International Science

1
International Science Technology Cooperation
and Collaboration April 7, 2008 Mr. Philip
Tomposki
2
International Science Technology Cooperation
and Collaboration

• Mr. Chris Cupp (Moderator)
• Performance Architect
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
• Mr. William McCluskey
• Director, International Technology Programs
  Office
• OSD/ATL
• Dr. Tony Sinden
• Defence Counsellor
• British Embassy to the U.S.
• Dr. Paul Gaertner
• Defence Counsellor
• Australian Embassy to the U.S.

3
DOD International Cooperative ST

• W. J. McCluskey
• Director, International Technology Programs
  Office
• OSD/ODDRE
• 7 April 2008

4
Why is ST important?

• ST supports the three pillars of national
  security
• Intelligence
• Diplomacy
• Military readiness
• Provides technological dominance to the
  warfighter
• ST serves as an excellent engagement tool

5
An Uncertain World

• Globalization of Science and Technology
• Intellectual Capital Advantage of the US
• Pace of Technology Development
• Disruptive Technology

Increasing Uncertainty Means U.S. Needs More
Technology Options
6
U.S. and WorldwideResearch Base Since WWII
100
Estimated
90
Total
Projected
80
70
E.U. and Japan
60
Billions of 87
50
40
U.S. Commercial
30
20
U.S. Gov. DoD
10
DoD
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
1970
1965
1960
1955
Year
Source Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on the Technology Capabilities of Non-DoD
Providers June 2000 Data provided by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development National Science Foundation
7
WORLD SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITYMap scaled to RD
investment, OECD 2002
37
37
Lyons, Mikami 2004, AOARD
Emerging Tech RD Publication Rank, 1999 NSF,
Report 9901310, Dec. 2001
8
U.S. No Longer Leads the World in the Generation
of New Scientific Knowledge
Physical Review Submission of Technical Papers
33
66
Source American Physical Society - APS News
August/September 2000
9
Comparison of Scientists Engineers Produced
The Rest of the World is Getting Smarter
Source Money Magazine
10
Global RD Advances

• The contribution of non-US RD investment
  continues to surpass that of the US
• Monitoring to avoid technological surprise is a
  necessity
• Partnering in ST for mutual advantage is an
  efficient way to leverage our resources

11
Response Global Outreach

• Global Outreach describes the processes and tools
  to ensure the Department of Defense is aware of
  global ST capabilities to
• Strengthen alliances and relationships
• Avoid technological surprise
• Identify mutually advantageous cooperation
  opportunities
• Accelerate technical development
• Minimize research expenditures

12
Global Awareness- Current Approach

• Service reps abroad
• ID Centers of Excellence
• Collaboration Opportunity
• Avoid technological surprise
• Longer term, primarily basic research partnering,
  assessments
• COCOM science advisors
• Nexus between warfighter and labs for technical
  solutions
• Near term, warfighting systems solutions
• Embassy military personnel
• FMS, mil-mil cooperation
• Near and mid-term, acquisition focus

13
Global Awareness- Current Approach

• Other US Government
• Intelligence entities
• By direction assessments Near term, arms length
• State Dept embassy personnel
• Engagement, cooperation, no assessment function
• Understaffed, few true scientists

14
Global Awareness- Current Approach

• Private Contract Companies
• Companies such as the Asian Technology
  Information Program (ATIP), and World Technology
  Watch (WTW), that provide reviews of specific
  countries ST capabilities, generally discipline
  specific
• US Subject Matter Experts
• Personnel (generally from academia, but can be
  from industry or military) who contract to US
  Agencies to provide world-wide tech assessments.
• Used to produce Developing Science and
  Technology lists for programs such as the
  Military Critical Technology Program (MCTP)

15
Service Reps Abroad

• Navy Office of Naval Research Global
• Offices in U.K., Japan, Singapore, Australia,
  Chile
• World-wide coverage
• 6.1 6.4
• Army International Technology Centers (Singapore,
  Chile, Argentina, Japan, U.K., Australia,
  Canada)
• World wide coverage
• 6.2 and above
• AF Air Force Office of Scientific Research
• Offices in U.K., Japan
• World-wide coverage
• 6.1-6.2

Specific to the world
16
Within-Service Reporting

• HQ-to-Field Tasking/Response
• Opportunistic assessments of foreign capability
  by service interest
• Exploration of collaboration opportunities
• Coordination via periodic global VTCs, all-hands,
  programmatic reviews, etc.
• Push reports to service clients via email,
  webpage posting of evaluations and trip reports

