Lecture 6c: The Basel III

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Lecture 6c: The Basel III

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Title: Lecture 6c: The Basel III


1
Lecture 6c The Basel III Implications
2
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Enhancement to Basel II
  • Building blocks of Basel III
  • Elements of Basel III relevant for banks
    treasurers
  • Implications of Basel III
  • Impact on Indian banks
  • Conclusion

3
Basel I
  • The Basel I 1988 capital charge for credit
    risk a simple broad-brush approach
  • Amendment to Basel I 1996 to incorporate
    capital charge for market risk
  • Standardized Measurement Method (SMM)
  • Internal Models Approach (IMA)
  • Market risk capital framework
  • Capital charge for general market risk
  • Capital charge for specific risk (credit risk)

4
Basel II
  • The Basel II 2004
  • Enhanced risk coverage
  • Credit
  • Market and
  • Operational risks
  • A menu of approaches standardized to model
    based with increasing complexity
  • Three pillar approach
  • The Basel II of 2004 copied and pasted the
    capital charge for market risk of Basel I
    amendment of 1996

5
  • As a result, the capital charge framework for
    market risk did not keep pace with new market
    developments and practices
  • Capital charge for market risk in trading book
    calibrated much lower compared to banking book
    positions on the assumption that markets are
    liquid and positions can be wound up or hedged
    quickly

6
  • Capital charge for specific risk (credit risk) in
    market risk framework (trading book) was lower
    than capital charge for credit risk in banking
    book
  • Lower capital charge for trading book led to
    scope for capital arbitrage
  • Capital charge for counterparty credit risk for
    derivative positions also covered only the
    default risk and migration risk was not captured

7
  • The global financial crisis mostly happened in
    the areas of trading book /off balance sheet
    derivatives / market risk and inadequate
    liquidity risk management
  • Banks suffered heavy losses in their trading book
  • Banks did not have adequate capital to cover the
    losses

8
  • There was heavy reliance on short term wholesale
    funding
  • Unsustainable maturity mismatch
  • Insufficient liquidity assets to raise finance
    during stressed period

9
Enhancement to Basel II
  • Post- crisis, global initiatives to strengthen
    the financial regulatory system
  • July 2009 Enhancement to Basel II mostly in
    trading book

10
  • Pillar 1 Standardized approach
  • Higher risk weights for CRE securitization and
    other re-securitization exposures almost
    doubled
  • Bank not permitted to use any external rating of
    ABCP program where it had provided liquidity
    facility or credit enhancement treated as
    unrated
  • Operational criteria for using external ratings
    prescribed
  • CCF for all eligible liquidity facilities made
    uniform at 50, irrespective of maturity (earlier
    20 CCF for maturity less than one year)

11
  • Pillar 1 Internal models approach
  • Capital based on normal VaR and stressed VaR
  • Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) for interest rate
    instruments introduced which will capture default
    as well as migration risk

12
  • Pillar 2 guidance
  • firm wide governance and risk management
  • capturing risk of off balance sheet exposures and
    securitization activities
  • managing risk concentrations
  • managing reputation risk and liquidity risk
  • improving valuation practices and
  • implementing sound stress testing practices

13
  • Pillar 3
  • appropriate additional disclosures completing
    enhancements in Pillars 1 and 2
  • Securitization exposures in trading book
  • Sponsorship of off balance sheet vehicles
  • Re-securitization exposures and
  • Pipeline and warehousing risks with regard to
    securitization exposures

14
The Basel III
  • December 17, 2009 Basel Committee issued two
    consultative documents
  • Strengthening the resilience of the banking
    sector
  • International framework for liquidity risk
    measurement, standards and monitoring

15
  • The proposals were finalized and published on
    December 16, 2010
  • Basel III A global regulatory framework for more
    resilient banks and banking systems
  • Basel III International framework for liquidity
    risk measurement, standards and monitoring

16
  • Objectives
  • Improving banking sectors ability to absorb
    shocks
  • Reducing risk spillover to the real economy
  • Fundamental reforms proposed in the areas of
  • Micro prudential regulation at individual bank
    level
  • Macro prudential regulation at system wide
    basis

17
Building Blocks of Basel III
  • Raising quality (Tier 1 6, of which TCE -
    4.5), level (82.5 CCB), consistency
    (deductions mostly from TCE) and transparency of
    capital base
  • Improving/enhancing risk coverage on account of
    counterparty credit risk
  • Supplementing risk based capital requirement with
    leverage ratio
  • Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness
  • Reducing pro-cyclicality and introducing
    countercyclical capital buffers (0-2.5)
  • Minimum liquidity standards
  • We will discuss 2, 3, 4 and 6

