Title: Snmka 1
1Ludovít JELEMENSKÝ Department of Chemical and
Biochemical Engineering, STU BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA
21th P R I S M Seminar 2003
Current State of Human Factors Knowledge in
Slovakia and Barriers, Which Need to be Removed
to Improve Human Performance 30th 31th
October 2003 B R A T I S L A V A
32th P R I S M Seminar 2004
European experiences with transferring of
information provide on human factors to Seveso
II safety reports, mainly focus on emergency
planning and response 27th 28th May
2004 TATRANSKE MATLIARE
4RESULTS FROM SEMINARS
The Seveso II requirements fulfillment differ in
the different countries. Current practice is that
some requirements are neglected. Most of the
Safety reports worked out by the operators has
been returned for insufficient stress on various
fields. Certain requirements are often
completely ignored / omitted. HF is considered
very superficially, more qualitatively than
quantitatively, but the most of all cases
ignored / omitted even if the HF is recognized to
be the most contributing factor in the major
industrial accidents which took place. HF
importance is underlined by recent major
industrial accidents, each had had a considerable
contribution from the human failure point of view.
5RESULTS FROM SEMINARS
- The safety documentation in the field of the
prevention of major accidents is - required by the act n. 261/2002 Z.z. in SLOVAKIA
- major accident prevention policy - MAPP
- safety management system - SMS
- risk assessment / analysis
- emergency planning (internal / external)
- safety report
Hidden responsabilities MAPP and SMS MAPP and
SMS are managing documents, which provide the
basis for dealing with the HF in relation to the
potential major accident occurrence. This
documentation is supposed to be the output of the
HF analysis measures resulting from the HF
assessment and analysis.
- Covered fields
- organizational structure
- risk identification and assessment
- operation management
- change management
- emergency planning
- performance monitoring
- audits
6RESULTS FROM SEMINARS
- There are two main streams in integrating the HF
into the quantitative risk assessment - an attempt should be made to treat the HF
explicitly so that the QRA directly reflects - the influence of the technology operators and
maintenance on the occurrence of - accidents.
- the QRA should be hardware-focused and the HF
should be hidden in the failure - rate of a certain component in order to reflect
an average standard of human - performance
a bit of heuristics
- These two approaches can be combined in order to
obtain a very representative - qualitative assessment reflexing the status quo
of the system. - This can be achieved by careful choice of the
basic events - detailed development of the failure tree where
appropriate - integrate the HF into equipment where suitable
7HF in Safety Documents
Identification of working positions, which can
have influence at safety of system or
subsystem Description and short
characterization of working positions Analysis
and human reliability assessment of certain
working positions Ø To indicate critical
places in human machine interaction Ø To
summarize the set of human errors and they
potential causes (HAZOP and the other
qualitative hazard techniques Ø To provide
quantification of human reliability assessment
(quantitative technique is not direct
recommended)
8HF in Safety Documents
Categorization/descriptions difficulties of
subsystems (compound hardware, complex of
start-up or shut-down procedures and difficulties
with communications) To declare the system of
people selection at working positions Ø
Physical health and to indicate the periodical
monitoring Ø Personal factors (mental
health, self-control, resistance at stress)
9HF in Safety Documents
To declare regular performance of next
activities Ø Ergonomics default Ø
Default and uncertainty with software Ø
Uncertainty and exact define responsibilities for
operators Ø Undesirable workload Ø
Undesirable rotation of working period Ø
Non-favorable working conditions Ø Outside
working influence live style Ø To provide
information about the risk which follows from
their working activities Ø Training of
hazard situation and emergency response Ø
Level of communication in regular and critical
situations To collect information about
needs, feelings and comments of
workers/operators.
10Future Development of HF in SLOVAKIA
Continued improvements in models for
incorporating human factors into a quantitative
risk assessment in chemical processes. Human
factors analysis focus on the dynamical aspect of
human machine interaction because by the
dynamical analysis it becomes possible to
consider specific sequences and accident paths,
which are no identified by the traditional
way. Better understanding of the impact of
company and plant culture, management systems,
maintenance practices on the reliability of
process plant equipment, in the case of modern
plants, the root causes of human errors can be
effectively identified by the application of an
accurate and structured method that accounts for
the cognitive processes in the management
system. To developed generally available data
for human error.