If two or more agree to make wills and not to revoke without mutual consent. ... no joint names because she was getting a divorce Norse LJ: ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation
Exhaustive categorisation not possible will examine some other of the categories but the main focus in this lecture is CTs of the
family home.
3 Mutual wills
CTs can arise from mutual wills. If two or more agree to make wills and not to revoke without mutual consent.
If first to die performs then it will be unconscionable for second to deviate from terms.
CT imposed on survivors property.
4 Proctor v Dale 1999 4 All ER
Held not necessary for testators to agree to leave property to each other.
Equity will impose trust on property of survivor where each testator agrees to leave property to third party.
Goodchild v Goodchild 1997 3 All Er 63 for mutual wills must be clear evidence intent not to unilaterally revoke.
5 Wills and formalities
Formalities s9 Wills Act 1837 a will must be in writing signed by testator and two witnesses in presence of testator
If not will is void.
6 Wills secret trusts
Take effect on testators death do not comply with requirements of Wills Act
Testator normally leaves property to someone prima facie an outright gift
But donee has agreed to take on certain trusts fully secret trust
7 Half secret trust
Property left on trust in will but without specifying terms trust
8 Why a secret trust?
Usually to keep identity of beneficiary secret
or
testator undecided about dispositions
Subject to some conditions secret trusts are enforceable despite not conforming with Wills Act.
9 Secret Trusts
STs traditionally justified on basis of doctrine of fraud
But modern doctrine is that STs arise independently of will
Are secret trusts express or CTs? Important in case of land and s53(1)(b) LPA 1925 which applies to express only.
10 CTs and crime unlawful killing
A person cannot benefit from their crime
If one person kills cannot take benefit from will or through intestacy rules. If killer acquire legal title to victims property he will hold it on CT for people next entitled.
11 Fraud
CT imposed where property gained through fraud. See
Rochefoucauld v Boustead 1897 1 Ch 196
Bannister v Bannister 1948 2 All ER 133
Binnions v Evans
12 Land
Contract to sell land is specifically enforceable vendor holds it on CT for purchaser. CT arises through maxim
equity treats as done that which ought to be done.
Contract for sale of personal property not generally enforceable unless unique see
Oughtred v IRC 1960 AC 206
13 Imperfect gifts
Substantive law relating to this dealt with in trustees lectures
In circumstances where failed transfer or gift as declaration of trust no real declaration of trust so if settlor is to be treated as trustee then must equity must impose a trust. See
Re Rose
Mascall v Mascall
Pennington v Waine
in lecture on creation of express trusts
14 CTs of the family home 15 CTs of family home
Trusts can arise where dispute as to ownership
e.g. where property owned by one cohabitee and the other claims interest through contribution to the purchase price or improvements or payment of domestic expenses
RT when two people contribute to purchase legal owner hoods it on RT in proportion to contribution
CT if one does not make direct contribution to purchase price interest under a CT? or proprietary estoppel?
16 CTs social context
Family home CTs arose out of married women where property held in husbands sole name
Wife may claim under CT if direct contribution to purchase
But if mortgage paid by husband then only monetary contributions count. CT developed to provide share. See Gissing v Gissing 1971 AC 886 and Pettit v Pettit 1970 AC 777 and also the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
17 Family home
MCA 1973 does not apply to unmarried cohabitees so general law principles apply doctrines of CTs and RTs
Also important to married couples where third party is claiming priority interest e.g. mortgagee
18 RTs and family home
Claim under RT requires direct contribution to purchase price at outset - share is then proportionate
Contrib can be payment towards mortgage instalment if agreed at outset
19 RTs limitations
Limitations of RT clear no contribution to initial purchase price then useless. Proportionate basis can also be unfair.
CT sometimes preferable. Not limited to contributions to the purchase price or share of entitlement
20 CTs requirements
Two requirements for CT
(i) common intention to share the beneficial interest in property
(ii) acted to their detriment on basis of that intention
21 Trusts of the family home
Lloyds Bank v Rosset 1991 1 AC 107
Lord Bridge two situations
(i) Agreement to share OR (ii) no such agreement.
If no agreement then conduct is used to infer common intention to share.
22 Common intention CTs
CT gives effect to common intention.
Can arise from (i) express agreement
OR (ii) inferred from conduct.
23 (i) express agreement
Agreement to share beneficial interest required.
24 (i) express agreement
Agreement must be expressly discussed.
