DeSecularisation

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De-Secularisation

• The Demographic Imperative

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Demography in History

• Populations are generally stable over the longue
  duree
• Periodic population changes through technology,
  disease and invasion
• Demography as Effect Technological advantage
  translates into expansion for some groups at
  others' expense through lower mortality (Europe)
  or military conquest (Europeans v. the rest
  Bantu v. Khoi San)
• Demography as Cause Role of demographic pressure
  in causing revolution (Goldstone) or innovation
  (Durkheim)
• Oft-cited role of demography in hastening decline
  of empires?

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The Demographic Transition

• From High Fertility/High Mortality to Low
  Fertility/Low Mortality
• UK Had slower fertility transition than France,
  had excess population growth for settlement which
  France did not. Geopolitical implications
• Second Demographic Transition permanently
  below-replacement fertility for 30 years in
  Europe and E Asia. Little movement beyond 1.5.
  Population decline
• Who will replace?
• Values rather than economic status is most
  strongly linked to fertility
• With mortality declining and state boundaries
  stable, could values fertility rather than
  technology now hold the key to group advantage?

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The Rise of Demography

• Demographic Transition Uneven
• Democracy, Equality, Liberty enhance demographic
  impact
• Ethnic differentials have political ramifications
  
• Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about religious
  makeover?

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Demography and Modernisation

• Modernisation urbanisation, education, wealth,
  secularisation
• Yet rural, uneducated, poor, religious have
  higher fertility
• Was not true before late 19th c. Something has
  changed
• Modernity must now move forward to stand still
• No one wants to be poor and uneducated, but
  religion has a much stronger hold
• Modernity can take a 'European/East Asian' or
  American route

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Religious Demography and Politics?

• Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts
  in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300
  A.D. (Stark)
• Mormon church same 40 percent growth in past
  century, widening fertility gap
• Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20th c. US
  ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12-point TFR
  advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election

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Secularisation and Religious Fertility

• "1. The publics of virtually all advanced
  industrial societies have been moving toward more
  secular orientations during the past fifty years.
  Nevertheless,
• 2. The world as a whole now has more people with
  traditional religious views than ever before--
  and they constitute a growing proportion of the
  world's population." (Inglehart Norris 2004)
• Which will dominate religious fertility or
  secularisation?

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Data

• Based on 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS, and 2004 ESS
• 10 Western European countries, in fixed
  proportions. 4 Scandinavian-Protestant, 4 mainly
  Catholic, 2 mixed
• EVS-ESS continuity on children and attendance only

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Focus on 6 Early Secularizing Societies

• 5 Protestant Countries France (Vanguard of
  secularization)
• Crosstab 'Raised Religious?' and 'Are You
  Religious?' questions (EVS 1991) to find
  apostates/converts
• Generate figures on apostasy/conversion by 5-year
  age group and sex for input into projection

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Projection

• Uses People 3.0 software
• Cohort Component Projection
• Using Base Populations of Religious and
  Nonreligious for 6 Countries from the survey data
• Religious-Secular Fertility Gap of 1.8 v. 1.6
• Late fertility Pattern, Standard Mortality
• 'Migration' for each 5-year age group is given by
  net apostasy/conversion figure derived from 1991
  crosstabulation

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Projections Under Fertility Convergence and
Re-Secularisation Scenarios
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The Role of Immigration

• Immigrants to Europe have higher religiosity and
  higher fertility
• Fertility behaviour trends toward host mean over
  the generations
• Religiosity seems to decline much more slowly
  esp. for Muslims
• Immigration from Islamic sources will provide an
  increasing component of W. Europe's Population

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• 'No Religion' will age due to decline in apostasy
  and low fertility
• Muslims will grow through immigration, fertility
  and religious retention
• Christians will stabilize due to higher
  fertility, female religiosity and declining
  apostasy

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Growth of European Islam

• Not 'Eurabia' as scaremongers suggest, but
• Austria assuming only 20k immigrants per year,
  projected to form 14-26 pc of population by 2051
  (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006)
• W. Europe will be 10-20 pc Muslim in 2050, up
  from 3 pc today
• Age structure and urban concentration
• Note that religious revival in Europe is both a
  Muslim and Christian phenomenon
• Political implications depends on nature of
  conservative political strategies

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Conclusion Secularisation

• In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries
  are secularising faster less religious (mainly
  Protestant) countries may have ceased to
  secularise
• Religious fertility and slowing of apostasy will
  lead to end of secularizing trend c. 2045-55 in
  Protestant western Europe even without
  immigration
• Immigration, especially of Muslims, will greatly
  hasten and enhance the onset of de-secularization

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Religiosity and Ideology, 1981-2000
R2 .071 N7534
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Political Implications

• An issue for the medium to longer term
• Religious are much more right-leaning
• Right-leaning voters vote for more conservative
  parties
• Religious conservatism (USA) vs Nationalist
  conservatism (Europe?)
• What of the future of Enlightenment modernity and
  the cultural project of modernism?

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Future Expand to Look at Middle East, South Asia
and USA
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IIASA, near Vienna
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Project Website

• http//www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html