Notional%20C2%20Architectures%20for%20MDP%20and%20MDA

1
Notional C2 Architectures for MDP and MDA

• Dan Boger
• Information Sciences Department
• Naval Postgraduate School
• dboger_at_nps.edu/831.656.3671

2
Background

• Results from class projects in capstone course
  for NPS JC4I Systems curriculum (CC4913, Issues
  and Problems in JC4I)
• MDP tasked in Spring 2004
• MDA tasked in Spring 2005
• Each represents slightly less than one
  student-year of workconcurrent with thesis
  completion and other courses
• And subsequent contemplation and editing by the
  instructor based upon MDA research efforts over
  several years

3
DCBs BLUF

• This is a system-of-systems issue
• OODA/SDA/net-centric implies paradigm of
• Sensor systems (hard)
• Weapons systems (harder)
• Decision-making systems (hardest)
• Network of networks (harder)
• All properly integrated (hardest?process changes)
• (Ed.) And unimportant platforms on which to
  locate these important nodes/functions because
  nodes/functions should drive platform
  capabilities.

4
Tasking

• Employ observe, orient, decide and act (OODA)
  framework to develop a C2 architecture for MDP
  (and then MDA).
• Examine command relationships.
• Why does one actor need to talk to another
  (IERs)?
• Examine all elements of OODA loop but focus on
  Processes and Organizational structures.
• Assume technical interoperability issues will be
  overcome!

5
Important Considerations

• Speed of Decision / Response time / Latencies
• Sensor Requirements
• Communications Requirements
• Decision Processes and Processors (doctrine)
• Information trade-offs
• Organizations and Commanders

• AOR Scope
• Threat and Mission
• Resources for Commanders
• Other command relationships (organic vs.
  inorganic)
• Rules Of Engagement
• Legal Requirements and Constraints (LES data/info)

6
Scope of the Problem

• Develop a Maritime Domain Protection (MDP)
  Architecture capable of discovering
• and quickly disseminating information pertaining
  to future or impending
• Acts of Violence,
• Weapon Engagement, or other
• Hostile Act at any Phase by any adversary.
• Originating from a planned Sea base, launched
  from the Sea, or utilizing the Sea as a conduit.
• The primary focus is outside of CONUS (gtgt12nm)
  and not inland waters. Designed to defend CONUS,
  Alaska, Hawaii.
• APPROACH
• Identify the key players.
• Define the information flow among the key
  players.
• Apply the information flow to a MDP Organization.
• Fine tune the scope of the MDP problem.
• Leverage existing organizations and systems.

7
Litmus Test

• Scenario
• Undercover Drug Enforcement Agency Agent in
  Thailand gets a tipper that an Anthrax shipment
  will be made on known merchant vessel.
• Considerations
• Keep him undercover.
• Locate the vessel.
• Get the info to the boarding team.

8
Maritime Threats

• Worldwide
• Must be able to differentiate terrorism from
  criminal activities
• LNG tankers
• Oil tankers
• Containerships and WMD/CBRNE
• Response in intl waters governed by UNCLOS

9
Ship Detection Technologies

• HUMINT
• Reporting Systems
• OSINT
• IMINT
• EO/IR, laser-enhanced TV
• ELINT/COMINT
• RADAR, Moving Target Indicator (MTI)
• Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) / Inverse SAR
• Over the Horizon RADAR (OTHR) / Re-locatable OTHR
• HF Surface Wave RADAR (220 nm)
• Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging
• Imaging Coherent Optical Ranging in development
• MASINT
• Acoustic
• Magnetic Anomaly Detection (500 m)
• Wake Detection Bioluminescence
• Stack Effluents

10
Cargo Detection Technologies(Close Proximity)

• High Energy Photons
• Detects Nuclear, Radiological
• Range Must Surround Target
• X-ray and Backscatter
• Detects Explosives, Nuclear, Radiological
• Range up to 15 feet
• Gravitational Anomaly
• Detects Nuclear Radiological
• Range Minimal
• Fast Neutron and Gamma Ray
• Detects Chemical, Biological, Explosives
• Range up to 6 feet
• Longer range increases detection time

11
Data Mining Tools for Non-obvious Relationships

• Reflexion rule-based engine that detects and
  reacts to patterns in live data streams.
• Colexion Taxonomy Navigation intelligence
  engine that aggregates, classifies, extracts and
  builds knowledge from live data streams.
• NORA seeks out and integrates non-obvious
  relationships between customers, employees,
  vendors, and other sources, 30 of separation.
• ANNA perform entity resolution using only
  anonymized data.

