FUTURE TRENDS IN EXPORT CONTROLS US

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FUTURE TRENDS IN EXPORT CONTROLS -- US

• David Hamon
• Analytic Services (ANSER), Inc
• david.hamon_at_anser.org
• www.anser.org

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The views contained herein are personaland not
those of ANSER Inc. or its clients
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ChallengesSuppliers and Control

• Circumvention strategies (new ways to beat the
  system e.g. KHAN)
• Structural limitations of regimes (bureaucratic,
  how to control people know how, control lists
  limits)
• Process weakness of regimes (consensus, weak end
  user verification, information sharing across
  regimes)
• National Implementation (laws and commitment,
  weak regulatory structure

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ChallengesSuppliers and Control2

• Technology change and globalization
• Industry and academic attitudes
• Politics (internal affairs vs. common good
  north-south differences on impact)
• Control of raw materials

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Background

• Threat from extremist groups and WMD
  proliferation
• Looking ahead means looking back
• Was higher fences around fewer things
• Now No tolerance for risk, maintain
  ability/option to break things, kill bad guys
  whenever and where ever necessary
• Transition from regulatory, compliance and law
  enforcement emphasis to military and
  intelligencethese are new drivers
• Focus on competing interests, groups
• Not always understood by other governments,
  analysts, public
• Observe and note their behavior
• Not always clear what the agendas are

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Background2

• 110th Congress
• While unknown will exert political influence
• Will possibly define new security policy
  initiatives through new legislation
• Exercise power through the authorization and
  appropriation processes
• Changes likely
• International regimes
• Coalitions
• Greater oversight and auditory functions

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The polar star that should guide all
our export control decisions in a world at war
must be national securityAssistant Secretary
of State John Hillen
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Policy and Operational Actions

• Strengthen international controls
• Who is the enemy?
• Emphasize intersection of economy, technology,
  and securitywork harder at adapting to changes
  in technology
• Possible Regime consolidation?
• Bring more countries under international
  standards
• Ensure defense cooperation and alliance
  interoperability
• More allies get access to more defense articles
  faster

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Policy and Operational Actions2

• Maintain the Global Defense Industrial Base (once
  was US Industrial base)
• AIA promoting new legislation next year
• Improve tracking speed
• Efficiency, predictability
• Bring in non-traditional partners
• Lower the Congressional notification threshold
• What to do about illicit networks
• Issue worried about more AQ Khans, esp. bio
• Impact more intelligence assets devoted to
  surveillance
• Focus on hidden proliferation pathways and
  criminal orgs.
• What to do about intangible transfers?
• Issue control the export and re-export of
  technical data traveling over networks
• Impact Expect a new initiative on this

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Policy and Operational Actions3

• End User Monitoring
• In 2005 45 of export license applications the
  user could not be confirmedexpand data basesi
• Defense pressure to strengthen EUM
• Build more government to government program
• Vet transfers prior to saletrack transfers
  afterwards

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Wild Cards

• Rare earth critical commodities
• Issue mining, transfer and trade of critical raw
  materials essential to the manufacture of things
  vital to national security
• Impact Future initiative?
• Manage flow of knowledge and information
• Issues no clear boundaries between military and
  commercial research esp.bio. Also tension
  between universities and government over control
  of the spread and accumulation of knowledge,
  scholars
• Driving universities out of the Government RD
  business
• Commercial Supply Chain
• Growing recognition on the part of firms they
  have responsibilities in export controls