2004)

Source For discussion of the principles and how
they apply to drug courts, see Marlowe and Kirby
(1999).
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How Drug Courts Work

• Substance abuse treatment
• Legal incentives to succeed
• Immediacy (early identification and placement)
• Judicial supervision
• Sanctions and incentives
• Perceptions of fairness

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Perceptions of Fairness
The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation
Source The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court
Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
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Towards an Empirical Model
Higher Treatment Dosage
Perceptions of (Judicial) Fairness
Positive Outcomes (less drug use and less
criminal activity at six months)
Drug Court Participation
More Supervision Officer Contacts
More Judicial Status Hearings
Background Characteristics (demographics, SES,
prior drug use, criminal history, etc.)
More Required Drug Tests
Source The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court
Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
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Part Two.Accountability ModelsThe Case of
Domestic Violence Courts
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Offender Accountability

• Conclusion DV courts appear to hold offenders
• more accountable
• Judicial Supervision More frequent compliance
  hearings (often monthly) (Gondolf 1998 Newmark
  et al. 2001 San Diego Superior Court 2000)
• Enforcement of Noncompliance More frequent
  probation violations and revocations (Harrell et
  al. 2006) or other sanctions (Newmark et al.
  2001 San Diego 2000).

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Victim Services

• Conclusion DV courts appear to link more victims
• with services.
• Brooklyn From 55 to 100 of victims linked to
  advocates after DV court opened (Newmark et al.
  2001)
• Shelby, TN From barely any to 56 of victims
  linked to advocates after DV court opened
  (Henning and Kesges 1999)

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Victim Satisfaction

• Conclusion DV courts appear to elicit more
• positive victim perceptions.
• Perceive Improved Case Handling (Eckberg and
  Podkopacz 2002 Gover et al. 2003 Hotaling and
  Buzawa 2003)
• Perceive Fairer Outcomes (Gover et al. 2003
  Hotaling and Buzawa 2003)
• Express greater likelihood of reporting future
  violence and cooperating with future prosecutions
  (Newmark et al. 2001, Safe Horizon and Courtroom
  Advocates Project data 2003, Smith 2001)

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Recidivism

• Conclusion Recidivism results are mixed.
• Mixed Results Of seven recidivism studies
• Three show positive results (Lexington, KY, San
  Diego, CA, and Dorchester, MA)
• Three show no impact (Brooklyn, NY, Shelby, TN,
  and Ann Arbor, MI)
• One shows mixed results (Milwaukee, WI)
• Expectations Problem Are accountability and
  victim services more attainable than offender
  behavior change?

Sources Ann Arbor and Dorchester studies
(Harrell et al. 2007) Brooklyn study (Newmark et
al. 2001), Lexington study (Gover et al. 2003),
Milwaukee study (Harrell et al. 2006), San Diego
study (San Diego Superior Court 2000), Shelby
study (Henning and Kesges 1999).
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Role of Batterer Programs

• Conclusion Batterer programs cannot be relied on
• to rehabilitate.
• Results Five Randomized Trials
• Earliest Study (Hamilton Ontario, 1992)
  Reduction in re-arrests
• Four Latest Studies (2000s) None show clear
  positive impact (Bronx, NY Brooklyn, NY Broward
  Co., FL, and San Diego Navy Base)
• Meta-Analysis Negligible net effect on official
  re-arrests and zero effect on victim reports of
  re-abuse (Feder and Wilson 2005)

Sources Hamilton study (Palmer et al. 1992)
Bronx study (Labriola et al. 2005) Brooklyn
study (Davis et al. 2000), Broward study (Feder
and Dugan 2002), San Diego Navy Base study
(Dunford 2000).
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Role of Judicial Monitoring

• Conclusion Judicial monitoring may work if
• implemented effectively more research needed.
• Suggestive Studies Higher program completion and
  lower re-arrest rates after DV court opened
  linked to monitoring (San Diego San Diego
  Superior Court 2000 and Pittsburgh Gondolf
  1998)
• Bronx, NY Judicial monitoring shows no effect
  involved simple surveillance (monthly
  check-ins), with little judicial interaction or
  sanctions (Labriola et al. 2005)