25 (i) express agreement
Bridge considered Eves v Eves 1975 3 All ER 768 and Grant v Edwards 1986 Ch 638 as outstanding examples of category (i)
In both cases female partner misled by male partner
26 (i) express agreement
In Grant v Edwards female partner told by male no joint names because she was getting a divorce
Norse LJ facts raised inference of common intention of females proprietary interest
27 (i) express agreement
Hammond v Mitchell 1991 1 WLR 1127 Hammond said he would have to put house in his name because of tax problems he had lost his accounts in fire.
Hyett v Stanley 2003 All ER (D) 284 statement to claimant that no need for her name on deeds because it was on mortgage and would give her a right to the property was a clear inference of understanding to share.
28 Common intention
Common intention without more does not give a CT. Is equal to express declaration of trust but ineffective unless formalities of 53(1)(b) LPA 1925 have been complied with. But does not apply to CTs see 53(2).
Claimant must have acted to their detriment in reliance on common intention.
29 Detrimental reliance?
Difficult to know what detrimental reliance is.
Conduct is different from that for inference of common intention.
Nothing short of direct contribution to purchase price will give rise to such an inference
Detriment not needed where express agreement
30 Detrimental reliance
Rosset does not analyse the conduct needed to give rise to a CT. Reference should be made to Grant v Edwards as leading authority
Grant made substantial contributions to expenses of household maintenance that enabled Edwards to pay mortgage thus detrimental reliance. Type of conduct that is acting on common intention? Uncertain.
31 Detrimental reliance
Norse LJ behaviour that would be unreasonable unless expected to have interest in house
Mustill LJ conduct to be used to determine quid pro quo if claimant provides this then sufficient
Browne-Wilkinson VC more liberal, any act of detriment done by claimant relating to joint lives is sufficient
32 Conduct as detrimental reliance
Conduct that has been considered sufficient
Grant v Edwards substantial indirect contribs to mortgage and bringing up children
Eves v Eves labouring work
Hammond v Mitchell unpaid business assistant as well as looking after house and children
Stokes v Anderson 1991 1 FLR 391 12k to man to pay ex-wifes mortgage
Chan v Lun giving up political career and helping with property development projects
33 Contrast Rosset
But Mrs Rossets activities painting , decorating, supervising builders carrying out renovations, ordering, delivering materials so trifling as to be de minimis.
34 No agreement to share
Conduct becomes basis from which to infer (i) common intention and (ii) conduct to give rise to CT
Usually nothing less than direct contributions to purchase price
35 Trowbridge v Trowbridge 2002 All ER (D) 207
Court found no discussions that Mr T to have interest in house. As no discussions possible inference from conduct? Payment to purchase price or by mortgage instalments. Common intent arose from his mortgage contributions
36 Contrast
Buggs v Buggs 2003 All ER (D) 379 claimant contributed to common pool from which mortgage payment were made. Judge decided no trust in her favour perverse and criticised.
37 Rosset
Rosset house bought from family trust. Property bought in Mr Rossets name. Mr Rosset obtained 15 k loan from Lloyds then defaulted. Possession claimed by bank and Mrs R claimed overriding beneficial interest 70(1)(g) LRA 1925
38 Rosset
Mrs R claim that express agreement that property would be jointly owned rejected at first instance. But common intention that Mrs should have beneficial interest under CT. HL held activities insufficient to justify inference.
39 Express agreement
Absence of express agreement not necessarily fatal court may still infer.
But only where conduct leads court to infer this is what happened I.e. court cannot infer simply if one would have been reasonable had the parties thought about it.
40 Direct contributions
Direct contributions to mortgage or purchase price will readily lead the court to infer an agreement was present.
See Burns v Burns 2004 EWCA Civ 1258 Gissing v Gissing decorating and gardening work justified on basis of making the homes more pleasant rather than gaining a share of equity.
41 Rosset indirect contributions
Bridge appears to rule out indirect contributions as in Grant v Edwards
These were accepted in Burns as giving rise to CT.
42 Rosset indirect contributions
Fox LJ absent express agreement then conduct is sued to infer common intention especially expenditure.
Court looks for expenditure related to purchase of house e.g. making of indirect contributions
43 Grant v Edwards indirect contributions
Norse LJ expenditure referable to purchase of house is necessary duel effect in establishing common intention and detrimental reliance
44 Rosset - indirect contributions
Does Bridge rule out such contributions?
Analysed Grant v Edwards females indirect contributions to mortgage and Eves v Eves where labouring done. Conduct was sufficient because of express common intention. On its own conduct was insufficient to base claim to CT.
