Title: Mud slides & earthquakes in California. When catastrophe
1The Psychology of Avoiding Disaster Readiness
Disasters
- Robin Dillon-Merrill
- Catherine H. Tinsley
- The McDonough School of Business
- Georgetown University
2Precursors to Catastrophes
- People are confronted by the same threats year
after year - Hurricanes along the Southeastern coast
- Floods and tornados in the Midwest
- Wildfires in the West
- Mud slides earthquakes in California
- When catastrophes occur that were preceded by
near miss events, the question becomes - Were near miss events ignored?
3Anecdotal Evidence
- Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi hurricane
fatigue - He feared that his constituents were not
evacuating in response to the Katrina threat
because they had successfully weathered earlier
storms. - A former FEMA official described an agency that
was responding to business as usual - (i.e., treating Katrina like past hurricanes)
- Individual statements I survived Camille my
house is sturdy I am staying put - Organizational decision making This is how we
have responded to hurricane warnings in the
past. 1 - Quotes from The Washington Post, September 11,
2005 pp. A6-A7
4Gap in Current Disaster Research
- Research has shown that the level of preparedness
is significantly linked to personal experience
with disasters - (Lindell and Perry, 2000, Wenger, 1980, and
Dooley, et al., 1992). - But these experiences can either lead to greater
awareness and preparedness or to greater
complacency and fatalism offering no conclusions
as to why the variation exists - (Tierney, Lindell, and Perry, 2001, Jackson,
1981, and Mileti and OBrien, 1992),. - It is precisely their interpretations of the
outcomes of prior disasters and why these
outcomes unfolded that will influence their
subsequent perceptions of, and preparations for,
future disaster events - (Lindell and Perry, 1992).
5Opportunities for New Orleans to have Learned
Prior to Katrina
- Hurricane Ivan
- 2004 cat 4-5 (140-155 mph winds)
- Predicted 25 chance stay on direct track to New
Orleans (actual landfall in Mobile Bay, Alabama
2am Sept. 16) - By noon Sept. 15 (when storm turned) estimated
600,000 out of 1.2 million evacuated New Orleans - 2/3 of non-evacuees (with means to evacuate)
didnt evacuate because they felt safe in their
homes. Others were discouraged by negative
experiences with past evacuations - 120,000 NO residents did not have cars
- Superdome was used to shelter non-evacuees
6Opportunities for New Orleans to have Learned
Prior to Katrina
- Hurricane Pam Simulation conducted July 2004
- 8 day table-top exercise with over 250 officials
participating - Assumed 120 mph (cat 3) slow moving storm
- Assumed more than 1 million evacuated
- Recognized that the levees would be overtopped
- Recognized the need to rely on state resources
for shelters for 3-5 days - Focused recommendations for managing the
aftermath of the catastrophe (i.e., search
rescue, debris removal, etc.) rather than for
minimizing the magnitude of the catastrophe
(i.e., improving evacuation and sheltering
strategies remained open issues) - A second exercise in summer of 2005 didnt take
place because of lack of funding
7Precursors Influence
- Decision Makers attend to near-misses
- Near-miss information is incorporated into
decision calculus - Near-misses will systematically bias decision
making - Towards more risk
- Near-misses can be evidence of a systems
vulnerability or of a systems resilience - Resilience gt Vulnerability
- Good Fortune is Discounted
8What is a Near-Miss?
- Near-miss
- An event that has some probability of a negative
(even fatal) outcome and some probability of a
positive (safe) outcome, and the actual outcome
is non-hazardous - A success that could have been a failure except
for good luck
9What is a Near-Miss?
