PrefixPreserving IP Address Anonymization: Measurementbased Security Evaluation and a New Cryptograp

1
Prefix-Preserving IP Address AnonymizationMeasur
ement-based Security Evaluation and a
NewCryptography-based Scheme

• Jun Xu, Jinliang Fan, Mostafa Ammar, Sue Moon
• College of Computing
  Sprint ATL
• Georgia Tech

modified presented by Zihui Ge
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Overview

• Motivation
• IP address anonymization
• prefix-preserving
• Prefix-preserving anonymization
• canonical form
• TCPdpriv
• cryptography-based scheme
• Attacks
• models, analysis, evaluation

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Motivation

• Traces collected, to share or not to share?
• client personal privacy?
• commercial confidentiality?
• IP address anonymization
• 1.2.3.4 ? 8.4.3.6
• one to one mapping, consistent
• Prefix relationships among IP addresses?
• important routing performance, clustering of
  end-systems
• Prefix-preserving anonymization
• 1.2.3.4 ? 8.4.3.6
• 1.2.255.2 ? 8.4.9.6
• preserve prefix correlation among addresses

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IP Address Anonymization

• Basic anonymization
• a original 4-byte IP address a a1 a2 a32
• a anonymized IP address aa1a2a32
• F 1-to-1 mapping function aF(a)
• Prefix preserving anonymization
• if a, b share k-bit prefix
• a1b1,a2b2, , akbk, ak1bk1
• then aF(a), bF(b) share k-bit prefix
• a1b1,a2b2, , akbk, ak1bk1

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Canonical Form

• Canonical construction of F using a series of fi
• ai ai ? fi-1(a1, a2, , ai-1)
• f0 is a constant
• F is a prefix-preserving anonymization function
• A prefix-preserving anonymization function
  necessarily takes this form
• Different schemes use different fi
• Visualized as a tree

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Visualization Address Space
0
1
0
1
0
1
0100
0111
0101
0110
1000
1011
1001
1010
1100
1111
1101
1110
0000
0011
0001
0010
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Visualization Original Address Tree
0
1
0
1
0
1
0100
0101
1000
1011
1111
1110
0000
0001
0010
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Visualization Anonymization Function
f0()1
0
1
f1(1)0
f1(0)1
0
1
0
1
f2(0,0)0
Flip
Leaf Node
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Visualization Anonymized Address Tree
0
1
0
1
0
1
0100
0101
1000
1011
1111
1110
0000
0001
0010
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TCPdpriv

• Sequentially scan IP address
• look up prefix in history table
• randomly choose suffix
• concatenate prefix,suffix update history table

a1a2akak1aK2an
rand(a1a2akak1an)
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TCPdpriv

• Sequentially scan IP address
• look up prefix in history table
• randomly choose suffix
• concatenate prefix,suffix update history table

• Mapping is trace-dependent
• Need to maintain a table to track previous
  mappings
• table size grow over time
• look up cost increase over time
• Unable to process in parallel

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New Crytography-Based Algorithm
fi(a1, a2, , ai-1) L(R(P(a1a2ai-1), K))
L least significant bit R pseudo-random
function P secret padding K secret key

• deterministic fi function
• trace-independent
• What PRF to use?
• Practical bock ciphers, e.g., AES, can be
  modeled as PRP

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Attacks on Anonymization Schemes

• Cryptographic attacks
• scheme specific
• vulnerability comes from the specific
  construction of fi
• TCPdpriv not susceptible
• our scheme provable secure
• Semantic attacks
• common to all schemes
• vulnerability comes from the canonical
  construction of F
• effectiveness should be measured

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Evaluation of Semantic Attacks

• Metrics to measure effect of attacks
• Virtual (but theoretically interesting) attacks
• good measure of the resistance of a specific
  trace to semantic attacks in general
• good relative reference points for measuring the
  effectiveness of practical attacks.
• Practical attacks

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Metrics to Measure Effect of Attacks

• Measure of attack severity
• U of unknown uncompressed bits
• C of unknown compressed bits
• Ki of addresses with exactly i known most
  significant bit

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If an address is compromised
1000
1001
0010
0000
0110
0111
1100
1101
1111
0010
1???
000?
C9, U18, K14, K22, K32, K41
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Evaluation on Real Traces

• Measure the resistance of a specific trace to
  semantic attacks in general
• Effect of compromising random address
• Effect of compromising greedily-generated address

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Effect of Compromising Random Addresses
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Practical Attacks

• Frequency Analysis
• DNS Server Address Tracing
• Others

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Conclusions

• Canonical form of constructing prefix-preserving
  anonymization function
• New cryptography-based scheme
• Framework of measuring the resistance of traces
  and the effectiveness of attacks
• Implementation
• http//www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/Telecomm/crypto
  pan/