POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

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POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN
Illustrated Lecture from John Large
13 December 2006, ECSSR Abu Dhabi
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research
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1967 US INSTALLS 5MWt TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR
PROGRAMME
1970 IRAN RATIFIES NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
1975 KRAFTWERK CONTRACT FOR 2 PWR 1,000MWe
REACTORS AT BUSHEHR
1979/82 KRAFTWERK CONTRACT FOR BUSHEHR ABANDONED
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1985 IRAN COMMENCES WEAPONS PROGRAMME
1985 IRAN COMMENCES WEAPONS PROGRAMME
1988/92 PLUTONIUM-239 EXTRACTION AT TEHRAN
1991 PROCURES URANIUM 1,800kg FEEDSTOCK FROM
CHINA
1993 POLONIUM-210 IRRADIATION AND EXTRACTION
1995 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGREE TO COMPLETE 1
REACTOR AT BUSHEHR
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1996 CHINA AGREES TO SUPPLY URANIUM
HEXAFLUORIDE PLANT AT ESFAHAN
2003 IRAN SIGNS IAEA NPT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
2003 PARTICLES OF HEU FOUND BY IAEA
2004 HF6 CONVERSION OF 37 TONNES OF URANIUM
COMMENCES
2004 URANIUM CONVERSION/ENRICHMENT SUSPENDED TO
EU-3 AGREEMENT
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2006 RESUMES ENRICHMENT PREPARATONS AT NATANZ
2006 HEAVY ARAK WATER PLANT COMMENCES
PRODUCTION
2006 NORTH KOREA DETONATES NUCLEAR WEAPON
LAST WEEK UN SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT SANCTIONS
YESTERDAY ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER STRONGLY HINTS
(12 December 2006)
OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
ENDING ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY POLICY
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Oh, I almost forgot, it packs a 150 to 170
kiloton nuclear punch
Its about the size of an office trash can
Lets start with a modern nuclear weapon
Heres one this is a US W80-1 thermonuclear
warhead
Its about 800mm long by 300mm diameter and
weighs 130kg
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ThermoNuclear
H-Bomb
A-Bomb
ELECTRONICS BATTERY PACK
FISSILE PACKAGE
FUSION or HYDROGEN PACKAGE
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CASING
HE SHAPED LENS
FISSILE PIT
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_________
TAMPER uranium-238
REFLECTOR sintered beryllium
PUSHER zirconium alloy
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neutron source
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SPANGLE polonium
CAPSULE beryllium
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COMPRESSION WARHEAD SHOPPING LIST
_________
TAMPER uranium-238
REFLECTOR sintered beryllium
SPANGLE polonium
PUSHER zirconium alloy
CAPSULE beryllium
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Heres a button, lets see if it works!
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1 COMPRESS
Zr PUSHER holds spherical geometry
Pu Sphere compressed to critical mass
2 NEUTRON INITIATE
Po-210 Be fuse together to generate neutrons
Lets click through that sequence!
U-238 tamper contains the neutrons
Be Reflector multiplies fast neutrons
3 SUPERCRITICAL FISSION
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So, basically, the trick is to compress a fissile
material down to its critical mass very quickly
There is another way to achieve a critical mass
but it requires a different fissile material
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INITIATOR Tritium
SHAPED CHARGE
HEU SLUG U-235
BARREL
SUB-CRITICAL HE uranium-235
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SUB-CRITICAL HE uranium-235
INITIATOR Tritium
BARREL
HEU SLUG U-235
SHAPED CHARGE
110kg
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This baby is the US W79 with dial-a-yield of 2 to
10 kilotons wanna see it go nuke ?
and it converts with a tritium boost to an
enhanced radiation or neutron bomb
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So, Irans nuclear weapon development relates to
its procurement of these IAEA SAFEGUARDED
materials
Be
BERYLLIUM
ATOMIC BOMB COMPRESSION GUN TYPES SHOPPING LIST
Zr
ZIRCONIUM
IAEA NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY controls the
processing, trading in and availability of these
materials
DU
DEPLETED URANIUM-238
PLUTONIUM-239
Pu-239
POLONIUM-210
Po-210
TRITIUM
H3
ENRICHED URANIUM-235
HEU
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Tritium Nothing much to speak of
Zirconium for its Bushehr fuel fabrication plans
Only Low Enriched Uranium for the Bushehr and
Tehran reactor fuel development
Depleted uranium from reactor fuel enrichment
No plutonium
IRAN
No polonium
This is what Iran claims to have capacity for
So lets examine those areas where the IAEA and
Iran are in dispute
Be
BUT the IAEA found several milligrams of
plutonium nitrate from extraction activities
during 1988 and 1992
Zr
BUT the IAEA found traces of polonium in 1993
DU
BUT the IAEA found several particles of HEU in
cascades in 2003 this led to the current
IAEA-IRAN crisis.