17
Awareness Promotes Collaboration

• DoD collaborates in many ways
• Participates in international conferences
• Exchanges research information
• Sponsors research
• Exchanges scientists
• Engages in collaborative projects
• Today, recognition of globalization and pursuit
  of mutually advantageous cooperation, anywhere

18
International Cooperation Fora

• NATO Research Technology Organization
• US-Japan Systems and Technology Forum
• The Technical Cooperation Program
• Multilateral Agreements
• Bilateral Agreements

19
Barriers to Partnerships

• Partnerships are largely personality dependent-
  driven by individuals vice organizations.
• Distance, language, culture
• ITAR, Deemed Export Controls, visa issues

20
Regulatory Barriers

• The federal regulatory system that oversees the
  conduct of scientific research and technological
  applications is a cold war remnant.
• It does not address the complexity of todays
  threats, the globalization of scientific talent,
  or the instantaneous global dissemination of
  scientific knowledge and technological
  information.
• As a result, American national security, our
  participation in the global conduct of science
  and our position in the global economy are at
  risk.

21
Enabling PartnershipsAn analysis of barriers is
needed

• To review the US policies and regulations that
  govern the conduct of ST, including
  classification, visa, and export policies.
• To articulate a new approach to these policies
  that reflects current risks and opportunities.
• To develop specific recommendations to update the
  federal regulatory system
• To develop a framework for a self-regulatory
  system for industry and academia.

22
Thank You

• William J. McCluskey
• Director, International Technology Programs
  Office
• OUSD (ATL)
• [phone]
• William.McCluskey_at_osd.mil

23
International Technology Cooperation
Dr Tony Sinden Defence Science and Technology
Counsellor, British Embassy
24
Outline

• Why Collaborate UK perspective
• Collaboration Benefits opportunities
• Collaboration Channels and routes

25
Why Collaborate?

• Operating together

• Sharing burden cost time

• Seeking technology advantage

Why Collaborate UK perspective
26
We operateside-by-sidearound the world
27
Foundation of Collaboration
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Why Collaborate?

• Benefits to US Forces

• Benefits to US taxpayer cost time

• Benefits to security

Collaboration Benefits opportunities
29
US benefits fromoverseas equipment development
30
US benefits from overseas technology
31
US benefitsfrom overseas facilities
32
Why Collaborate?
OR SHARED RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT COSTS
33
Why collaborate?

• Channels and routes

34
How to Collaborate
Allied Program Allied Government Allied
Industry
US Program US Government US Industry
35
Government Government

• Information Exchange share results of national
  programs
• Cooperative Development coordinate share
  results of national programs
• Collaborative Development mutually dependent,
  shared programs

Lower Overhead, Lower Value Higher Overhead, Hi
gher Value
36
Government Government

• Sources of Information (for US Government staff)
• US National Representatives to collaborative fora
  (e.g. TTCP, NATO) for advice on Allied programs
  and collaborative channels
• Overseas US ST Staff for advice on Allied
  programs, collaborative channels and processes
• DDRE International Technology Programs staff
  for advice on collaborative channels and
  processes
• DoD International Agreements staff for advice
  on collaborative processes
• Defense ST staff in Allied Embassies for
  advice on Allied programs, collaborative channels
  and processes

37
Government Government

• Wide range of existing collaborative arrangements
  (bilateral and multilateral), including
• NATO The Technical Cooperation
• Program (TTCP)
• Chemical, Biological
• Radiological (CBR) MoU UK/US Master
  Information
• Exchange MoU (MIEM)
• UK/US Research Development
• Projects (RDP) MoU

38
How to Collaborate
Allied Program Allied Government Allied
Industry
US Program US Government US Industry
Contract directly with Allied Government via
normal commercial channels (not true
collaboration)
39
How to Collaborate
Allied Program Allied Government Allied
Industry
US Program US Government US Industry
Use Government-Government collaboration to
exchange outputs of complementary national
programs
40
How to Collaborate
Allied Program Allied Government Allied
Industry
US Program US Government US Industry
Use Industry-Industry collaboration to obtain a
share of Allied program work
41
Industry Industry

• Sources of Information (for US Industry staff)
• Allied ST Managers for advice on Allied
  programs and opportunities
• Overseas US ST Staff for advice on Allied
  programs, opportunities and processes
• Allied Contracts Bulletins, etc. for advice on
  Allied programs and opportunities
• Defense ST staff in Allied Embassies for
  advice on Allied programs and processes

42
How to Collaborate
Allied Program Allied Government Allied
Industry
US Program US Government US Industry
Multinational GovernmentIndustry Partnership,
e.g. JSF, Network Information Sciences
International Technology Alliance
43
An Alternative Model International Technology
Alliance