12
Reasons to use JIACG

• JIATF (JIACG?) is a tested and proven JC4I
  structure.
• It already leverages interagency relationships.
• It already combines observe/orient (intel) with
  decide/act (operators and law enforcement).
• Have USCG and USN units that chop to them
• They have an existing knowledge of their maritime
  region.
• Need to plus up with CT and CP missions and
  personnel.

13
Organization
POTUS
NSC
DoD
DoS
DoHS
CIA
SOUTHCOM
NORTHCOM
PACOM
CENTCOM
EUCOM
USCG
Global Affairs
Arms Control
TTIC
SOCOM
JIACG-W
JIACG-E
JIACG-S
JIACG-N
14
JIACG x Missions

• Maritime Domain Protection
• Maritime Domain Awareness
• Counter-Drug (JIATF-S and JIATF-W only)

15
Why a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC)?

• Already Coordinates with
• Law Enforcement Agencies
• Intelligence Agencies
• Operating Forces
• Numbered Fleets Coast Guard Districts
• They leverage existing JC4I systems
• But must subordinate MIFC to JIACG

16
Responsibilities
JIACG x
Discover
Eliminate
MIFC
USN
USAF
Interrupt
JIC
DIA
SOF
CT
CIA
NMIC
CP
INTRL
USCS
USCG
INS
FBI
DEA
PT AUTH
Discover heavy because MDA part is so big.
New to JIACG x
17
JIACG x Organization
JIACG x (CG)
DEP DoHS (SES)
JAG/Counsel
COS (Any)
LNO NORTHCOM
C4 Support JI-C (Any)
OPS JI-O (Any)
LAW ENF JI-L DoJ (GS)
ADMIN JI-A (GS)
INTEL JI-I (Any)
Plans Policy JI-P DoHS (GS)
LOG JI-G (GS)
MIFC
FBI
Force Coord.
DoS
DoD
DoD
INTRL
LNOUSAF
DoHS
DoHS
DoHS
JIC
CIA
USCS
LNOUSN/MC
DoJ
INTRL
NMIC
DIA
LNO USCG
INS
DoE
CT
CP
DEA
LNO SOF
PT AUTH
18
JIACG x Centers
MIFC Watch
OPS Watch
INS
JIC
Force Coord.
DoS
CT
FBI
LNOUSAF
DoHS
DEA
NMIC
LNOUSN/MC
DoJ
LNO USCG
CP
CIA
DoE
USCS
DIA
INTRL
PT AUTH
LNO SOF
JAG/Counsel
19
Proposed Locations of JIACGx
20
Litmus Test

• Scenario
• Undercover Drug Enforcement Agency Agent in
  Thailand gets a tipper that an Anthrax shipment
  will be made on known merchant vessel.
• Considerations
• Keep him undercover.
• Locate the vessel.
• Get the info to the boarding team.

21
Thailand Scenario Info Flow
22
Thailand Scenario Information Needed by
Boarding Team

• Ship picture
• Flag
• ELINT
• Location
• Home port
• Departure city, date, time

• Arrival city, date, time
• Blueprints
• Crew
• Manifest
• Target (CBRNE?)

23
MDA Tasking

• Inputs 
• Provide justification for required input
  capabilities that do not currently exist. 
• Provide assessment of how to employ and integrate
  these inputs.
• What should feed the MDA CROP?
• Structure and Processes 
• Design the (global) organizational architecture
  and underlying processes that are required in
  order to convert the inputs into usable
  information that will support national and
  strategic level decision-makers.
• What should the MDA CROP provide these
  decision-makers?
• Outputs-Customer needs/information exchange
  requirements 
• Construct a C2 system that will support
  operational and tactical level decision-makers.
• What should the MDA CROP provide to these players?

24
The Vision of GMIC

• Epitome of Net-Centric Environment
• Distributed networking of systems of (systems of)
  humans and technology
• Constructively interdependent
• Center of Excellence (Community Of Interest?!)
  for the repository of maritime data and
  information
• Store, publish, and exchange information/intellige
  nce

25
GMIC Mission

• Analyze, fuse, and disseminate maritime
  intelligence that provides comprehensive and
  tailored maritime situational awareness and
  understanding to the entire maritime community of
  interest

GMIC Process(analysis, fusion, dissemination)
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
26
Tools for Success

• Information/intelligence management
• Net-centric data exchange
• Tools to analyze existing data
• Trend analysis for anomaly detection
• Data sharing protocols with interagency and
  multinational partners