18
Improving/enhancing risk coverage on account of
counterparty credit risk
  • In addition to July 2009 Basel II Enhancements
  • Counterparty credit risk (replacement cost value)
    is measured either by OEM, CEM, Standardized
    Method or IMM
  • Banks using IMM for measuring exposure for
    counterparty credit risk in derivative
    transactions will be required to use stressed
    inputs in Effective Expected Positive Exposure
    model

19
  • Banks using standardized approach or IRB approach
    for credit risk in OTC derivatives, must add a
    capital charge to cover CVA (Credit Valuation
    Adjustment) risk to capture down gradation of
    counterparty before default in all approaches
  • Capital charge for wrong way risk PD and EAD
    are positively correlated - in all approaches

20
  • Asset value correlation of 1.25 for financial
    firms of 100 billion assets and unregulated
    financial firms
  • Strengthening collateral management and extend
    margining period of risk to 20 days for OTC
    derivatives
  • Increasing incentives for use of CCPs compliant
    with CPSS/IOSCO norms, for OTC derivatives

21
Supplementing risk based capital requirement with
leverage ratio
  • Objectives to supplement capital ratio in
    capturing risk
  • Numerator Tier 1 capital
  • Denominator on and off balance sheet exposure
    credit equivalent with 100 CCF, except 10 CCF
    for unconditionally cancellable OBS commitments
  • Derivatives on CEM and Basel II netting basis
  • Collateral, guarantees or credit risk mitigation
    will not reduce on balance sheet exposures

22
  • Ratio 3
  • As a Pillar 2 measure to start with but will be
    integrated with Pillar 1
  • Leverage ratio will be tracked from January 1,
    2011 to see the result of the above definition
    and parallel run from January 1, 2013 to 2017 and
    final adjustment in 2017 Disclosure from
    January 2015
  • As Pillar 1 ratio from January 1, 2018

23
Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness
  • Capital and liquidity surcharge on SIBs/SIFIs
  • Activity restriction/exposure on SIBs/SIFIs
  • Intensive supervision of SIBs/SIFIs
  • Asset value correlation of 1.25 for exposures to
    large financial institutions and unregulated
    institutions
  • Stricter treatment of OTC derivatives not cleared
    through CCPs

24
  • Improving loss-absorbing capacity of SIBs/SIFIs -
    Contingent capital and bail-in-able debt
  • Orderly unwinding of SIBs/SIFIs improving
    resolvability living wills

25
International framework for liquidity risk
measurement, standards and monitoring
  • Key characteristic of the financial crisis was
    inaccurate and ineffective management of
    liquidity risk
  • Two standards/ratios proposed
  • Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) for short term (30
    days) liquidity risk management under stress
    scenario
  • Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for longer term
    structural liquidity mismatches

26
  • Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
  • Ensuring enough liquid assets to survive an acute
    stress scenario lasting for 30 days
  • Defined as stock of high quality liquid assets /
    Net cash outflow over 30 days gt 100
  • Stock of high quality liquid assets cash
    central bank reserves high quality sovereign
    paper (also in foreign currency supporting banks
    operation) state govt., PSE assets and high
    rated corporate/covered bonds at a discount of
    15 - (A)
  • Level 2 liquid assets with a cap of 40

27
  • Fundamental characteristics of liquid assets
  • Low credit and market risk
  • Ease and certainty of valuation
  • Low correlation with risky assets
  • Listed in a developed and recognized exchange
  • Market-related characteristics
  • Active and sizable market
  • Presence of committed market makers
  • Low market concentration
  • Flight to quality

28
  • Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
  • To promote medium to long term structural funding
    of assets and activities
  • Defined as Available amount of stable funding /
    Required amount of stable funding gt 100

29
  • Other monitoring tools for liquidity risk
    management
  • Contractual maturity mismatch
  • Concentration of funding
  • Available unencumbered assets
  • LCR by significant currency
  • Market-related monitoring tools

30
Implications of Basel III
  • Impact on economy
  • IIF study loss of output of 3 in G3 (US, Euro
    Area and Japan) on full implementation during
    2011-15
  • Basel Committee study likely to have modest
    impact of 0.2 on GDP for each year for 4 years
    for 1 increase in TCE
  • Similarly, for 25 increase in liquid assets,
    half the impact of 1 increase in TCE
  • However, long term gains will be immense

31
  • Global banks could have a gap of liquid assets of
    1,730 billion - to be met in four years
  • Global big banks could have a capital shortfall
    of 577 billion to meet 7 common equity norm
    to be met in eight years
  • Tier 1 capital ratio falls to 5.7 from 11.1
    under the new definition / adjustment of capital
    and increase in risk coverage (RWAs)
  • Therefore, long phase-in arrangements (Annex1)

32
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33
Conclusion
  • Basel Committee is undertaking a fundamental
    review of the trading book whether a particular
    position to be covered in trading book or banking
    book and capital requirement
  • Not only sluggish growth, high unemployment and
    low returns, but also more resolution will be the
    New Normal
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