Title: LVNL Safety Criteria Reaction to SRC findings
1LVNL Safety Criteria - Reaction to SRC findings -
2Issue 1Risk allocation to Aircraft systems and
Aircraft Operations
- The philosophy is that LVNL is responsible for
the design of its operations within the
ATM-related risk budget - This corresponds with JAR 25 aircraft systems
related risk budget - Risk allocations to the aircraft systems and
aircraft operations domains, including ATM as a
causal factor, should be organised on initiative
of the national regulator
3Issue 2Scope of TLS
- LVNL recalculated the TLS because the defined
scope is different than as described by SRC - Starts from the type of accident, rather than the
cause - To ensure robustness of the ATM operation,
irrespective of the accident cause (ATC, pilots,
aircraft systems) - To recognise that most accidents are preceded by
a chain of events (bow-tie principle) - To recognise human operator errors due to poor
system design or organisational shortcomings
Examples
4Issue 3Derivation of TLS
- The scope of the LVNL TLS is
- ATM-related
- accidents (ICAO definition)
- Derivation based on national experience was not
considered feasible because of insufficient data - Analysis shows a reasonably consistent
ATM-related accident risk rate for different
world regions - This rate is the basis for the LVNL TLS
- Transparency of ESARR 4 TLS
5Issue 4Incorporation of traffic growth
- Objective is to ensure that the number of
accidents per year does not increase - It is recognised that only significant traffic
growth affects the target safety level - LVNL already incorporates an ambition factor in
the TLS - At the time of definition of the LVNL TLS,
traffic growth was considered neither obvious nor
reasonably accurately to predict - Effect of traffic growth is incorporated through
reviews
6Issue 5Proportional distribution of ATM-related
risk
- Number of ATM-related accidents worldwide is not
sufficient to derive a distribution that is
statistically significant - Alternatively a proportional distribution is
assumed, corresponding to JAR 25 - Most critical ATM sub-products are assessed
first. - As a result proportional distribution rather
leads to a conservative safety target
7Issue 6ambition/negligible factors versus
ALARP principle
- LVNL recognised the need to define an ALARP
region instead of a single TLS - to allow application of Safety Management
Principles - to enable decision-making
- Practicability of ambition and negligible
factors must be shown by experience
8Converging approaches outside UDP
Sticking mike
No direct ATM contribution
9Crossing of active runway
Erroneous crossing instruction
Direct ATM contribution
10Crossing of active runway
Crossing without instruction
No direct ATM contribution
11Oceanic track system
Deviation from oceanic track
No direct ATM contribution
12Controlled flight into terrain
Excursion from assigned route in mountainous
terrain
No direct ATM contribution
13Controlled flight into terrain
Incorrect QNH
Direct ATM contribution
14Scope LVNL Safety Criteria
CFIT
UFIT
Collision
Outcome
Recovery
Detection
Occurrence
ATM event
Flight Ops event
A/c systems event
15Scope ESARR 4
Collision
CFIT
UFIT
Outcome
Recovery
Detection
Occurrence
ATM event
Flight Ops event
A/c systems event