ANALYSIS
DISSEMINATION
FUSION
27
ORGANIZATIONAL INPUTS TO THE GMIC
NMIC
DIA
CIA
DoS
28
Overall Organization
POTUS
NSC
DNI
GMIC
NCTC
DoD
DoS
DHS
CIA
DoT
NSA
NGA
MTAC
ONI
USCG ICC
29
GMIC Organizational Structure
Staff
GMIC Director
NationalProgramManagers/LNOs
Deputy Director of Plans/Policy
Deputy Director of Support
Deputy Director of Operations
Legal/JAG
Information Technology
Maritime RD
Maritime Awareness WATCH
Targeting
Collections
COP Mgmt
Functional Analytical Cells
Functions Network Analysis IPB Support Exercise
Support Red Cell
Functions IMINT SIGINT HUMINT ISR RFI Mgmt
Functions Tool Development Exercise
SupportACTDs
Functions IT Mgmt National Maritime Data Base
MgmtMLS Mgmt
Functions Mgmt of Automated/ Manual entries
into COP Data Warehouse
International Maritime Analysis
HomelandMaritime Analysis
Functions GWOT Counter-Proliferation Counter-Traf
ficking Alien Smuggling
Functions Port Vulnerabilites Fisheries Civil
Maritime Vessel, Crew Cargo Analysis
30
Watch Floor Organization
Senior Watch Officer
Crisis Action Supt Cell
Deputy
COP Manager
Collection Manager
Maritime Terrorism Analysts
Civil Maritime Analysts
NGA representative
NSA representative
Maritime Defense Analysts
LawEnforcement representative
Maritime HLS Analysts
31
Liaisons / Integre?s

• Dept of Defense
• ONI, MTAC, COCOMs, DIA, JIATFs
• Dept of Homeland Security
• USCG, CBP, ICE, Port Authorities
• CIA
• NCTC
• Dept of Justice
• FBI, DEA, Major Police Depts.
• NSA
• NGA

• Dept of Commerce
• NOAA
• Dept of Transportation
• MARAD
• Dept of Treasury
• FINCEN, OFAC
• Dept of State
• Dept of Energy
• Coalition partners/allies

32
CROP Definition

• The National Maritime CROP will be a compilation
  of existing architectures
• Single CROP for the National Community
• GMIC will populate the CROP
• Filters need to be established by customers to
  create tailorable maritime pictures

33
Information Contained in the CROP (1)

• Conveyances vessel, ships, aircraft, barges,
  ferries
• People crew, master, port workers, passengers,
  civilians
• Cargo containers, vehicles, bulk cargo,
  liquefied natural gas (LNG), hazardous materials
• Ports, waterways, and facilities port terminals,
  piers, cranes, petrol facilities
• Environment weather, currents, natural
  resources, rookeries, fish stocks

34
Information Contained in the CROP (2)

• Infrastructure undersea, nuclear power plants,
  rail heads, transportation nodes, bridges
• Maritime geospatial sea lanes, oceanic regions,
  coasts waterways
• Threats activities identified threats, illegal
  migration, offshore drilling
• Friendly (i.e., Blue) forces military, federal,
  state, local, allied/coalition
• Financial transactions illegal money trails,
  hidden ownership

35
Overall Information Flow (Output)
NCIS (MTAC)
USCG ICC
Processed Intel Product
DHS (HSOC)
36
Methods

• Output will be available in a push-pull
  architecture
• All information from CROP will be available
  operational/tactical filters can be applied at
  subordinate levels to best address disclosure
  constraints
• DOD customers will receive output via DISN
  services (JWICS, SIPR, GCCS)
• Mobile users to receive IBS/GBS
• LE agencies access RISS and JRIES/HSIN

37
JRIES Users
38
JRIES Systems

A Portal to Multiple Applications through
web-based tools
Media Studies
Email and Collaboration Tools
Databases
Mapping and Imagery
Reporting
Analysis
39
Information Collection and Dissemination
Information for LE Operation
40
RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems)

• 25 year old agency founded in response to
  regional crime problems
• 6 regional centers
• Policy authority
• Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies
  (Federal Regulation 28 CFR Part 23)
• Secure LE network called RISSNET

41
Technology Summary

• Its all about the data
• Metadata/tagging
• Definitions
• XML-ize only whats important
• Mesh networks and beyond more work on net
  management issues
• IT can help us with process issues if we let it

42
Further Issues and Considerations

• Coordinating handoffs seams
• Processes within the organizations seams
• Existing legal and cultural walls seams
• This only hints at the seams encountered in a
  coalition environment

43
Bottom Line At the Bottom (BLAB)

• Continue streamlining bureaucratic and legal
  hurdles seams!
• HUMINT is the key to detecting and understanding
  emerging threatsgtcoalition partners are critical
• OSINT and public networks offer more than you may
  think
• Invest in critical technologies
• Further integration of civilian and military
  organizations
• Experiment, experiment, and experiment some
  morenot only on technologies but also on
  processes and organizational structures

44

• QUESTIONS?