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Role of Probation Monitoring

• Accountability Specialized DV probation units
• More often impose and enforce special conditions
  (Buzawa et al. 1998 Harrell et al. 2007 Hayler
  et al. 1999)
• Generate higher technical violation and
  revocation rates (e.g., Klein et al. 2005
  Harrell et al. 2006)
• Recidivism
• Rhode Island Intensive DV probation led to lower
  re-arrest rates among low-risk DV offenders
  (Klein et al. 2005)

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Part Three.The Future of Problem-Solving
Courts Community Justice and Other Directions
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Community Impacts

• Community Restitution e.g., Red Hooks community
  service mandates contribute 500,000/year in
  labor to the local community (Center for Court
  Innovation, results memorandum, 2008)
• Public Confidence in Justice
• Community courts lead to positive stakeholder and
  resident attitudes toward the court (Justice
  Education Center 2002 Moore 2004 Sviridoff et
  al. 2001 Weidner and Davis 2000)
• DV court stakeholder meetings lead to increased
  collaboration, mutual understanding, and
  confidence in the court (Harrell et al. 2007
  Henning and Klesges 1999 and Newmark et al. 2001)

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Other Models in Brief

• Community Courts appear to produce
• More use on alternative sanctions and less use of
  jail (Sviridoff et al. 2001, Soroushian and
  Hakuta 2008)
• Better community service compliance (Sviridoff et
  al. 2001, Eckberg 2001)
• Increased litigant perceptions of fairness
  (Abuwala and Farole 2008 Frazer 2006)
• Mental Health Courts appear to produce
• Lower recidivism, based on four recent impact
  studies (Bess 2004 McNeil and Binder 2007 Moore
  and Hiday 2006 and Cosden et al. 2005)
• Improved psychosocial functioning, based on just
  two recent impact studies (Bess 2004 Cosden et
  al. 2005)

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Other Models in Brief (Cont.)

• Family Drug Courts appear to produce
• Increased treatment retention and completion
  rates
• Increased case length and time to permanency
• Increased probability of family reunification
• Source Four-site national evaluation Worcel et
  al. (2007).
• Juvenile Drug Courts may not reduce recidivism
  
• Twenty impact studies yield mixed results (see
  Kralstein 2008)
• Seven show lower recidivism
• Five show higher recidivism
• Eight show zero difference or mixed results by
  measure
• Average recidivism reduction is significantly
  greater in studies of adult than juvenile drug
  courts (Schaffer 2006)

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The Problem of Scale

• Most Problem-Solving Courts
• Serve small fraction of those eligible (Bhati et
  al. 2008 Zweig and Schaffer 2004)
• Require substantial up-front investments (e.g.,
  see Carey et al. 2006 Farole et al. 2004, Farole
  et al. 2005)
• Two Paths
• Expand problem-solving courts Increase the
  number of specialized courts or number of
  litigants served by them
• Apply problem-solving methods in conventional
  courts
• Threat to efficacy piecemeal application of
  practices possible watering down of the model
• Threat to problem-solving court
  institutionalization siphon cases, resources,
  and political support.
• Potential to expand reach expand benefits to
  large numbers

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For More Information

• Center for Court Innovation www.courtinnovation.o
  rg (research page at www.courtinnovation.org/resea
  rch)
• Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse
  http//www.mincava.umn.edu
• National Center for State Courts
  http//www.ncsconline.org (problem-solving court
  resources at http//www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/
  ProblemSolvingCourts/Problem-SolvingCourts.html
• National Drug Court Institute at
  http//www.nadcp.org/
• New York City Criminal Justice Agency at
  http//www.nycja.org
• NPC Research http//www.npcresearch.com
• The Urban Institute at http//www.urban.org
  (Justice Policy Center at http//www.urban.org/jus
  tice/index.cfm)