45
Le Foe v Le Foe HC concluded Bridge had not intended to exclude wifes indirect contribution to mortgage. Court entitled to infer from indirect contribs of Mrs Le Foe parties intended she should have beneficial interest.
46 Improvements
Are improvements - contributions of time and labour enough to give rise to inference necessary to found CT?
These can detrimental reliance - see Eves
But unclear whether would fall into Bridge second category (see earlier decisions Cooke v Head 1974 2 All ER 1124 and Hussey v Palmer but now apparently ruled out)
47 Rosset - criticisms
Confusion of second category with that of RTs. Direct contributions traditionally gives rise to RT but in Rosset is basis for CT.
48 CT/RT confusion
CT/RT confusion problematic for quantification. Midland Bank v Cooke 1995 4 All ER 562 CA held that where direct contrib made not an RT on proportionate basis but would assess contributions the parties could be assumed to have intended by undertaking a survey of whole course of conduct relevant to ownership.
49 See also
Drake v Whipp 1996 1 FLR 826 D made direct contributions to the purchase and claimed direct share under RT CA found a CT not RT as evidence of express common intention to share can employ broad brush approach set out in Midland Bank v Cooke. Here fair share was one third.
50 Le Foe v Le Foe
Parties married 40 years. In husbands sole name. Wife made indirect contributions to mortgage and cash contributions to second mortgage and arrears on earlier mortgage. Husband argued beneficial interest was 10. J applied Midland Bank v Cooke. From whole course of dealing share should equal 50.
51 RTs/CTs and Rosset
Direct contribution can equal RT and a proportionate share
Under Rosset such a contribution can give rise to CT or can be used to infer necessary common intention
Court not bound to apply RT formula but can take account of whole range of conduct as above
52 Quantification
Where express common intention to share then shares equals what parties agree e.g. Hammond v Mitchell
53 Quantification
Where there is no express agreement then principles laid down in Gissing v Gissing apply. Can an inference be drawn from parties conduct of what share was intended.
e.g. Grant v Edwards and Hyett v Stanley
54 Quantification
e.g. half shares awarded in
Grant v Edwards and Hyett v Stanley
55 Quantification
Could be inferred that share was to be quantified later having regard to total contributions of whatever kind.
Court can then determine what in all the circs is a fair share. Stokes v Anderson Oxley v Hiscock 2004 EWCA Civ 546
56 Oxley v Hiscock
Court at first instance determined shares on basis of intention to share equally.
On appeal defendant argued that shares should be proportionate on basis of original contributions.
57 Oxley v Hiscock
CA held each entitled to share considered fair in regard to whole course of dealings including occasional expenses.
Accounting also for defendants greater contribution fair share was 60/40.
58 Oxley v Hiscock
Where no discussion therefore each is entitled to share court considers fair after survey of whole course of dealing.
Chadwick LJ gave leading judgement followed Gissing. In absence of any express agreement intention must have been to agree this later on what was agreed to be fair.
59 Quantification
Under second limb of Rosset CT as a result of direct contribution to the purchase price then starting point in quantifying shares is proportionate entitlement.
e.g. Springette v Defoe 1992 2 FLR 388 RT ordered after council house discount obtained. See also Ashe v Mumford 33 HLR 756 and
Huntingford v Hobbs 1993 1 FLR 736
60 Quantification
Where direct contribution court is not bound to use proportionate basis.
Midland Bank v Cooke wife made contrib of 550 being half of wedding gift to both parties. At first instance awarded 6.5.
61 Quantification
CA held not bound to deal with quantification on strict basis of cash contrib. Could attribute intention to share beneficial interest by survey of whole course of dealing and take account of all conduct relevant to issue of hat shares were intended.
62 Quantification
Approach in Midland Bank v Cooke applied applied in other cases
63 Oxley v Hiscock
CA in Oxley criticised approach of Waite LJ in Midland Bank v Cooke that whole course of dealing should be surveyed
Chadwick thought this artificial that shares should be fixed as from time of the acquisition when the evidence suggests they gave no thought to the matter.
64 Lloyds Bank v Rosset
Rosset appeared to provide clear statement but problems surrounding quantification of beneficial interest especially where direct contribution is made
65 Law Commission
Discussion paper Sharing Homes
law is complicated, difficult to apply and unsuited to informalities of home sharing.
Much depends on what court identifies as common intention unrealistic