US Coast Guard Sector Boston

1
LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRITLoss of Propulsion off
the Massachusetts Coast2/11/08
CAPT Gail Kulisch
2
Situation

• Monday, 11 Feb 2008, 630 a.m., LNGC CATALUNYA
  SPIRIT reports loss of propulsion 37nm off
  Provincetown.
• Tugs enroute.
• Established Incident Command Post at Sector
  Boston w/ Unified Command reps FOSC U.S.
  Coast Guard SOSC Mass. Dept. of
  Environmental Protection RP Teekay
  Shipping
• CGC ESCANABA diverted to vessel as On Scene
  Commander
• CG helicopter air lifts technicians, class
  surveyor and CG response personnel to CATALUNYA
  SPIRIT for inspection/investigation.
• Tugs took control of vessel at 2200.

3
Situation

• Wednesday, 13 Feb 08, CATALUNYA SPIRIT towed to
  safe area 7 NM off Gloucester. Safety/Security
  zone enforced around vessel.
• Thursday, 14 Feb 08, propulsion and power
  generating system tested with satisfactory
  results. Tests and repairs continued.
• Friday, 15 Feb 08, class surveyor deemed ship
  safe to sail, detention rescinded, vessel
  departed zone returned to international
  service.

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Vessel Path
CULTIVATORSHOALS
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Trajectory for diesel/bunker fuel onboard
6
Marine Inspector, Investigator, Class Society
Tech reps onboard LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT
Tug ATLANTIC SALVOR
Tug IONA MACALLISTER
USCGC ESCANABA
Tug FREEDOM
Tug LIBERTY
OSRV ME RESPONDER
OSRV NJ RESPONDER
OSRV DEL RESPONDER on stand-by
7
Pollution Response

• Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) under
  contract with The OBriens Group (QI).
• OSRV MAINE RESPONDER and OSRV NEW JERSEY
  RESPONDER on-scene with OSRV DELAWARE RESPONDER
  on stand-by.
• Environmental Unit and Technical Specialists
  developed Shoreline Protection/Recovery Plan.
  sensitive areas protective booming strategies
  list of equipment/resources available

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Safe Area for Vessel

• Utilized COMDTINST 16451.9 U.S. Coast Guard
  Places of Refuge Policy to conduct risk
  assessment of 3 potential safe areas.
• Risk Probability x Consequences Probability
  evaluated affect of towing, sea conditions,
  currents, wind, ease of response operations,
  etc. Consequences Human Health and
  Safety Natural Resources Economic
  Impacts
• Determined Northern Area location was lowest
  risk option for vessel.

9
Best Practices

• Maintained high degree of situational awareness
  on-site presence (Marine Inspector onboard
  vessel, USCGC ESCANABA on-scene, etc) Common
  Operating Picture (COP)

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Best Practices

• ICS/Unified Command
• Disciplined positive control fully manned 24x7
  for duration of operation
• Rigorous planning cycle
• Aggressively managed transitions
• Valuing the risk equation Risk threat x
  vulnerability x CONSEQUENCE

11
DATE February 16, 2008 093758 EST
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Best Practices

• Strategic communications as element of
  operations 4-hour TACREPS conference calls
  words matter
• Establishing and being guided by benchmarks
  successful operation and testing of vessel
  propulsion system completion of permanent
  repairs satisfaction of class society
  approval of class report, removal of detention,
  return vessel to intl service
• Rigor to root cause analysis early engagement
  of subject matter experts on-scene/external

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Vessel Casualty

• Vessel equipped with a steam propulsion plant.
• Boiler is fed water by steam feed water pumps.
  (1)
• There was a high back pressure on the discharge
  side of the feed water pump.
• This high back pressure caused the feed pump to
  trip.
• Due to the inability of the crew to take
  immediate reactive steps to start an electric
  feed water pump, the boiler shut down due to a
  low water level. (2)
• Once the vessel was dark ship, the crew was
  unable to put the diesel generator on-line to
  feed power to the main switchboard to power the
  auxiliary systems necessary to put the boiler
  back on-line. (3)

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Steam feed pump
Electric feed pump
Steam feed pump
To Main Steam System/Engines
Emergency Generator
1
Feed pump trip on back press.
2
Boiler
Boiler
Emergency Circuit Power
Boilers trip on low water level
Turbo-generator
Inability to provide electricity to main
switchboard
Diesel Generator
Main Switchboard
Turbo-generator
3
Power to main switchboard
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Vessel Casualty

• Causative Factors
• Defective back pressure trip.
• Commonly shared discharge line from steam feed
  pumps (common trip).
• Crew failure to start electric feed pump.
• Inability to supply power from the diesel
  generator to main supply panel.
• Crew failure to properly reset diesel generator
  breakers.
• Corrective Actions
• Faulty back pressure trip repaired.
• Additional alarm installed in system for back
  pressure trip line.
• Vessel operating protocol created for loss of
  steam feed pump including remedial actions.
• Maintenance procedures modified for diesel
  generator.
• Crew training and operational procedures created
  to address proper reset procedure for diesel
  generator breakers.

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Key Issues

• Vessel/crew/public/environment safety
• Sustainment of natural gas supply chain integrity
  to NE
• Information management demands/political
  concerns
• Thorough casualty investigation
• Complexity of command and control within shipping
  companies
• Overlapping jurisdictions