• Bring UK US Industry, Government and Academia
  together
• Tackle common technology challenges early
• Bring Industry expertise to bear in defining
  problems as well as solutions
• Bring intellectual capital and finance together
• Share the outputs
• Build interoperability in from the outset

44
ITA Overview

• UK MOD - US Army
• Consortium, led by IBM
• Fundamental research in Network and Information
  Sciences
• Transition results
• A 5 year, 58M, research programme started in May
  06
• Builds on the success of UK Defence Technology
  Centres and US Army Collaborative Technology
  Alliances

45
Technical Programme

• Consortium Technical Activities
• 4 technical areas
• 12 projects
• Each Project
• One Project Champion
• Researchers from Academia, Industry, Government
• Spans multiple technical areas

Network Theory
Security across a System of Systems
Sensor Information Processing Delivery
Distributed Coalition Planning Decision Making
46

• Thank You

For further information please contact Tony
Sinden Counsellor Defence ST British
Embassy 3100 Massachusetts Avenue,
NW Washington DC 20008 tony.sinden_at_bdsus.mod.uk P
hone 1 202 588 6723
47
High cost (Political, Legal and Policy issues) to
engage in successful collaboration

• Dr Paul Gaertner
• A/g Counsellor, Defence Science
• Australian Defence Staff
• Embassy of Australia, Washington D.C.
• March 2008

48
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50
WHY DO WE DO ST?
51
30 Years Ago DoD ST Developed Technologies
That Changed Warfighting

• Disruptive technologies resulting from technology
  push
• Internet
• GPS
• Night vision
• Lasers
• Stealth
• Predator
• Global Hawk

All provided dominant capability
NONE OF THESE TECHNOLOGIES EMERGED FROM A
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS PROCESS
(slide courtesy OSD, adapted)
52
ST in Defence

• Science and Technology RD plays several
  different roles in Defence, including
• Enabling RD (typically 10-15)
• Capability Analysis - what do we need?
• Acquisition Support what are we getting?
• Operational Analysis how do we use it?
• Operational Support fix it yesterday
• Capability Access international trade goods
• National Security an evolving area

53
FUTURE FOCUS

• Emerging technologies
• Hypersonics
• Energy systems
• Human interfaces
• Non-lethal weapons
• Smart warheads
• Non-invasive imaging
• Individual warning devices
• Autonomous Systems
• Forward-looking intelligence - data fusion and
  data mining
• Directed IR Countermeasures lasers/multifunction
  lasers
• Nanotechnology

54
ST DRIVERS IN THE U.S.- CULTURE AND STRATEGIC
TRENDS -
55
CULTURE

• PROPOSALS
• The U.S. Defence Force, more than any other
  national Defence Force, defines itself by its
  technological superiority.
• The U.S. values its coalition allies, however it
  particularly values those allies that can
  contribute to its mission of maintaining its
  technological superiority.

56
STRATEGIC TRENDS

• The world is experiencing
• an unprecedented diffusion of technology
  (computing power, microchip design and
  fabrication, communications systems,)
• a rapidly growing and technically (very) capable
  middle class (particularly in China and India),
  and a cadre of technically capable leaders
• shifting ST alliances due to political change
  impacting U.S. technology export regimes (eg
  nuclear India)

57
The Globalization of ST
(slide courtesy of OSD)
In 2001, India graduated almost a million more
students from college than the United States did.
China graduates twice as many students with
bachelor's degrees as the U.S., and they have six
times as many graduates majoring in engineering.
In the international competition to have the
biggest and best supply of knowledge workers,
America is falling behind.'' --The World is
Flat, Friedman, 2005
China had 15 companies on Forbes Global 500 list
in 2004, up by 4 from the 2003 rankings. India
had only 1 company on the Global 500 in 2003. In
2004, there are 4 Indian companies.
IBM Global Services India unveiled its global
delivery centre in Hyderabad on June 14, 2005,
the fifth IBM center in India.
Chinas Gross Domestic Product is now 2nd in the
world to the U.S.
'' 14 of the top 25 IT Companies are based in
Asia6 of 25 are based in the US March 27, 2006
IS NEWS and World Report
For the first time ever, all members of Chinas
Politburo Standing Committee, the highest tier
within the Communist Party, are card-carrying
engineers.
58
International ST--Data Points from 2006
Augustine Report
(slide courtesy of OSD)

• In 2007, for the first time, the most capable
  high-energy particle accelerator resided outside
  the US
• Chemical Companies closed 70 US facilities in
  2004 of 120 Chemical Plants being built with
  price tag gt1Bn, US (1) China (50)
• In 2003, only 3 US companies ranked in the top 10
  recipients of patents issued by US Patent and
  Trade Office
• Undergraduate degrees in SEGermany (36) China
  (59) Japan (66) US (32)
• Projections
• The US Share of Global RD spending continues to
  decline
• The US share of scientific output continues to
  decline
• Europe surpassed US in mid-1990s Asia Pacific
  projected to pass US in 6-7 years
• US Ability to Attract Best International
  Researchers continues to decline

59
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR ST
60
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?..