Definitions Lx lt CMIN Success Cx gt LMAX
Success CMIN lt Lx lt LMAX AND Lx gt Cx
Hit CMIN lt Lx lt LMAX AND Lx lt Cx
Near-miss Examples L1 lt CMIN SUCCESS C3 gt
LMAX SUCCESS L3 gt C1 HIT L2 lt C2
NEAR-MISS L2 lt C1 NEAR-MISS L3 lt C2 NEAR-MISS
NEAR MISS Or HIT
SUCCESS
SUCCESS
C2
L2
L3
L1
C1
C3
LMAX
CMIN
10First Studies
- Simulation of a Mars Rover mission
- Limited battery life (8 days)
- 5 travel days to destination
- Rewarded 5 extra dollars for each battery day
extra - Weather forecast for each day
- Mild weather or 95 chance of severe storm
- Severe dust storms can cause catastrophic failure
- 40 catastrophic failure if drive through severe
storm - 100 safe if stop deploy wheel guards
- Operational decisions (stop/ go) for day 6-13
- Decide to drive or stop deploy wheel guards
- Manipulation check, risk propensity, and
engagement
11Manipulation
- Near-Miss
- Of 5 days before you started operating the rover,
had 3 days of severe storms and rover had driven
successfully through these - Of 5 days before you started operating the rover,
all mild weather
12Results-- NASA
13Results-- Students
14Results Experiment 2 Those who USED probability
information
15Results Experiment 2 Those who did NOT use
probability information
16Second Studies
- Given biases exist, how does that influence how
managers are evaluated within an organization? - Failures and successes are attributed to poor
decision making - Is there another variable?
- Loma Prieta 1989 (Friday afternoon rush hour)
- Northridge 1994 (430 am on a holiday)
- If all outcomes are a function of decision
quality and luck, how do we evaluate others
decision processes?
17Biases in Decision making
- Outcome Bias (Baron Hershey, 1988, Allison, et
al., 1996) - The outcome systematically influences peoples
evaluations of the quality of the decision making - Hindsight bias (Fischoff, 1982)
- Anchor on outcomes
- Exaggerate what could have been anticipated at
time of decision - Misremember ones own predictions to be
consistent with now-known outcomes - Suggest we will anchor on outcomes
18Hypothesis 1
- H1a Managers whose decisions result in a miss
(organizational success) will have their decision
making evaluated in a significantly more
favorable light than managers whose decisions
result in a hit (organizational failure) - H1b Managers whose decisions result in a miss
(organizational success) will be judged to be
more competent, to be more intelligent, to have
more leadership ability, and to be more
promotable than managers whose decisions result
in a hit (organizational failure)
19What happens with near-misses?
- Recall that a near miss is both
- Evidence of a systems resilience
- Evidence of a systems vulnerability
- And what if we know the outcome was derived, in
part, from good luck? - Prospect theory reference points
- Norm theory
- Immutable features give you class of events to
categorize something - Mutable features (easily imagined as different)
give you contrast events - What is easily imagined mutable feature?
- Failure
- Thus near miss miss and near miss contrasted
with failure - Suggests near-misses more likely to be coded as
successes than as failures - Suggests we will discount others good luck
20Hypothesis 2
- H2a Managers whose decisions result in a
near-miss will have their decision making
evaluated more favorably than managers whose
decisions result in a hit and judged less
favorably than managers whose decisions result in
a miss. -
- H2b Managers whose decisions result in a
near-miss will be judged more competent, more
intelligent, to have more leadership ability, and
to be more promotable than managers whose
decisions result in a hit and judged less
competent, less intelligent, to have less
leadership ability, and to be less promotable
than managers whose decisions result in a miss.
21Hypothesis 3
- H3 Managers whose decisions result in a
near-miss will be judged closer to those whose
decisions ended in a miss than to those whose
decisions ended in a hit.
