SHAPING SHIP SAFETY: THE FACE OF THE FUTURE

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Project POPC (Pollution Prevention Control) A
Rational Risk Based Approach For Design And
Operation Of Tankers
By Dr Seref AKSU Department of Naval Architecture
Marine Engineering, Universities of Glasgow
and Strathclyde
International Workshop on Marine Pollution
Control, Athens , 9 June 2006
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Presentation Outline

• Background
• Project Pollution Prevention and Control
• Objectives
• Technical Work Areas
• Some findings / Expected Outcomes /
  Dissemination Activities
• Concluding Remarks

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Background to Tanker Safety
Stricter International Regulations enacted in the
early 90s, improved the tanker industry safety
record but societal concern is ever
present. Despite these efforts, tanker accidents
continue to occur Erika and Prestige incidents
have had major political, social and economical
implications. As a result, new accelerated
phase-out of single hull tankers was
introduced. Despite the political and economic
importance of these issues, some of the relevant
new regulation still tends to be made before
incidents have been properly investigated. A
proper risk analysis may determine which types of
oil tanker pose the highest pollution risk, the
relative safety of new tanker designs, or the
most appropriate response to an evolving oil
pollution incident.
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Pollution Prevention and Control - POPC Project

• FP6 - Strategic Targeted Research Project
  (STREP)
• Start date January 2004
• Duration 3 years
• Total Budget 2.2 mEuros
• Consortium consists of
• 4 Universities
• 5 Research Institutions
• 2 Classification Societies
• 2 Ship yards
• 2 Ship Operators, and
• IMO (External)

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Consortium Partners

• Participant name Short name Country
• INTERTANKO INTERTANKO Norway, UK
• University of Strathclyde NAME-SSRC UK
• Bureau Veritas BV France
• Sirehna SIREHNA France
• Center of Maritime Technologies CMT Germany
• National Tech. Univ. of Athens NTUA Greece
• Gdynia Shipyard GDY Poland
• Maritime Simulation Rotterdam MSR Netherlands
• Lloyds Register lloyds Register UK
• Navantia NAV Spain
• SSPA Sweden AB SSPA Sweden
• Istanbul Technical University ITU Turkey
• Herbert Software Solutions - EU HSSE UK
• Souter Shipping (OSG) OSG UK
• Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne UNEW UK

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POPC Objectives

• To develop a risk-based methodology to assess the
  oil spill potential of tankers
• To develop a risk-based passive pollution
  prevention methodology (design and operational
  lines of defence)
• To develop a risk-based active post-accident
  pollution mitigation and control framework

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POPC
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POPC Focus of Application

• To demonstrate the developed methodology, POPC
  consortium agreed to consider AFRAMAX class of
  tankers.
• However the methodology is applicable to any type
  or size of tanker.
• Therefore, the foregoing discussion will be
  specific to AFRAMAX class of tankers.

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Hazard Identification and Ranking

• Objective
• To identify hazards such as grounding and
  collision, fire and explosion, structural failure
  with potential to lead to vessels loss of
  watertight integrity and consequently to
  pollution and environmental damage.

• Compilation and analysis of tanker accidents
  database
• Identification and selection of method(s)
  suitable for the hazards identification and
  ranking (techniques such as tabular HAZID, FT/ET
  analysis, and networks will be considered).
• Identification and ranking of relevant hazards
• Selection of critical scenarios

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Outcomes of HAZID Analysis

• An AFRAMAX tanker incidents database was compiled
  and a comprehensive analysis was performed.
• Historical Data Analysis yielded that most
  important Hazards for Tankers are
• Collisions, Contact, Grounding,
• Fire, Explosions, and Non-accidental Structural
  failure
• A method utilising both Fault Trees and Event
  Trees was chosen. Fault Trees and Event Trees
  were developed for these Hazards
• FTs and ETs were populated based on historical
  data analysis and expert judgment

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Example-Grounding Fault Tree
Example-Grounding Event Tree
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Loss of Damage Stability

• Objective
• To assess the survivability performance of a
  tanker following breach of watertight integrity
  of the hull from damage stability and sinkage
  points of view.

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Specific Work Performed/Required

• Existing probabilistic survivability assessment
  models were evaluated for tanker ships
• Damage extents for Non-accidental structural
  failure, Fire, and Explosions were developed.
• Population of AFRAMAX tanker fleet configurations
  were identified
• A survivability index (Attained Index of
  Subdivision - A) is determined for the critical
  scenarios identified in Hazard Identification and
  Ranking study
• Index A is calibrated against the derived
  historical risk

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Example Damage Scenario
Figure Damage to transverse bulkhead between
tanks 2 and 3
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Sample Calculations
Probability of Survival after damage
Oil outflow capacity
Aframax Tanker Configuration Data
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Structural Reliability

• Objective
• To determine the probability that the hull
  structural integrity will be lost in the event of
  the watertight integrity of the hull being
  breached.

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Specific Work Areas of Structural Integrity

• Development of specific scenarios for loss of
  structural integrity
• Collision Analysis of single hull and double hull
  tankers
• Residual strength analysis using non-linear FE,
• Development of simplified model to account for
  damage ship structural strength
• Assessment of residual structural strength for
  critical damage scenarios

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Collision Analysis
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Collision Damage Locations/ Collision Angles
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Single Venture - Double Venture Comparison
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Single Venture - Double Venture Comparison
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Single Venture - Double Venture Comparison
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Damage Extent- Marpol (mostly single hull tankers)

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Damage Extent- Derived for double hull tankers
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Overall Passive Pollution Risk

• Objective
• To determine an overall risk index through
• Determining consequences of oil outflow, loss of
  vessel and loss of lives /injuries (and other
  pertinent costs) in the form of an Index
• Developing risk acceptance criteria for each risk
  element or the combined risk
• Developing a Risk-Based Design and Assessment
  Methodology

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RISK
Risk Frequency of Occurrence x Consequence
Frequencies of main Hazards
icollision, contact, grounding, fire,
explosions, structural failure.
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Pollution Prevention

• Objective
• To identify a risk reduction index (or reduction
  in frequency of events leading to major hazards)
  if active measures are taken to prevent oil
  spills through

- Identification of measures to reduce pollution
risk by prevention - Examination of scenarios
and developing counter measures - Identification
of generalised scenarios and counter measures.
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Pollution Mitigation and Control

• Objective
• To formulate a pollution mitigating and control
  framework capable to cover adequately oil spill
  incidents/accidents generated from maritime
  transport players, namely vessels (tankers)
  through

• identification, ranking and assessing a critical
  mass of RCOs and PCOs
• pinpoint on-board (and nearshore) procedures,
  processes, policies, guidelines, technologies,
  innovations and practices, along with human
  factor aspects
• post-accident pollution control activities, such
  as on-board confinement, safe refuge operations
• Risk reduction by reducing consequences

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RISK Reduction
?R ?(Pi) x ?Cj
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Recent Dissemination Activities
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Concluding Remarks

• The POPC project aims to improve the overall
  safety in transportation of hazardous goods
  through the development of a risk-based
  methodology that encompasses ship design and
  operation (passive and active safety).
• In this respect, the focus is twofold
• - Existing tankers to contain risk through
  identifying/evaluating cost-effective measures
  of pollution prevention/mitigation by active
  means.
• - New designs to approach design of new tankers
  rationally by integrating systematically risk
  analysis in the design process, addressing
  prevention/ reduction of pollution risk by
  passive and active means by a direct
  (first-principles) approach.