• Technology Diffusion..clearly a threat, however
  lowering barrier to entry also applies to AS?
  more opportunities to increase AS contribution to
  the alliance and increase our value as a
  strategic partner develop trade goods
• Relevance
• Need to increase AS Defence understanding and
  culture in investment in strategic technology
  areas that aim to develop trade goods? need to
  understand US strategic/critical technologies,
  and develop AS processes to support long-term
  engagement/collaboration in key areas

61
ST Horizons for Cooperative Capability
Development
Short RD horizon fails to cross threshold for
relevance to US requirements and hence no
co-development
Capability state of the art
Operational D5 years
US operational capability
AS operational capability
AS operational capability
US
AS
AS
62
NULKA an example
Basic concepts
Capability requirement definition
Next-generation system
Information Exchange (via PA, DEA, MOU)
Capability acquisition
Countermeasures and tactics development
Trade Goods
Technology Upgrade (threat system evolution)
63
NULKATHE STORY SO FAR

• Defence
• NULKA being fit to US, AS and CA ships.
• 138 USN ships CG, DDG, FFG, LPD17, LSD41,
  LHA6,.and Coast Guard
• Industry
• Recently, BAE Systems announced passing the 500M
  in contracting for NULKA-related RD and
  procurement

64
ST DEVELOPMENT PROCESS/CULTURE
We need to balance the requirements-driven rd
with world-class innovation (i.e. trade goods)
to remain a relevant and valued partner.
65
US/AS Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty
66
Export Control Current Process

• Under the ITAR US Exporters must apply for
• A Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) before
  they can engage in discussions with Australian
  companies
• An export licence before any hardware is exported
  to Australia.
• For most defence programs, a number of TAAs and
  licences are required and these take time on
  average about 3 months each.
• Cumulative impact on projects and sustainment can
  be years.
• Retransfers especially problematic for
  Australian Industry.

67
Current Process (contd)

• 2361 licences and 312 agreements were approved
  for Australia in 2006
• About 1/3 (718) of Australias licences and all
  agreements (312) are referred
• Average licence approval time for referred
  licences is about 150 days
• Average licence approval time for non-referred
  licences is about 80 days
• licences and agreements referred to other
  agencies can take as long as 12 months
• 15 licences are for operations and are very
  quick
• Total processing time in 2006 was around 640 yrs
• Plus knock-on inefficiencies (eg. Retransfers
  in sustainment).

68
The Treaty

• Our Treaty was signed 5 September 2007 by
  President Bush and Prime Minister Howard.
• The Australia/US Treaty parallels the UK/US
  treaty but with minor differences.
• The Treaty provides for
• Licence free defence trade between Australia
  and US
• Transfer of articles within the approved
  communities without need for prior approval
• Safeguards against unauthorised release or
  diversion of technology.
• Trusted Australia/US Community concept.
• Implementation arrangements (about 20) have been
  negotiated.
• Treaty can be found at www.defence.gov.au/publicat
  ions.cfm

69
Elements of the Treaty

• Establishes an ITAR-free environment for the US
  Government, Australian Government and accredited
  US and Australian companies and sites
• Applies to bilateral collaborative programs,
  operations and support, Australian Defence and
  counter terrorism end-use programs, and US
  Government end-use
• Covers classified and unclassified data,
  software, services and material
• Preserves all the normal rights conveyed by
  contracts and agreements
• Provides for the exclusion of highly sensitive
  technologies from either side

70
Operation of the Treaty

• Criteria will be established to qualify companies
  and facilities
• Under commercial arrangements, companies will be
  able to exchange data, services and material
  without licenses or agreements
• Under FMS Cases, once the Australian Government
  has received the data, services or material, it
  can then be handled under the Treaty provisions
• Participants will be required to record the
  movement of items under the Treaty
• Transgressions bring the ITAR into effect,
  including the ITAR-like provisions which
  Australia has in place