22Method
- Case study loosely based on development details
from past unmanned NASA missions - Development problems
- Challenges interacting across NASA development
centers - A skipped peer review
- Mission not delayed over a last-minute
potentially fatal problem (considered highly
unlikely) - Three different outcomes
- Success Launch and deployment successful (no
problem shortly after launch) - Failure Problem shortly after launch, because of
spacecrafts orientation to sun, problem is
catastrophic - Near-miss Problem shortly after launch, because
of spacecrafts orientation to sun, not a
problem, data collection is successful
23Participants
- 89 undergraduate students
- 98 MBA students
- 24 NASA managers
24Sample Differences
- In general, NASA managers tended to be a bit
easier on Chris - Rated decision to launch higher (plt.05)
- NASA mean 3.7, MBA mean 3.4, UG mean 3.0
- Were marginally more likely to promote Chris
(p.1) - NASA mean 3.8, MBA mean 3.3, UG mean 3.3
- Were significantly less likely to fire Chris
(plt.001) - NASA mean 3.0, MBA mean 4.2, UG mean 4.3
- No significant interaction effects between sample
and condition
25ALL PARTICIPANTS
Competence
Decision to proceed without peer review
2 (very bad)
2 (not at all)
4 (neutral)
3
4 (somewhat)
5
3
5
6 (greatly)
6 (very good)
plt0.001
plt0.001
Intelligence
Decision to launch without redesign
2 (not at all)
3
4 (somewhat)
5
2 (very bad)
6 (greatly)
3
4 (neutral)
6 (very good)
5
plt0.05
plt0.001
Decision making ability
Decision to promote
2 (not at all)
2 (very bad)
plt0.01
3
5
4 (somewhat)
4 (neutral)
6 (greatly)
6 (very good)
3
5
plt0.001
plt0.001
Leadership ability
Decision to fire
2 (very bad)
6 (very good)
4 (neutral)
3
2 (not at all)
6 (greatly)
3
5
5
4 (somewhat)
plt0.001
p.11
- Failure
- Near-miss
- Success
26Summary
- Rated managers whose decisions resulted in
organizational success significantly more
favorably than mangers whose decisions resulted
in failures - Rated mangers whose decisions, BUT FOR LUCK,
would have resulted in failures more favorably
than those whose decisions resulted in failure - Did not hold managers accountable for faulty
decision making if results in good organizational
outcome, EVEN WHEN SUCCESS IS BECAUSE OF LUCK
27Implications for organizations
- Near-misses categorized as misses rather than
hits, meaning organizations fail to take
advantage of learning opportunities - Generally lack the formal failure investigation
board - Near-miss bias may make organizations more risky
- May explain the normalization of deviance
(Vaughan, 1996) Without obvious failures, events
that once caused concern become accepted as
normal occurrences. - If those experiencing near-misses are promoted
through organizational ranks, given they make
more risky subsequent decisions, organizations
will come to embrace more and more risk.
28What to do about all this?
- Knowledge and recognition that biases exist
- Hindsight, Outcome, and Near-Miss Bias
- Decisions do have a luck component
- Developing an Effective Lessons Learned System
- Effectiveness of Lessons Learned systems are
dependent on completeness of data - A complete data set requires noticing both
failures and successes and being able to
distinguish near-misses - How can you increase chances of acknowledging
both successes and failures - Improve group decision making groupthink,
escalation, abilene
29Avoiding Groupthink
- Monitor team size (lt10)
- Provide face-saving mechanism for dissent and
changing ones mind - Dont be a bystander because fearful of appearing
foolish (evaluation apprehension) - Discuss risks before benefits
- Discuss how things might have failed
- Encourage track alternative viewpoints
- Get external observers
30Avoiding Escalation
- All advice for avoiding groupthink, plus
- Set resource limits up front
- Recognize sunk costs
31Avoiding Abilene Paradox
- All advice for avoiding groupthink, plus
- Generate solution alternatives without evaluation
(brainstorming) - Conduct a private vote (Delphi)
- Create norms for expression of controversial
views (rotating devils advocate)
32Future Work
- Determine what factors may help mitigate a
near-miss bias - Determine what effect the accumulation of the
near-miss bias may have as an inhibitor to
organizational learning