Southern African Regional Poverty Network Funding Presentation

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Politics and the PRS Approach in Southern
Africa
Benjamin Roberts
Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty
Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka 9-11th March 200
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Scope of presentation

• Aim
• Provide a desk-based review of emerging findings
  on the political dimensions of the PRSP approach
  in the sub-region
  
• Builds upon recent research by the Overseas
  Development Institute (ODI, London)
  
• Outline
• Coverage of the PRSP initiative in the
  sub-region
  
• Emergent themes from the process of development
  and ongoing implementation of PRS
  
• Limitation
• Formulation versus implementation (evidence
  base)
  

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PRSPs in Africa

• PRSPs dominant vehicle for development policy in
  SSA.
  

• Sub-Saharan Africa (48)
• 19 full PRSPs
• 9 I-PRSPs
• 8 not eligible
• 12 no (I-)PRSP
• Southern Africa (14)
• 5 full PRSPs
• 1 I-PRSP
• 6 not eligible
• 2 no (I-)PRSP but started process

Full PRSP
I-PRSP
Not eligible
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PRSPs in Southern Africa Experience to date
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Source World Bank, UNDP (2004)
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(No Transcript)
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Creating Spaces Opening up policymaking processes

• PRSP formulation conceived as being conducted in
  consultation with a broad range of stakeholders.
  
• Opening new spaces for domestic policy dialogue
  one of potentially most salient contributions of
  PRSP process
  
• Southern Africa Some supporting evidence that
  process of formulating PRS begun to encourage
  opening up of policy spaces.
  
• Representation of CS in PRSP processes has
  commonly assumed the form of the participation of
  NGOs, both in institutional structures overseeing
  PRSP formulation and local consultations.
• Process catalyst for establishment of new
  national networks of CSOs to engage with poverty
  policy (e.g. MEJN, CSPR) Pre-existing umbrella
  organizations also instrumental (e.g. LCN).

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Creating Spaces Opening up policymaking processes

• Predominant form of CS participation through
  district, regional and national consultations.
  
• Varied in coverage and depth from 7 zonal
  workshops in Tanzania to, consultations in 200
  villages in Lesotho.
  
• Engagement with CSOs varied in level of
  inclusiveness and representation Collaboration
  less frequent, and joint decision-making
  extremely rare (Eberlei, 2001).
• Fast trcak PRSPs (Tan, Moz) appear less
  consultative in nature than some more recently
  produced PRS (Zam, Les).
  
• Relative inexperience of govts desire to secure
  debt relief.
  
• Despite positive achievements, concerns that PRSP
  process may have by-passed politics in some
  countries and established forms of representation
  that do not necessarily advance the interests of
  the poor over the longer term.
• Problem key actors and institutions (parliament,
  politicians, and political parties) marginally
  involved
  
• What organizations, interest groups or social
  forces have managed to take advantage of the
  political space?
  

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Political Timing of PRSPs

• Launch of the PRSP approach by IFIs and
  subsequent adoption by countries in Southern
  Africa corresponded to different national
  political events and processes.
• Political timing can be either more or less
  favourable to the PRS process.
  
• Some instances relatively fortuitous concurrence
  between national and international timetables,
  allowing both governments to use ongoing domestic
  processes to feed into PRSP formulation, helping
  to shape them as nationally owned strategies.
• Less favourable in the face of electoral
  politics, the PRSP initiative may produce a
  tension between the desire for a deep,
  participatory process on the one hand and the
  urgency of finalizing the PRSP quickly in order
  for poor countries to access debt relief

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Political Timing of PRSPs

• Tanzania
• 2000 was an election year President Mkapa keen
  to be seen to be doing something about poverty
  and debt burden.
  
• The PRSP/HIPC initiative provided President and
  CCM with a crucial opportunity in run-up to the
  elections
  
• Decision to eliminate primary school fees
  politically popular policy change
  
• Accessing debt relief
• Theme of his re-election campaign.
• Next elections scheduled for October 2005
  Election calendar is again coinciding with the
  development of the second PRSP.

