The Human Factors Design Process

1
The Human Factors Design Process
AMSTERDAM
Presented by REUZEAU Florence Head of Human
Factors department General secretary of HFOG

• Application of the JAA INT POLICY

2
Lay out

• Historical recall
• the Human Factors design process (HFDP)
• certification context JAA HF steering group and
  HFHWG
• Airbus answer to the JAA INT POLICY
• HFDP for the flight deck novelties
• HEA human error analysis
• Conclusion

3
Historical recall

• 1995 the officialisation of the HF in the
  design office organisation (existing organisation
  in training center)
• in 2002 , equivalent of 12 HF experts working for
  flight desck design and certification
• 1997 the Human Factors Operational Group
• network of 25 people
• To set up a Human Factors policy, from the
  initial phase of the aircraft design, to the
  final stage of the customer support

4
The HFOG structure
HFOG Human Factors Operational Group
Maintenance
Design
CONSISTENCY
HFOG
Operations
Training
5
HFDP The HF issues
Medical issues, (trombosis)
SA
Decision making
Automation
language
Cognitive resources
HF topics
Culture
Human error
H-H Cooperation
Risk management
HF regulation
Stress, fatigue, comfort
Anthropo,biomeca.
6
HFDP HUMAN FACTOR ORGANIZATION

• A HF experts group
• graduated
• cognitive ergonomics
• language sciences
• physical ergonomics
• a network of HF specialists
• systems designers qualified by a HF training
• 35 people

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HFDP the principles

• highlight the main HF issues Develop a top-down
  approach to cover them
• Propose HF methods and expertise for HMI
  design/evaluation all along the design cycle
• Set up systematic and iterative evaluation of the
  design
• Ensure a Participatory Design process, based on
  users participation and crew tasks modelling
• gt to anticipate the bad/good human performances
  , and human error consequences...

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HUMAN FACTOR PROCESS APPROACH
Pilots needs analysis
HUMAN FACTOR
DESIGN
SAFETY
IN SERVICE FOLLOW UP
CERTIFICATION
Cockpit Philosophy
EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK
FLIGHT TESTS
TYPECERTIFICATION
CERTIFICATION BASIS
GENERAL SPECIFICATION
VALIDATION H-H-M-I
Safety analyses/ hazards
INTEGRATION in A/C
HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATIONS
Func. Analysis/ Prelim. Safety Analyses
DETAILED SPECIFICATION
ASSEMBLING
MANUFACTURING
Task modelling
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HFDP the integration in the design cycle

• Fully integrated in the design and certification
  process
• needs analysis with the users
• concept phase cockpit philosophy and HMI
  guidelines
• detailed design phase evaluation and
  validation
• certification activities process and Human
  error analysis
• Main basis the USERS TASKS MODELLING

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Framework for work analysis
The task goals, tools organisation environment
The results mission sucess performance cockpit
management
Activity actual behaviour cognitive physical
The people physical, sociological biological
rythms experience/expertise
Effects on people physical, mental, psychical,
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HFDP the tools
HF METHODS
- Interviews - Surveys - Expert judgement -
Observation - HF design handbook
WORK STATIONS
REAL AIRCRAFT
VIRTUAL SIMULATOR
INTEGRATION SIMULATOR
RESEARCH SIMULATOR
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HFDP Data collection for HF activities
Tools
Strategy

• Observation
• Test of SA or performance
• Self-confrontation
• Collective debriefing
• Free or directed
• discussion
• Expert judgement
• (IHM, pilots)
• Questionnaire

• Specifications
• paper mock ups
• workstations
• research simu.
• engineering simu.
• integration simu.
• aircraft

• Experimentation
• Walkthrough
• (free or controlled)
• Heuristic
• evaluation
• Inquiry

Measurement tools
Methods
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HUMAN FACTORS CRITERIA GRID
Integration in environment Ease to learn Ease
to use Performance Safety
Task level
Interface level
Operational utility
Interaction transparency
Information display
Crew/system cooperation
Interface handling
Task type
Utility of information
Transp. Of system strategy
Perceptive capab.
Consistent actions
Task context
Intelligibility
Conciseness of action
Utility of proposed means
Guidance for the task
Task repartition
Relevance of info. organization
Guidance of actions





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PILOTS PARTICIPATION
Maintenance Specialists
System Specialists
Procedures Specialists
training Pilots (AI/ST)
Etc
Test pilots (AI, AS)
Designers
Airlines pilots
Pilots
Human factors experts
Cognitive Ergonomics
Linguistics
Physical Ergonomics
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Certification context JAA HF steering
groupHFHWG

• Review of JAR/FAR 25
• rule and AC preparation on HF topics
• human errors
• Pilots characteristics
• automation
• interface and controls
• evaluation
• etc.

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Application of INT POLICY

• Special condition of the INT POL
• Application to a list of A380 Novelties
• implication of the JAA/FAA in the application of
  the HFDP
• Human errors Analysis (HEA)

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HEA principles

• Hypothesis the pilot is not an error generator
• human errors management safety barriers
• safety objectives
• qualitative design objectives

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Safety barriers safety objectives

• Safety objectives
• a The production of a single human error should
  not be capable of progress to a potentially
  hazardous outcome without direct and compelling
  feedback for the crew
• b In failure conditions, abnormal procedures
  shall be established so as to minimise the
  likelihood of human errors as much as
  practicable.

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Safety barriers qualitative objectives

• qualitative design objectives
• a Make a design preventing the production of
  human error that means that the design objective
  is to eliminate the potential for human errors.
  This can be done through the removal of hazards
  which may be initiated by operators, by giving
  unambiguous operational procedure, by automation
  of complex tasks which are not necessarily to be
  carried on by the crew or by automation of tasks
  in very urgent situations, in situations
  demanding a high level of cognitive resources,
  etc.
• b Make a design tolerant to human error and
  control the effects the HMI should be designed
  to cope with the positive contribution of human.
  That means that the design objective is to
  prevent the propagation of human errors that can
  lead to not desirable effects. By selection of a
  design (e.g. data entry format) or operating
  modes, by maximising the error detection
  (adequate feedback e.g. informative messages),
  and recoverability (e.g. reversible action
  through undo action), the effects can be
  controlled.

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Human errors assessment

• A Identification of credible list of scenarios
  (including the identification of the human error
  type) .
• B. identification of Performance Shaping Factors
• C description of the safety barriers ( in term of
  human error management, i.e. detectability,
  recoverability, etc)
• D.detailed description of human error
  consequences
• E.identification of the criticality of the
  scenarios
• F.identification of the supported material
• (used to verify compliance with the hypotheses)

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Scenarios identification

• Opportunistic observation
• to discover unexpeceted human errors which could
  affect significantly the safety.
• During evaluation session in simulator
• use of experience/expertise
• through the SSA failure conditions for human
  errors during the application of a procedure
  after a technical event in the HAZ and CAT safety
  diagrams
• through meeting with experts for the novelties
  when human errors can be an initiating event

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Conclusions and remarks

• production of the means of compliance
• to acquire and show an acceptable level of
  confidence in the flight deck use, in normal and
  abnormal situations
• to be capable to share the results with the
  authorities,
• theoritical viewpoint Human errors knowledge
• positive point of view
• validity of the approaches no demonstration
• some paradoxes 3 simulators tests are more
  demonstrative than 10 years of experience
  feedback to show that an event will not happen
  ???
• If an event has never happened, the system is
  safe ???

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Conclusions and remarks

• pragmatical reasonable ( limited set of
  scenarios, realism, number of combination)
• consequences of the first applications of HF
  certification
• high costs
• difficult process due to the transversal
  approach.

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