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LESSON 20 CRISIS DECISION MAKING USS Vincennes Case Study

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Title: LESSON 20 CRISIS DECISION MAKING USS Vincennes Case Study


1
LESSON 20CRISIS DECISION MAKINGUSS Vincennes
Case Study
2
USS Vincennes Case StudyHistorical Background
  • THE LINGERING THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
  • SHAH OVERTHROWN - 62 AMERICANS TAKEN HOSTAGE
    (1979)
  • IRAN/IRAQ WAR COMMENCES (SEP 1980)
  • BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING (1983)
  • TANKER WAR ESCALATES (1984)
  • USS STARK INCIDENT (MAY 87)
  • IRAQI F-1 LAUNCHES (2) EXOCET MISSILES (Pilot
    Error)
  • 37 DEATHS, 21 INJURED, CO RELIEVED FOR CAUSE
  • U.S. REFLAGS KUWAITI TANKERS (1987)
  • OPERATION EARNEST WILL - U.S. REFLAGS 11 TANKERS
    (JUL)
  • M/V BRIDGETON STRIKES A MINE (as did two other
    vessels)
  • IRAN AJR CAUGHT LAYING MINES (SEP 87)
  • USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS STRIKES MINE (APR 88)
  • OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS - Response against the
    Iranian Navy

3
USS Vincennes IncidentSeven Minutes that
Stunned the Navy
4
USS Stark IncidentHistorical Background (Review)
5
USS Vincennes (CG-49)Combat Information Center
6
Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East Chain
of Command
Combatant Commander (COCOM)
Component Commander (OPCON)
Warfare Commanders (TACON) O-6
7
USS Vincennes Case StudyAir Warfare PID Criteria
  • Kinematics (course, speed, altitude ??, CPA)
  • Point of origin
  • Composition (Quantity)
  • ESM
  • IFF
  • Position relative to COMAIR routes
  • Published AOG Flight Schedules
  • Intel Reports (Indications and Warnings)
  • Voice comms (Queries and Warnings)

8
USS Vincennes Case StudyPeacetime Rules of
Engagement (ROE)
  • COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
  • Officers in command are not only responsible for
    ensuring that they conduct all combat operations
    in accordance with the law of armed conflict
    they are also responsible for the proper
    performance of their subordinates.
  • While a commander may delegate some or all of
    his authority, he/she cannot delegate
    responsibility for the conduct of the forces
    he/she commands.

9
USS Vincennes Case StudyPeacetime Rules of
Engagement (ROE)
  • INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE - permits the use
    of force in self-defense against armed attack or
    threat of imminent armed attack subject to the
    following
  • NECESSITY - use of force must be IRT a hostile
    act or demonstration of hostile intent.
  • PROPORTIONALITY - use of force must be limited
    in intensity, duration, and scope.
  • HOSTILE ACT - deliberate attacks by opposing
    forces.
  • Examples actual attacks, laying mines in
    international waters, etc.
  • HOSTILE INTENT - the threat of imminent use of
    force by opposing forces.
  • Examples training weapons systems, energizing
    fire control radars, maneuvering to launch
    position.

10
USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03
Jul 88Surface Engagement
  • VINCENNES IN GULF ENROUTE PVST BAHRAIN
  • 0711 MON hears reports of 5-7 explosions near a
    Liberian tanker MON directed by GS to proceed
    away from the tanker VIN directed to vector
    SH-60B to investigate
  • 0742 OL25 observers gunboats circling a German
    cargo ship
  • 0915 OL25 reports being fired upon by IRG
    gunboats
  • 0939 VIN requests permission to engage
    gunboats
  • 0941 GS gave permission to engage boghammers
    with guns
  • 0942 Iranian gunboats turn inbound toward VIN
  • 0943 VIN/MON commenced fire with 5in/54 guns
  • 094530 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas
  • 1003 VIN/MON ceased fire (119 rounds expended)

UNCLASSIFIED
11
USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03
Jul 88Air Engagement
  • 094530 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas
  • 0947 VIN gains radar contact (SPY-1A) (47 nm)
  • 0949 VIN issues initial warning over MAD to TN
    4131 (40 nm) Ten warnings given in next five
    minutes (3 IAD / 7 MAD)
  • 0950 VIN reports inbound F-14 to GB (32 nm)
  • 0951 VIN states that intentions are to engage
    contact at 20 nm if the contact does not turn
    away (now 30 nm)
  • 0951 VIN forward 5in gun jams (MT51) - ship
    turns violently
  • 0952 VIN issues several warnings to TN 4131
    (25nm)
  • 0952 VIN requests and receives permission to
    illuminate (20 nm)
  • 0953 TN 4131 was at 16nm SPD 371 kts, ALT
    11,230 ft
  • 095405 VIN engages TN 4131 at 10 nm (salvo size
    two)

UNCLASSIFIED
12
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13
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14
USS Vincennes Case StudyArtershocks
  • Formal Board of Inquiry was convened by RADM
    Fogerty 13 Jul 88.
  • Official parties to the inquiry
  • RADM Less (principal)
  • CAPT Rodgers (principal)
  • LCDR Scott Lustig (Air TAO)
  • LCDR Vic Guillory (TAO)
  • Findings
  • during the formal portion of the inquiry, the
    board found no grounds for disciplinary or
    punitive action.

15
USS Vincennes Case StudyInvestigation - Synopsis
of Facts
  • IRAN AIR ACTUAL FLIGHT PROFILE
  • Always ascending
  • Only mode III IFF squawk
  • Within airway Amber 59
  • Maximum air speed of 385 knots
  • AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
  • No Aegis weapon system equipment deficiencies
    existed during the engagement. Link-11 was down
    for 28 seconds.
  • PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
  • With little time and under combat stress during
    the surface engagement, watchstanders
    misinterpreted some tactical information.

UNCLASSIFIED
16
USS Vincennes Case StudyFundamental
Considerations that the Vincennes Could Not
Control
  • ISSUES FACED BY CAPTAIN RODGERS
  • Ongoing surface engagement.
  • The unidentified assumed hostile contact had
    taken off from a civilian-military airfield.
  • Heading directly toward Vincennes, relentlessly
    closing.
  • No definitive radar emissions.
  • Unanswered warnings.
  • Short decision window.
  • No proof that the contact was not related to the
    ongoing surface fight.

UNCLASSIFIED
17
CRISIS LEADERSHIPKey Lessons
  • MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY
  • be willing to show flexibility do not be tied
    to inflexible policies of the past that may not
    apply to the fast-moving situations of the
    present.
  • be open to suggestions on how to solve crises
  • AVOID TASK FIXATION
  • someone needs to be looking at the big picture
  • AVOID SCENARIO FULFILLMENT BIASES
  • dont neglect to search for disconfirmatory
    information.
  • KEEP THINGS SIMPLE
  • ask people to do things that they are already
    trained to do.

18
USS Vincennes Case StudyEpilogue
  • CAPT Rodgers
  • Completed remainder of scheduled deployment,
    returning to San Diego in 24 Oct 88.
  • July 1989 assumed command of TACTRAGRUPAC
  • Retired Aug 1991 and is now a consultant
  • RADM Less
  • Subsequently promoted to VADM and appointed
    COMNAVAIRPAC.
  • LCDR Vic Guillory and LCDR Scott Lustig
  • Both promoted to CDR and completed successful XO
    tours aboard new-construction Aegis Cruisers.
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