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Stateless Optimization of MultiCommodity Flow

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Title: Stateless Optimization of MultiCommodity Flow


1
Stateless Optimization of Multi-Commodity Flow
  • Baruch Awerbuch
  • JHU
  • Rohit Khandekar
  • IBM Watson

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2
Main Issue avoiding congestion
Main result Greedy agents operating without
coordination can minimize congestion in
poly-logarithmic time
3
Concurrency causes oscillations
  • Best response least loaded path

Because of concurrency becomes worst response
Control is needed to avoid oscillations
4
Internet perspective
  • Since 70s Load-Sensitive routing discarded
  • Fixed path routing used
  • Routing paths are highly vulnerable to
    DOSattacks masquerading as congestion

5
Our framework
  • Agents route commodities through a flow-network
    and share network bandwidths
  • There is a certain Social objective
  • Min the maximum congestion on the links
  • Agents are greedy act greedily to minimize their
    own cost no regard to social objective
  • Greedy behavior often leads to highly sub-optimal
    performance or even system collapse

6
Our approach
  • Impose rules of conduct on the agents
  • Stateless local rules easy to enforce locally
    without any coordination and without keeping
    track of history
  • Induce agents to concurrently converge to a
    near-optimum social objective quickly (typically
    in poly-logarithmic time)

7
To Nash
  • Traditional approach Analyze Nash equilibrium
  • No agent has an incentive to move unilaterally
  • Poly-time convergence to Nash via sequential
    moves
  • Or, simpler yet, ignore convergence issue all
    together
  • Does this make sense in a distributed and dynamic
    system?
  • System is distributed agents dont move
    sequentially
  • In poly-time system changes thus no convergence

8
or Not To Nash?
  • We define a notion of aggregate equilibrium.
  • Where system state does not change by too much in
    long-enough period of time
  • Aggregate equilibrium implies near-optimality.
  • While not in aggregate equilibrium
  • Irreversible significant progress
  • Eventually in Aggregate equilibrium.

9
Concurrent Multi-commodity Flows
  • a graph G(V,E,C) edge-capacities c(e)
  • k commodities
  • source si, sink ti, demand di 0

For each commodity route di flow between si and
ti such that the maximum edge congestion is
minimized.
?i fi(e)
f(e)
total flow thru e
congestion(e)


u(e)
u(e)
capacity of e
10
Concurrent Multi-commodity Flows
ce capacity
11
Concurrent Multi-commodity Flows
d(5)
d(2)
d(1)
d(4)
d(3)
Route all demands and minimize the max
edge-congestion.
12
Previous sequential solution
  • Many combinatorial algorithms known
  • Shahrokhi-Matula (1990)
  • Klein-Plotkin-Stein-Tardos (1990)
  • Leighton-Makedon-Plotkin-Stein-Tardos-Tragoudas
    (1991)
  • Plotkin-Shmoys-Tardos (1991)
  • Garg-Könemann (1998)
  • Fleischer (2000)
  • Young (2001)

13
Previous Work
  • Even-Dar and Mansour 05 complete network
  • symmetric strategy space
  • Fisher, Räcke, Vöcking 06 another congestion
    model
  • Infinitely many agents each controlling
    infinitesimal flow.
  • Single commodity (symmetric strategy space).
  • Fisher Vöcking (2004) , Chien Sinclair
    (2007)
  • Sequential games
  • polynomial convergence to Nash equilibrium

14
Stateless algorithms
  • Algorithms reacting to the current state of the
    system without keeping history
  • Output function (State)
  • Greedy algorithms are a special case of
    stateless algorithms

15
Properties of stateless algs
  • Incremental operation we do not start from
    scratch upon each change
  • Self-stabilization system corrects itself
    after transient failures
  • There is no need to initialize consistently

16
Components of our framework
  • Load-sensitive pricing of the edges
  • flow agents are forces to pay these prices
  • Flow control (speed limit) rule
  • cannot increase or drop the flow too fast
  • Profit margin (inertia) rule
  • rerouting must yield ? gt 0 profit margin

17
Opportunity cost
  • Cost of an edge with flow f (m1/e)f(e)

Opportunity cost
congestion
18
Algorithmic Framework
  • We want to minimize the maximum flow through any
    edge
  • minimize maxe f(e)

We use a smooth convex equivalent
function minimize ? ?e (m1/e)f(e)
Fact mO(1)-approx. of ? implies (1O(e))-approx.
of maximum congestion
19
Concurrent Algorithmic Framework
  • Maintain the correct estimate of the derivative
  • During the flow rerouting, the lengths l(e)
    should not change by more than a factor of (1e).
  • ?l(e) l(e) log (m1/e) ?f(e)
  • l(e) e
  • ?f(e)

e2
log m
Flow control constraint
20
Flow control for concurrency
  • A flow cant increase by more than 1?
  • A flow cant decrease by more than 1-?-
  • ?- L ? , i.e., downwards speed limit is
    more aggressive than upwards limit
  • Agents are forced to obey the speed limits

21
Effect of speed limit
Flow (log scale)
  • Fast increase, slow decrease

time
22
Inertia rule
  • Profit margin (inertia) rule
  • rerouting must yield ? gt 0 profit margin

1 ?
b
a
d
c
1
23
Algorithm run by each flow
  • Graph residual capacity speed limits
  • while
  • non-saturated path exists at a cost of (1-?)
    below the average cost, and
  • Less than 1-?- fraction of demand rerouted
  • Saturate this path, by increasing its flow to
    1? times the flow on the bottleneck edge
  • Compensate by proportional uniform decrease

24
Blocking Flow along Shortest Paths
25
Blocking Flow along Shortest Paths
26
Blocking Flow along Shortest Paths
27
Blocking Flow along Shortest Paths
28
Summary Bounded Best Response Dynamics
  • We impose congestion-sensitive (exponential)
    edge-costs.
  • Each agent reroutes its flow to minimize its own
    cost subject to
  • flow control rule cant ramp up too fast
  • inertia rule dont bother with minor
    improvements
  • Does this bounded best response dynamics converge
    to a near-optimum solution?
  • If yes, how fast?

29
Main idea of proof
  • We define the notion of aggregate equilibrium
    (weaker than Nash)
  • We show that aggregate equilibrium yield
    near-optimality
  • We show that non-equilibrium state will
    eventually involve large improvement in a
    potential function

30
Showing potential decrease
  • Without speed limits, it would be easier to claim
    potential improvement in moving from expensive to
    cheap routes
  • We show that speed limit achieves the same, in
    spite of ghost chasing problem, namely shortest
    path changing very frequently.

31
Main Result
Starting from an arbitrary flow, the flow
converges to a 1? approximation to the minimum
max-congestion in of rounds upper bounded
by Here m edges, P paths C
maxj Cj/minj Cj
Self-stabilizing
32
Conclusion
  • These ideas can be extended to other packing and
    flow problems.
  • Open question Eliminate the dependency on L in
    the convergence time and get a completely
    poly-logarithmic convergence?
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