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Political Timing of PRSPs

• Mozambique Timing proved to be of mixed favour.
• Political deadlock following disputed Dec-99
  electoral outcomes deteriorated into riots in
  Nov-00. Increasing focus on these events crowded
  out time and space for political dialogue on
  poverty reduction policy during a key phase of
  the PRSP process. Consequently, neither
  parliament nor political parties were brought
  into the PRSP process.
• Nonetheless, fortuitous coincidence betw.
  national and international timetables govt use
  Action Programme for the Reduction of Absolute
  Poverty 2000-2004 (PARPA) as basis of I-PRSP and
  PRSP formulation, thus helping to shape them as
  nationally owned strategies.

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Political Timing of PRSPs

• Zambia
• PRSP process coincided with debacle and
  fragmentation of the ruling party following
  President Chilubas attempt (late 00/early 01)
  at changing constitution to allow for a third
  term.
• Also occurred alongside Dec 2001 electoral
  campaign. Impact parties and candidates notably
  absent from the PRSP debate. Fear that the PRSP
  would be perceived as a political platform for
  political parties to gain unnecessary mileage.
  This made it difficult to invite parties to PRSP
  conferences.
• Malawi
• I-PRSP preparation understood simply as a
  requirement for reaching the HIPC Decision
  Point.
  

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Political Timing of PRSPs

• Lesotho potential political risks to PRSP
  process emerged around May 2002 elections (in
  middle of PRS formulation)
  
• Concern result in insufficient attention being
  paid to developing the PRSP affect participatory
  process quality and timeliness of final document
  (disruption of process).
• Concern change in government may affect
  commitment to PRSP (ownership).
  
• Community consultations occurred weeks before
  Election Day were not disrupted.
  
• Timing of Parliamentary briefings during the
  preparation of the 2002 General Elections not
  ideal.

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PRS Implementation and Good Governance

• When governments perform poorly resources are
  wasted, services go undelivered, and citizens are
  denied social, legal, and economic protection.
  
• Emphasis on good governance underlies PRSP
  approach and the associated process
  conditionality
  
• Latent political objective of PRSP approach by
  encouraging good governance, the state will
  become more responsive to the needs of the
  citizenry, especially the poor
• Lingering questions
• Is there any indication that governments are
  becoming more responsive to citizen demands
  across a range of policy areas?
  
• Are neopatrimonial structures beginning to weaken
  and consequently facilitate progress in reducing
  poverty?
  
• Examining existing documentation together with
  attitudinal data from Afrobarometer series
  rather tentative conclusions

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PRS Implementation and Good Governance

• Limitation in most instances, 1 year is probably
  insufficient time to see significant results.

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State Responsiveness Economic Reform

• Management of the national economy in 2002/03 is
  viewed in a moderately positive light in all
  countries except Malawi.
  
• Tanzania 68 say government handling
  macroeconomic affairs fairly/very well 50 in
  Zambia 48 in Mozambique.
  
• Malawi two-thirds feel that economy being
  managed fairly/very badly.
  
• Specific economic policies generally negative
  appraisal
  
• 53 of Tanzanians feel government is doing well
  at keeping inflation stable, a third or less
  think so in the other three countries.
  
• In all 4 countries, government is rated as doing
  poorly in creating employment and narrowing gaps
  between the rich and the poor, especially Malawi
  and Zambia.
• Tanzanians, Mozambicans think mass living
  standards have improved since the adoption of
  economic structural adjustment and the PRSP while
  in Zambia and Malawi the converse is true.
• Agreement that economic reform has reduced the
  availability of job opportunities and led to
  inequality. especially pronounced in Malawi and
  Zambia (nearly 80 perceive a worsening trend).

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State Responsiveness Economic Reform

• Growing social inequalities emerge as a driving
  force for popular dissatisfaction with
  market-oriented economic reforms.

