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Discussion of Bilateral Implicit Taxes and AntiCompetitive Banking Regulation

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Robust empirical relation between interest rates on home mortgages and: ... Adding theories from economics could help us determine if these effects are the same ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Discussion of Bilateral Implicit Taxes and AntiCompetitive Banking Regulation


1
Discussion of Bilateral Implicit Taxes and
Anti-Competitive Banking Regulation
  • David A. Guenther
  • 2008 JATA Conference
  • February 22, 2008

2
Dave? and Terry's? state tax benefits
Terry Shevlin's state tax benefit (0) ?
Dave Guenther's state tax benefit (9) ?
3
Paper looks at two tax-related issues
  • To what extent are lenders able to capture the
    benefits of borrowers' tax deductions in the form
    of higher interest rates? (does Dave pay more
    than Terry?)
  • To what extent are lenders' tax costs (state
    income taxes) passed on to borrowers in the form
    of higher interest rates? (does Dave pay more
    than Terry?)
  • Both of these effects are discussed as "implicit
    taxes"
  • How has more banking competition changed these
    results?

4
Main results
  • Robust empirical relation between interest rates
    on home mortgages and
  • banks' state effective tax rates
  • borrowers' state-specific tax benefits for home
    mortgage interest deduction
  • Result is significantly less after legislation
    allows interstate competition among banks
  • Impressive set of robustness tests!

5
Link between theory and paper's results
  • Result intriguing, but I wanted to know
  • Are these two effects really part of the same
    underlying phenomenon?
  • What theory would explain them?
  • Are they implicit taxes?

6
Is this one effect or two?
  • Incidence of corporate tax if demand is
    inelastic, firms can pass on corporate tax to
    customers in the form of higher price
  • Lenders capturing borrowers tax benefits how is
    this different from simple supply and demand? If
    borrowers' cost of something decreases, won't
    borrowers demand more, pushing up price?
  • Adding theories from economics could help us
    determine if these effects are the same

7
Are both (or either) of these implicit taxes?
  • "We use the term implicit taxes to mean the
    variations in the prices of goods and services
    resulting from the taxes on a transaction being
    levied on one or another party to that
    transaction." (p. 1)
  • "This is consistent with several papers, such as
    Maydew (2001, p. 396), who states, broadly, '
    "implicit taxes" was popularized by Scholes and
    Wolfson to describe the phenomenon where tax
    favored assets bear lower pretax returns than tax
    disfavored assets.' " (p. 1)

8
Theory of tax incidence
  • Competitive markets if demand is inelastic,
    corporate income tax can be shifted to customers
    through higher prices
  • Monopoly corporate income tax has no effect on
    pricesmonopolist is already maximizing pre-tax
    profits
  • Oligopoly ???

9
Is pre-1994 banking an oligopoly?
  • "We use the term 'contracting power' to stand for
    ... oligopolistic market structure." (p 2)
  • "... how the resultant oligopolistic contracting
    power enables banks to favorably shift taxes
    between themselves and the parties they contract
    with." (p 5)
  • "consistent with the remaining banking regulation
    being significantly anticompetitive and with
    banks operating in a naturally oligopolistic
    market." (p 33)
  • (italics added)

10
Tax incidence in oligopolies
  • "Unfortunately, there is no well developed theory
    of tax incidence in oligopoly. The reason for
    this embarrassing fact is simple Incidence
    depends primarily on how relative prices change
    when taxes are imposed, but there is no generally
    accepted theory of oligopolistic price
    determination."
  • Rosen, Harvey S. (2002). Public Finance. Sixth
    edition. New York McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
  • "There is no definitive model of oligopolistic
    behavior, however, and different stories can have
    quite different implications for tax shifting.
    The tendency has been to ignore oligopoly on the
    grounds that 'anything can happen.' "
  • Michael L. Katz and Harvey S. Rosen, "Tax
    Analysis in an Oligopoly Model," Public Finance
    Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1 (1985), pp. 3-20.

11
Additional points
  • Not clear why shifting of taxes changes with out
    of state bankingisn't mortgage interest income
    taxable to out of state banks?
  • If oligopolistic tax shifting, why do interest
    rates go down when state corporate tax rates
    decrease?
  • Is there any empirical evidence in the economics
    literature on supply and demand curves for
    mortgages?
  • Econometric tests aren't there just 50
    independent observations?

12
Conclusion
  • A well-crafted empirical study with robust
    results
  • My opinion
  • the paper demonstrates two separate effects
    rather than two parts of a single effect
  • the paper's contribution could be strengthened by
    adding a discussion of economic theories about
    how oligopolies (1) set prices and (2) shift
    taxes to customers
  • Is it really necessary to expand the definition
    of implicit taxes?
  • Can the paper use differences in state income tax
    rates to explain why Terry gets paid more than I
    do?
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