Post Hong Kong

1
Post- Hong Kong

• Collapse of Doha Round
• in July 2006
• Challenges and opportunities

2
Presentation overview

• Stumbling blocs
• Decision-making process
• Implications of suspension
• Opinions about time out
• Challenges and opportunities
• Additional remarks

3
Stumbling blocs 1

• Agriculture Developing countries argue that US
  and EU fail to make meaningful offers
  
• - US has not offered reduction in domestic
  subsidies and demands reduction of agricultural
  tariffs by 66, also to developing countries,
  whereas latest EU offer proposes 51 reduction
  (oct 2005, 38)
• - conditional agreement to eliminate all forms
  of export subsidies by 2013
  
• -LDCs want crucial additional 3 (now 97)
  non-tariff market access for their competitive
  products

4
Stumbling Blocs 2

• NAMA US and EU agreed to request reductions of
  industrial tariffs to developing countries by 50
  70. Developing countries wait for significant
  offers by US and EU in agriculture and developed
  countries wait for offers by developing countries
  in NAMA

5
Stumbling blocs 3

• GATS Especially EU demands substantial
  liberalization of services by developing
  countries, in exchange for reduction of
  agricultural tariffs by 51 and elimination of
  export subsidies in agriculture by 2013
• - flexibility in (plurilateral) request-offer
  negotiations (time, how much, obligations)
  
• - necessity test in services domestic regulation
  (restrict trade-policy objective)
  
• - mode 4 on presence of workforce no real
  commitments by developed countries

6
Stumbling Blocs 4

• Development Doha Development round?
• - Cotton US does not address Cotton subsidies,
  requested by African Cotton producers
  
• -Special and differential treatment (sensitive
  and special products, special safeguard
  mechanisms) in AOA and NAMA. Disagreement on
  flexibility
• - Exemptions for national development objectives
  (access to essential services, emergency
  safeguard mechanisms) under GATS. Disagreement on
  flexibility.

7
Decision-making process 1

• Green rooms Informal meetings of various WTO
  organisms of which no records are available and
  to which only some are invited
  
• - Majority of Hong Kong meetings, only opening
  and endorsing session attended by full
  membership
  
• - mini ministerial on 30 June and 1st July also
  existed out of green rooms composed on similar
  base as in Hong Kong (who decided?). Lamy was
  given the mandate to discover solutions by GC on
  27-28 July top down and with focus on G6 US,
  EU, Japan, Australia, India, Brazil
• - criteria of selections nor who attended these
  are clear

8
Decision making process 2

• Other Influential bodies
• - G8 US, GB, Japan, France, Germany, Canada,
  Italy Russia (no member of WTO) extended
  consultation round of Lamy to 15 august, after
  GC, thus cancelled and recommitted to Doha Round
• - IMF, World Bank, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP and WTO had
  agreed on an Integrated framework to combine
  efforts with LDCs and donors for trade
  development needs and to mainstream trade into
  PRSPs.

9
Decision making process 3

• Power rituals
• - Achieving agreements with smaller powerful
  groups to pressurize others to approve those (eg
  G6, Green Rooms)
  
• - secret knowledge (requests-offers, Green
  Rooms)
  
• - Alliances with other vectors of free trade (eg
  G8)
  
• - Time pressure (eg plurilateral negotiations
  before 31 July)
  
• - Numbers of delegations and meetings
• - Talks of the last chance
• - Fast-track authority
• - Doom scenarios and informal time out

10
Current Implications of Suspension

• Initial deadlines will not be met (eg Fast track
  authority)
  
• All agreements made under the Doha round are
  frozen
  
• GC has taken note of the suspension, but has
  not formally endorsed it.
  
• More focus on other vectors of liberalization

11
Opinions on Time out 1

• Lamy Today there are only losers. This is the
  time to review and reflect on current proposals
  and solutions, no new deadlines for resumption,
  sober reflection on what is at stake
• Failure blow for vulnerable members that hope for
  growth and poverty alleviation and to MDGs
  
• WTOs role in trade dispute settlement can be
  undermined
  
• Danger for resurgence of protectionism
• Increase of geopolitical instability

12
Options on Time out 2

• African countries We hoped that negotiations
  would redress balance. Now we are taken hostage
  by larger developed countries
  
• India Trade deal is between Intensive care and
  crematorium
  
• Brazil and US A deal could be reached within 5-7
  months but While most nations agree that freer
  trade would help boost economic growth, they are
  often unable to make difficult decisions because
  of political concerns and pressures from domestic
  producers. (democracy?)

13
Options on Time out 3

• Australia The round is not dead, but hanging by
  a thread. Organises a meeting of main agricult
  exporters 18 members Cairns group and maybe G6 in
  margins.
• USCSI We regret that WTO failed to reach an
  accord that would allow the Doha round to
  progress, but it is good to insist on an
  ambitious round for services, agriculture and
  goods. It is regrettable that only agriculture
  can stop progress in services. We hope that talks
  can be restarted.

14
Notes on Time Out 4

• Christian Aid Collapse of talks a terrible blow
  to developing countries.
  
• 11.11.11 no deal better than bad deal
• Vandana Shiva WTO is dead, long life to free
  trade. US gets free market access bilaterally and
  unilaterally.
  

15
Challenges and opportunities

• Time out good or bad?
• WTO dead or alive? (informal processes)
• Other vectors for free trade
• Role of WTO-watch?
• OXFAM Option of litigation is open because EU
  and US are violating existing WTO rules (esp
  agriculture)
  
• Ball at the side of national governments, time to
  pressurize.
  

16
Additional remarks

• Corporate agenda well represented. EC asked ESF
  to make a list for each country which policies
  they see as hindering trade.
  
• Lamy was part of European branch of RAND
  corporation. Rumsfeld was chairman from 1981-86
  and Rice was trustee in the 90s ?NAC ?global
  politics permeated by militarist techniques and
  ideas.