DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS IN EUROPEAN CUP COMPETITIONS

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DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS IN EUROPEAN CUP
COMPETITIONS
Dr Peter Dawson University of Bath, UK
IASE 10th Annual Conference, Gijon, Spain. 9-10
May 2008.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of studies have investigated the
behaviour of agents in sporting contests.

• Managerial and coaching decision-making (Clement
  and McCormick, 1989)
• Strategic behaviour of penalty-takers and
  goalkeepers (Palacios-Huerta, 2003)

• Another important relationship is between players
  and match officials (referees).
• In football, as indeed in most sports, referees
  are assigned the task of implementing the laws of
  the game and ensuring that players abide by its
  regulations.
• Evidence based on match analysis from the
  European Championship of 2000 suggests that a top
  official would make an average 137 observable
  interventions during any one game.

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INTRODUCTION
The performance of players and the actions taken
by referees can have an important bearing on the
outcome of individual contests and the course of
a season. Player transgressions that result in
red cards have been found to influence match
outcomes (Ritter et al. 1994). A yellow card,
which is often issued for a lesser offence, can
influence subsequent decision-making made by that
player for the reminder of the match. Consequentl
y, and if we assume players rationality, players
will commit major transgressions such as
professional fouls either if the probability of
detection is low and / the player believes the
foul will benefit the team.
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OUTLINE

• Previous Literature
• Data
• Modelling Disciplinary Sanctions
• Empirical Results

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PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Recent academic literature, which has focused on
domestic leagues in a number of major European
football leagues, has found evidence to suggest
match officials are inconsistent in their
decision-making both in terms of the
distribution of disciplinary sanctions and time
added-on at the end of contests. Some
examples Disciplinary Sanctions Buraimo et al.
(2007) English Premier League and German 1st
Bundesliga. Dawson et al. (2007) English
Premier League. Downward and Jones (2007)
English FA Cup matches. Time Added-On Dohmen
(2005), Sutter and Kocher (2004) German 1st
Bundesliga. Garciano et al. (2005) Spanish
league Scoppa (2007) Italian league
Main finding referee decision-making is biased.
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CONTRIBUTION OF PRESENT STUDY

• This study looks at disciplinary sanctions in
  the context of European
• cup competitions at club level (UEFA Cup and
  Champions League).
• - Comparison of elimination tournaments
• - Ability to identify possible nationality
  effects (evidence from
• subjectively judged sports indicates this is
  important determinant
• of decision-making)
• Very much a work in progress (comments /
  suggestions welcome!)

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DATA

• Match based data provided by UEFA
• Full dataset includes over 13,000 observations
  over the period 1971-2007
• Sub-set of observations used in this study
  2002-03 to 2006-07
• n 1720
• - Champions League
• - UEFA Cup

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DATA
Cross-Tabulation of Yellow Cards Issued to Home
and Away Teams (by Competition)
Note Main figures Champions League data, figures
in parentheses UEFA Cup data
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DATA
Cross-Tabulation of Red Cards Issued to Home and
Away Teams (by Competition)
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MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

• A number of different modelling approaches have
  been used in the literature
• Univariate OLS and Poisson (Witt, 2005)
• Bivariate Poisson and Negative Binomial Models
  (Dawson et al., 2007)
• Bivariate Probit Models (Buraimo et al., 2007)
• It is also possible to model count data by
  discrete choice methods that
• recognise the sequential nature of the data
  (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
• One such candidate is the ordered probit model

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MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
The dependent variable is constructed as the
total number of disciplinary points incurred by
the home team and away team in each match. One
point awarded for each yellow card and two points
for a red card. The dependent variables in the
home and away equations are then re-coded as
follows
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MODELLING DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS

• The average number of disciplinary points
  awarded to both home and
• away teams in the Champions League is lower
  compared to the UEFA Cup.
• A strong home team (relative to the away team)
  incurs less disciplinary points.
• Home teams from the big five leagues incur
  less disciplinary points.
• Contests which involve both teams from big
  five leagues generate more
• disciplinary points.
• The presence of a running track has the effect
  of increasing the number of
• disciplinary points issued to the home team.
• The number of disciplinary points awarded to the
  away team is higher the
• fuller the stadium.
• Elite referees issue more disciplinary points to
  the home team.

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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Referee Nationality Effects
Difficult to establish the precise interplay
between referee nationality, team nationality and
reputation
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Consistent with previous studies we find that
referees do issue more cards to the away
team. This is partly a reflection of the home
advantage and the difference in quality of the
two teams competing. However stadium specific
characteristics are also important. Furthermore
there are significant differences across the two
competitions analysed in this study. Given the
apparent variation in referee behaviour across
nationalities further work should explore why
such variation occurs. For example to what
extent does reputation of teams / nations matter?
Are referees with more experience less biased?
Are there important differences between the
decision-making of referees in domestic
competitions compared to European competitions?