Pu-239
Po-210
H3
HEU
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Uranium Fuel
Nuclear Power Plant
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication
BUSHEHR
ESFAHAN
URANIUM ENRICHMENT
Iran claims its enrichment programme is solely
for the civil nuclear reactor at Bushehr
If so, thats a lot of trouble and expense from
mining to fuel in the reactor
SAGHAND
ESFAHAN
NATANZ
SAGHAND
Uranium Ore Mining
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NATANZ
NATANZ
From the cooling capacity you can backtrack to
the size of the enrichment cascades which, here,
is about 30,000 centrifuge units
TUNNEL PORTAL
SUPPORT (COOLING) SERVICES
UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES
2004
2002
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Natural Uranium 0.7 U-235
LEU Fuel for Bushehr 2 to 4 U-235 - 30
tonnes/year
HEU for Nuclear Warhead gt93 U-235 - 25kg/warhead
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Nuclear Weapons
Uranium Fuel
So, if the IAEA cannot access the Natanz plant it
looks at the radioactive waste for traces of HEU
This is what caused the IAEA-Iran spat in 2003
when the IAEA found gt93 HEU particles at Kalaye
HEU Gun Type Warhead
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication
Uranium Enrichment
The IAEAs concern is that HEU can be diverted at
Natanz
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ISRAEL
IRAN
N KOREA
Now we can fill in IRANs DU and HEU capacity
Be
Zr
DU
Pu-239
Po-210
H3
HEU
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Now lets look at Irans progress with materials
for the compression weapon
Pu-239
Po-210
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Uranium Fuel
BUSHEHR
Spent Fuel
PLUTONIUM SEPARATION
For this route, fissile plutonium has to be
extracted from natural uranium U-238 irradiated
in a reactor
So the IAEA require the Bushehr fuel to be
supplied by and RETURNED to Russia
Iran could do this by reprocessing the uranium
fuel from Bushehr
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ARAK
HEU Pu WARHEADS
ARAK
So, to overcome this, Iran builds a new, high
capacity research reactor, thereby bypassing
Bushehr
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication
The ARAK Heavy Water plant was started this year,
it produces 10 to 15 tonnes HW per year and the
RD-40 reactor requires an initial 60-80 tonnes
so 4 to 5 years before it is commissioned
To separate the plutonium from the fuel a small
reprocessing plant
Pu-239
A plant to provide the Heavy Water for the reactor
Chemical Separation
HEU
Milling Separation
Uranium Enrichment
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RD-40 HEAVY WATER REACTOR
HEAVY WATER PLANT
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ISRAEL
IRAN
N KOREA
Now we can fill in IRANs plutonium capacity
Be
Zr
DU
Pu-239
Po-210
H3
HEU
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ISRAEL
IRAN
N KOREA
The RD-40 reactor will also provide a
Polonium-210 generator
Be
Zr
DU
Pu-239
Po-210
H3
HEU
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ISRAEL
IRAN
N KOREA
And the heavy water moderator is a rich source of
tritium
Be
Zr
DU
Pu-239
Po-210
H3
HEU
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Bushehr
Tehran
Heavy Water Plant
HEU Pu WARHEADS
Lets compare the Iran, North Korea and Israel
nuclear programmes
Bushehr and Tehran reactors are safeguarded under
IAEA
Fuel Fabrication
Pu Breeding Reactor
Pu-239
Chemical Separation
Irans programme is dual-role and complex
HEU
Milling Separation
Uranium Enrichment
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North Korea
Economy Model No Frills One Track Military
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Israel
One Track Military Sophisticated Thermonuclear
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North Korea
Iran
Israel
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Iran has experimented with and is now building
the technology so when will it break out?
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2011
NOW
2 YEARS
UP TO 4 YEARS
1 TO 4 YEARS
NOW
4 YEARS
MUCH OF THIS MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY IN PLACE AT
ESFAHAN
TROUBLE AT NATANZ WITH MULTIPLE CASCADES
TAKE TEHRAN REACTOR OUT OF SAFEGUARDS OR WAIT FOR
RD-40 AT ARAK
COULD BE PROCURED AND POLISHED AT ESFAHAN
WAIT FOR ARAK RD-40 REACTOR TO COMMISSION
2-4 Years 1 to enrich 3 to 5 years
4 Years 1 to Pu Breed/Separate 5 years
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Whatever, one outcome is there is now to be UN
Security Council sanctions against Iran
Or is it a confused civil nuclear power programme?
Is IRAN on a dash for nuclear weapons
Well, whats it to be ?
Remember what the US and Brits concluded about
Iraqs WMD !
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(likely) UN Security Council Sanctions

Most Nuclear Technology Transfer
NUCLEAR SAFETY
Information
Training
Education Exchange
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BUSHEHR - largest source of radioactivity in
region
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I-131 prophylaxis
decontamination
evacuation
sheltering
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It may be that the risk is not be directly with
Irans nuclear weapons programme but, because of
UN sanctions, a breakdown of nuclear safety at
Bushehr!
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Large
and
ASSOCIATES
Consulting Engineers
http//www.largeassociates.com/