Conglomerate discount

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Conglomerate discount

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Estimated conglomerate discount. Took sample of conglomerate firms (segments in different 4-digit ... Used median comp ratio to value segments of conglomerate ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Conglomerate discount


1
Conglomerate discount
  • Corporate Restructuring
  • Tim Thompson

2
Arguments based on fundamentals
  • Conglomerates are good
  • Williamson (1975), with superior inside
    information, diversified firms can allocate
    capital better than the market
  • Stein (1997), can fund winners and abandon losers
    more efficiently than market, agency costs
    mgr/shareholder

3
Conglomerates are bad
  • Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1990)
  • Look at bidder returns to announcements of
    acquisitions
  • Bad past performing managers incur larger
    negative abnormal returns at the announcement of
    acquisitions, relative to good performers
  • Avg bidder return in related acquisition is
    positive, avg bidder return in unrelated
    acquisition is negative, stat. insig, but seems
    signif in 1980s

4
Conglomerates are bad, contd.
  • Jensen (1988), agency costs of free cash flow
    argument for forming conglomerates
  • Comment and Jarrell (1995)
  • Herfindahl index of focus
  • Increasing focus correlated with abnormal
    positive stock returns
  • diversified firms dont have more debt, dont
    rely less on cap mkt and are targets more often

5
Berger and Ofek
  • Estimated conglomerate discount
  • Took sample of conglomerate firms (segments in
    different 4-digit SIC codes)
  • Calced Value to Sales, Assets, EBIT ratios for
    companies, same industries as conglom segs
  • Used median comp ratio to value segments of
    conglomerate
  • Summed to calc imputed value of conglom

6
Berger and Ofek, contd.
  • Calculated ratio of market value of conglom to
    imputed value
  • Average 13-15 value discount for congloms
    relative to single-segment competitors
  • Value loss greater when segments not in same
    2-digit SIC code
  • Value loss related to overinvestment relative to
    peers and cross subsidization

7
Divisional managers incentives
  • Incentives of management may be enhanced with
    stock, options, SARs, etc.
  • In diversified firm, often dont have divisional
    stock (carve outs and target shares are rare)
  • Conglomerate stock may not set up appropriate
    payoff for risk taking

8
Stock market explanations
  • Market cannot understand multi-division firm and
    attach a correct multiple to its earnings or cash
    flow
  • RJR/Nabisco, Phillip Morris/Kraft argument
  • Companies dont allocate analysts from each
    market segment to study conglomerate firm

9
Papers on Conglomerate Discount
  • Berger, Philip and Eli Ofek (1995).
    Diversifications Effect on Firm Value, Journal
    of Financial Economics.
  • Berger, Philip and Eli Ofek (1996). Bustup
    Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms,
    Journal of Finance.
  • Comment, Robert and Gregg Jarrell (1995).
    Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal of
    Financial Economics.
  • Jensen, Michael (1986) The Agency Costs of Free
    Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
    American Economic Review.
  • Stein, Jeremy. (1997) Internal Capital Markets
    and the Competition for Corporate Resources,
    Journal of Finance.
  • Williamson, Oliver (1975). Markets and
    Hierarchies, Free Press.
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