• Majority think governments economic policies
  have hurt most people and that reforms have
  only benefited a few.
  
• Zambia 3 times as many people think that
  economic reform incurs more costs than benefits.
  
  
• Moz slim majority believe that the governments
  economic policies have helped most people
  possibly reflects relatively robust per capita
  economic growth 1993 - 2003 (5.7).
• Trends little change with majority still
  perceiving adverse impact.

Perception of Economic Policies
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State Responsiveness Economic Reform

• While one might anticipate that, under such
  circumstances, people would support abandoning
  market-driven economic policies reality is more
  mixed.
• Tanzanians and Zambians remarkable degree of
  economic patience, with 58 and 50 respectively
  willing to accept some hardships nowin order
  for the economy to get better in the future
• Malawians (40) and Mozambicans (37) are the
  less patient, and in the former case there is
  majority support (55) for an overhaul of
  economic policy.
• Economic patience positive in that it gives
  policymakers time to achieve results, negative in
  that it may be sign of uncritical acceptance of
  status quo

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State Responsiveness Social Reform

• After more than 2 years experience in
  implementing PRS in Tanzania and approx. 1 year
  in other 3 cases Remains great variation in
  perceived state responsiveness, as measured by
  the level of difficulty in accessing certain
  types of state provided services.
• Relatively easy to get a place in a school for a
  young child but difficult to access HH services,
  business loans or welfare payments
  
• Perceived state responsiveness subsequently
  influences the overall assessment of governments
  social performance.
  
• All cases majority believe government doing a
  good job in terms of addressing educational needs
  and improving basic health services.
  
• Tanzania approximately three-quarters give a
  positive appraisal.
  
• More negative assessment is reported in relation
  to the delivery of water to the household.

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State Responsiveness

• Limited level of agreement in these countries
  that elected leaderslook after the interests of
  people like (me) or listen to what people like
  (me) have to say.
• Despite participatory PRSP processes, upwards of
  two-thirds of citizens in the PRSP countries
  acknowledge that the agents of the state are
  unresponsive to popular needs (esp. high in Zam,
  Mal)

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State Responsiveness Summing Up

• Economic domain Deeply entrenched view among
  citizens in the 4 countries that governments
  economic policies continue to hurt most people,
  related to real concerns about the shortage of
  wage-paying jobs and about the poverty,
  destitution, and shortages of food that often
  accompany unemployment.
• Social front some signs that pro-poor spending
  is increasing the assets of the poor through the
  provision of social services (e.g. abolition of
  school fees in Tanzania).
• Tension between the two dynamics PRS likely to
  exacerbate this (old wine in new bottles
  debate) unless pro-poor growth achieved.
  
• Tendency of PRS to privilege social sector
  spending (educ, health) while longer-term
  structural issues (e.g. employment, agriculture)
  tend to be underempahsised
• Result increasing disaffection, and belief that
  state is not listening to what people have to
  say and responding to their needs.

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Clients or citizens? Political Values

• 2002/03 Afrobarometer round Some tension between
  democratic and neopatrimonial political values
  
• Strong desire to influence the decisions taken by
  political leaders and belief in equal treatment
  by leaders (rejection of neopatrimonialsm),
  
• Apparent contradiction 60 - 69 still tend to
  see themselves as the clients of big men.
  
• Perceived Govt performance w.r.t. allowing
  ordinary people to influence government and treat
  people fairly?
  
• Results indicate that further institutional
  development is required in these areas.
  
• 73 Malawians think democratic transition
  improved ability of ordinary people to influence
  what government does compared with half of
  Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Zambians.
• Even less (47-56) perceive gains in equal and
  fair treatment for all people by the government
  since democratization.
  
• Appears to be emerging an increasing demand for
  political accountability. However, despite this,
  there is still substantive room for improvement
  on the supply side in enabling the citizenry to
  influence government and promoting the equal
  treatment of all.