71
Criteria to Use the Treaty

• Is the Program/Operation/Activity approved ?
• Does the technology/equipment qualify ?
• Are the facilities and/or personnel approved ?
• 3 Yes answers allows freedom of movement and
  exchange of data, hardware and software, and the
  provision of services throughout the Approved
  Community subject to any contractual restrictions

72
Why will the Treaty work so well
73
Treaty Arrangements

• Under the Treaty, US exporters will only need to
  advise State Department that they have engaged in
  eligible defence export activity
• Prior export authorisations will not be required.
• Eligible exports will include
• Agreed security and defence projects where the
  Governments of either country are the end user
  (classified and unclassified data, software,
  services and material)
• Cooperative security and defence research,
  development, production and support programs
• Combined military or counter-terrorism
  operations.
• The Treaty arrangements will operate in parallel
  with existing US export controls
• this will allow those outside the approved
  community to continue business as usual, ie Opt
  out is allowed.

74
AS Capability Development

• Australia produces a Defence Capability Plan with
  a 10 year outlook that allows early forecasting
  of requirements
• Australia has the Defence Industrial Security
  Program (DISP) which closely matches the
  requirements of the NISPOM
• Australia has a very thorough and robust Security
  vetting process
• Australia has legislation in place to allow
  prosecution under our Customs Regulations
• Australia has the equivalent of the USML and CCL
  in the form of the Defence and Strategic Goods
  List

75
Treaty Benefits

• We expect there will be five key benefits for
  Australian and US companies
• Reduced licence processing times
• Increased efficiency in business and shortened
  delivery times
• Enhanced business opportunities
• Reinforcement of the special AS/US relationship
  and
• More efficient use of personnel resources by
  Industry
• Total processing time in 2006 was around 640 yrs.
• Estimate around 50 processing not required (320
  years saved!)
• Impact is not just raw processing time. It is
  multiplier effect of uncertainty (Numerous
  Workforce) X (unexpected delays).

76
Obligations for Australian Government under the
Treaty

• The Australian Government will
• Maintain visibility of the transfer of US
  articles
• Control access to US technology by dual
  nationals
• Oversight the safeguarding of US technology
  provided to Australian companies
• Control intangible transfers
• Monitor and enforce what AS companies do with US
  defense articles
• Strengthen our domestic export control
  legislation
• Consider changes to Customs legislation to track
  the importing of articles under the Treaty.

77
Obligations for Industry Under the Treaty

• Those who choose to participate will
• Gain the prior approval of the US exporter before
  transferring articles within the approved
  community
• Gain prior approval of State before transferring
  articles outside the approved community
• Ensure that articles received are not used for
  any purposes other than authorised under the
  original contract
• Implement safeguards to ensure that only
  authorised employees have access to the defense
  articles
• Maintain records of transactions conducted under
  the treaty and make them available for audit.
• Transgressions bring the ITAR into effect.

78
Australias Defence Industry Policy

• Australia has had export control requirements in
  place since 1958 under its Customs Act
• Australia had an Offsets program under the
  Australian Industry Participation program
  through until the early 1990s
• In the 1980s Australia introduced the equivalent
  to DDTC which is now called DECO
• In 1995 Australia announced the cessation of an
  Offsets program and formalised the Australian
  Industry Involvement program
• In 1998 Australia further refined the AII program
  to provide definition around those capabilities
  it was seeking to keep onshore
• In 2001 Australia reviewed its Intellectual
  Property management and control

79
CONCLUSIONS

• ST development as trade goods, used in order
  to leverage capability access and contribute to
  the AS-US alliance is not a well-understood role
  of ST in AS DoD (broadly speaking)
• Changing world demographics and technology
  diffusion are driving fundamental changes in
  long-term strategic relationships and
  opportunities
• While this poses a threat to technological
  dominance, given the right strategic ST planning
  and some cultural change, the opportunities to
  significantly contribute to the alliance via
  technology trade goods is, in fact, increasing
• AS/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty is a
  significant step towards increasing the flow of
  AS/US trade-goods. Watch this space.

80

• Thank You for Your Attention.

We need to balance the requirements-driven rd
with world-class innovation (i.e. trade goods)
to remain a relevant and valued partner.
81
Points of Contact
Mr. Christian Cupp US Citizenship and Immigration
Services 202-272-8946 Christian.cupp_at_dhs.gov Mr.
William McCluskey OSD/ATL 571-309-4841 william.mc
cluskey_at_osd.mil Dr. Anthony Sinden British
Embassy to the U.S. 202-588-6724 Tony.sinden_at_bdsus
.mod.uk Dr. Paul Gaertner Australian Embassy to
the U.S. 202-797-3378 Paul.Gaertner_at_defence.gov.au