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Overhead 191

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Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.' Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.) Overhead 19-3. Overhead 19-4 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Overhead 191


1
Crisis Characteristics
  • Threats to major values.
  • Time urgency.
  • Ambiguity or uncertainty.
  • Surprise or uniqueness.

Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Page 472.
2
CRISIS SITUATIONS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
  • Crisis situations are novel, unstructured and
    outside of an organizations or individuals
    typical operating framework
  • Crises require nonprogrammed decision responses
  • Crises are highly uncertain and complex
    situations
  • Crises are characterized by an overload of
    incomplete, conflicting information
  • The process of perceiving, selecting, and
    processing this information is critical to
    effective crisis management

Source Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing for the
Worst The Process of Effective Crisis
Management. Industrial and Environmental
Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118.
3
CRISIS ATTRIBUTES
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT (Source Reilly, A.H. 1993. Preparing
for the Worst The Process of Effective Crisis
Management. Industrial and Environmental
Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.)

PROBLEM SENSING
CRISIS OUTCOMES
EVENT PERCEPTION
PROBLEM/THREAT DIAGNOSIS
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
DECISION RESPONSE EXTERNAL INFORMATION FLOW
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION RESPONSE ACTIONS
INTERNAL INFORMATION FLOW
Overhead 19-3
Environment
4
The Three Rights of Information to Support Crisis
Decision Making
  • Get the right information
  • to the right people
  • at the right time.

5
Layered Functions
  • 5. Organizational Memory
  • 6. Group Processes
  • 4. Values
  • 3. Filtering
  • 2. Data Validation
  • 1. Connectivity

Source Hale, Joanne. 1997. A Layered
Communication Architecture for the Support of
Crisis Response. Journal of Management
Information Systems. Vol. 14, No. 1.
6
Tasks of the Crisis Decision Maker
  • Define the main elements of the situation
  • Maintain receptivity to new information
  • Identify and adequately consider the major
    values, interests, and objectives to be fulfilled
  • Search for and evaluate alternative courses of
    action
  • Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives
  • Search for new information relevant to assessment
    of options
  • Discriminate between relevant and irrelevant
    information
  • Consider problems that arise in implementing
    options
  • Assess the situation from the perspective of
    other parties
  • Resist both defensive procrastination and
    premature closure
  • Monitor feedback from the developing situation
  • Make adjustments to meet real changes in the
    environment

7
Characteristics of Defective Decision Making in
Crisis
  • A truncated time span, with major attention being
    devoted to the immediate and diminished attention
    to long-range consequences of the action
  • A perceived requirement for decisional closure,
    which may in turn lead to premature action or,
    conversely
  • In searching for certainty, a tendency to
    irrational procrastination
  • Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a
    fixed mind-set and not be open to new
    information
  • A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and
    uncertainty
  • A reduction of the range of options considered
  • In considering options, a tendency to bolster,
    - that is to upgrade factors in favor of the
    favored action prescription and downgrade factors
    militating against

Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Pages 475.
8
Characteristics of Defective Decision Making in
Crisis (Contd)
  • A tendency to view the present in terms of the
    past
  • A tendency to seek familiar patterns, to relate
    the critical events to mental schemata or
    scripts
  • Diminished creativity
  • A tendency toward the fundamental attribution
    bias to see the others actions as being
    precipitated by internal (psychological) causes
    rather than external circumstances (example my
    adversarys actions show he is malevolently out
    to destroy us, rather than that he is protecting
    himself from external threats) and
  • A corresponding tendency to fall into the
    actor-observer discrepancy that is, to see the
    external situation as the cause of ones own
    behavior without attending to ones own internal
    psychological motivations.

9
The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decision
Makers
Stress
Perception of threat to values
Impact on information processing
Choice of decision or policy
  • Stimulus situation

Anxiety or fear
Coping Pattern
Effects of stress on leadership
decision-making Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993.
The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy
Makers, in Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by
A. George. Boulder, CO Westview Press. Page 475.
10
PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE
Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers. in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Page 474.
STRESS
PERFORMANCE
11
The Compulsive Personality Under Crisis Induced
Stress
  • Folie du doute - paralyzed by indecision.
  • Tendency to irrational procrastination because of
    search for certainty fear of making a mistake.
  • Once decisional closure, difficult to reopen.
  • Comfortable with applying set policies and
    procedures to solve problems.
  • Sensitive to position in hierarchy.
  • Overly responsive to superiors, competes with
    peers and dominates subordinates.

Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Pages 477-479.
12
The Narcissistic Personality Under Crisis Induced
Stress
  • Self centered, egocentric, and self-absorbed.
  • Seek constant reassurance of self-worth.
  • Primary loyalty to self acts to promote own
    position.
  • Can shift positions easily.
  • Believe that they are principled and scrupulous
    individuals.
  • Seek advisors who prop up their self-esteem.

Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Pages 479-481.
13
The Paranoid Personality Under Crisis Induced
Stress
  • Surrounded by enemies - extreme suspiciousness.
  • Difficulty trusting own subordinates.
  • Fixed conclusion in search of evidence.
  • Do not accept information and advice that runs
    contrary to own conclusions.

Source Post, Jerrold M. 1993. The Impact of
Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers, in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George.
Boulder, CO Westview Press. Pages 481-483.
14
Five Basic Patterns of Decision Making
  • Unconflicted adherence
  • Unconflicted change
  • Defensive avoidance
  • Hypervigilance
  • Vigilance

Source Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management
Planning for the Inevitable. New York Amacom.
Pages 133150.
15
Decision Making Patterns
  • Vigilance follows a methodical, high-quality
    process to objectively collect available
    information, thoroughly consider it, search for
    other possible options, and make a well reasoned
    decision.
  • Unconflicted adherence continuing with the
    current situation.
  • Unconflicted change following the last advice
    received.
  • Defensive avoidance avoiding decision making.
  • Hypervigilant vacillating approach.

Source Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management
Planning for the Inevitable. New York Amacom.
Pages 133150.
16
A Definition of Groupthink
  • a mode of thinking that people engage in
    when they are deeply involved in a cohesive
    in-groupmembers striving for unanimity override
    their motivation to realistically appraise
    alternate courses of action a deterioration of
    mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral
    judgement that results from in-group pressures.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in
Groupthink.
17
Antecedent Conditions for Groupthink
  • Primary Moderately or highly cohesive group.
  • Structural or administrative faults in the
    organization in which the group exists including
  • Insulation of the group.
  • The group leaders preference for a certain
    decision.
  • A lack of norms requiring methodical procedures
    for the group.
  • Homogeneity of the group members social
    background and ideology.
  • High stress from external threats with low hope
    of a better solution than the leaders.
  • Low group self-esteem induced by the groups
    perception of recent failures, excessive
    difficulty on current decision-making tasks, and
    moral dilemmas (i.e., apparent lack of feasible
    alternatives except ones that violate ethical
    standards).

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 2 and 3.
18
Symptoms of Groupthink
  • Direct social pressure placed on a member who
    argues against the groups shared beliefs.
  • Members self-censorship of their own thoughts or
    concerns that deviate from the group consensus.
  • An illusion of the groups invulnerability to
    failure.
  • A shared illusion of unanimity.
  • The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that
    screen out information from outside the group.
  • Collective efforts to rationalize.
  • Stereotyped views of potential adversaries
    outside the group.
  • Unquestioned belief in the groups inherent
    morality.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
19
Symptoms of Defective Decision-Making
  • Incomplete survey of alternatives.
  • Incomplete survey of objectives.
  • Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.
  • Failure to reappraise initially rejected
    alternatives.
  • Poor information search.
  • Selective bias in processing information at hand.
  • Failure to work out contingency plans.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.
20
Antecedent Conditions of Teamthink
  • Team beliefs and assumptions emphasizing the
    positive.
  • Team self-talk - encouraging open discussion.
  • Team mental imagery - creating a common vision.
  • Thought patterns - optimism.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 57.
21
Symptoms of Teamthink
  • Encouragement of divergent views.
  • Open expression of concerns and ideas.
  • Awareness of limitations and threats.
  • Recognition of members uniqueness.
  • Discussion of collective doubts.

Source Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. From
Group Think to Teamthink Toward the Creation of
Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing
Work Teams. Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8.
Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis
(Boston Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 7.
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