Title: Conglomerate discount
1Conglomerate discount
- Corporate Restructuring
- Tim Thompson
2Arguments based on fundamentals
- Conglomerates are good
- Williamson (1975), with superior inside
information, diversified firms can allocate
capital better than the market - Stein (1997), can fund winners and abandon losers
more efficiently than market, agency costs
mgr/shareholder
3Conglomerates are bad
- Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1990)
- Look at bidder returns to announcements of
acquisitions - Bad past performing managers incur larger
negative abnormal returns at the announcement of
acquisitions, relative to good performers - Avg bidder return in related acquisition is
positive, avg bidder return in unrelated
acquisition is negative, stat. insig, but seems
signif in 1980s
4Conglomerates are bad, contd.
- Jensen (1988), agency costs of free cash flow
argument for forming conglomerates - Comment and Jarrell (1995)
- Herfindahl index of focus
- Increasing focus correlated with abnormal
positive stock returns - diversified firms dont have more debt, dont
rely less on cap mkt and are targets more often
5Berger and Ofek
- Estimated conglomerate discount
- Took sample of conglomerate firms (segments in
different 4-digit SIC codes) - Calced Value to Sales, Assets, EBIT ratios for
companies, same industries as conglom segs - Used median comp ratio to value segments of
conglomerate - Summed to calc imputed value of conglom
6Berger and Ofek, contd.
- Calculated ratio of market value of conglom to
imputed value - Average 13-15 value discount for congloms
relative to single-segment competitors - Value loss greater when segments not in same
2-digit SIC code - Value loss related to overinvestment relative to
peers and cross subsidization
7Divisional managers incentives
- Incentives of management may be enhanced with
stock, options, SARs, etc. - In diversified firm, often dont have divisional
stock (carve outs and target shares are rare) - Conglomerate stock may not set up appropriate
payoff for risk taking
8Stock market explanations
- Market cannot understand multi-division firm and
attach a correct multiple to its earnings or cash
flow - RJR/Nabisco, Phillip Morris/Kraft argument
- Companies dont allocate analysts from each
market segment to study conglomerate firm
9Papers on Conglomerate Discount
- Berger, Philip and Eli Ofek (1995).
Diversifications Effect on Firm Value, Journal
of Financial Economics. - Berger, Philip and Eli Ofek (1996). Bustup
Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms,
Journal of Finance. - Comment, Robert and Gregg Jarrell (1995).
Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal of
Financial Economics. - Jensen, Michael (1986) The Agency Costs of Free
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
American Economic Review. - Stein, Jeremy. (1997) Internal Capital Markets
and the Competition for Corporate Resources,
Journal of Finance. - Williamson, Oliver (1975). Markets and
Hierarchies, Free Press.