Growing radicalization among youth in Somalia

1
Growing radicalization among youth in Somalia

• By Lilla Schumicky
• PhD Candidate/ University of Bradford/ Peace
  Studies
• Africa Conflict Monitoring Group Coordinator /
  University of Bradford
• UNDP Somalia Intern
• ACTED Area Coordinator / North-West Kenya

2
Hypothesis

• Radicalization among youth is currently
  increasing in Somalia, especially after the
  Ethiopian intervention in 2007. In order to
  mitigate the radicalization among youth, it is
  crucial to understand the motivations and
  contributing factors. Once they are
  deconstructed, community based, bottom up
  approach national interventions could decrease
  the level of radicalization, through prevention,
  rehabilitation and reintegration.

3
Introduction

• The Islamic Court Union (ICU) took over control
  of South and middle Somalia in 2006
• Mass engagement of youth in fighting appeared,
  after the invasion of Somalia by the US supported
  Ethiopian troops, which have overthrown the ICU
  in 2007
• From both national and international environment
  youth joined various armed factions in order to
  defeat the invaders
• From the diasporas in the US and Europe youth
  started to disappear and moved back to Somalia.
  In 2007, 23 youth moved from Minneapolis to
  Somalia according to the Central Intelligence
  Agency (CIA). 8 persons were judged on court for
  recruitment of youth

4
Various armed factions

• The ICU had a specially established youth wing
  that was under the command of a small group of
  people lead by Sheikh Muhtar Robow al-Shabaab
• ICU was commanded by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and
  Hassan Dahir Awey
• Sheikh Sharif is the current minister of the
  Transitional Federal Governement (TFG)
• Hassan Dahir Aweys has formed the other main
  opposition group Hizbul Islam
• Most youth both locally and internationally
  joined al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam

ICU
Ethiopians
TFG
Hizbul Islam
Al-Shabaab
Ahlu Sunna
AMISOM
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The major groupsHizbul Islam al-Shabaab

• Relations
• Hijbul Islamiya and al-Shabaab are sharing common
  ideology and interests
• Both are mainly supported by the diaspora and
  external actors such as Eritrea. However recent
  terrorist attacks such as the Shamo Hotel
  Graduation attack in December 2009 offset the
  support by the diaspora.
• Both are fractions originating and a type of
  continuation of ICU however
• HI is militarily less organized
• HI has a more centralized leadership
• Al-Ss leadership and military officers are
  trained foreign fighters from Afghanistan,
  Pakistan, Iraq, Chechnya linked to al-Qaeda
• Al-S has different units operating separately

6
The major groupsHizbul Islam al-Shabaab

• It is an increasingly feeble and unreliable
  alliance of various armed groupss
• Stated interests
• To fight the Wests puppet government the TFG,
  which is considered to be infidel
• To fight all of its supporters such as Ahlu Sunna
  and AMISOM
• To uproot all external / international
  interventions in any form such as humanitarian or
  development aid, military support etc
• To introduce a strict version of Sharia law
• To fight the Global jihad beyond the border of
  Somalia and spread it first to the neighboring
  countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia and than to
  Africa and the West
• To support other jihadist movements in different
  Muslim countries such as Palestine
• Dufferences
• HI and al-Shabaab is fighting each other in order
  to gain economical control over strategic points
• HI Hidden interests
• To control Mogadishu hence its leader Awey
  belongs to Ayr clan, which is a sub-clan of
  Hawiye and one of the most powerful in the
  capital city
• Personal bad feelings towards the current
  president Awey was left out of the deal while
  establishing the current TFG
• Al-Shabaab s hidden intrests
• To support farmers of the Rahanweyn clan and
  Leysan sub-clan from where Sheikh Mukhtar Robow
  Abu Mansur the leader is originating from by
  banning food aid distribution by aid agencies
  such as WFP

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Causes and contributing factors

• 45 percent of the population is below 14 and
  years and the median age of the Somalias total
  population is 17.5 (CIA Factbook).
• A three level analysis is provided in order to
  capture the possible angles of the motivations of
  joining on individual, social and institutional
  levels. These three are interlinked and it is not
  possible to separate one from the other however
  dominant causes can be identified on all three
  levels.

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Causes and contributing factors

• Individual level engagement
• Linked to the psychological status of the mind
• The whole society, which has been impacted by the
  war became brutal and brutalized in the same time
• Traumatisation is caused by the separation of
  family members, torture and rape, frequent
  displacements, lack of financial support and
  adaption of a new way of life from the nomadic
  society to the displaced and aid dependant
  society
• These factors lead to depression and sadness that
  further acts as being the only solution for all
  problems.
• Lack of hope The sixteen failed peace-talks the
  two previous and the third currently failing
  government
• Growing anger and bitterness towards the
  international community due to the lack of
  support encourages global jihad against the West
• War caused the fragmentation of the nuclear
  family child abuse became rampant
• Feeling of Revenge (disappearance of the
  traditional xeer)
• Participation is based on money, the promise of
  money and khaat According to the Kenya National
  Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse a
  daily 300 000 is paid by Somalis for the drug.
• Guarantee from the various factions that they
  will have the freedom to loot, extort and rape.
  The looting is officially part of the salary and
  subsidizes the low wage which is not paid
  regularly.

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Causes and contributing factors

• Social level engagement
• High rate of unemployment - about 80 percent in
  Mogadishu according to SAACID
• If the nuclear family has enough funds then they
  may buy a gun, most frequently AK47 machine gun
• Families decide to dedicate one of the sons for a
  security job
• Environmental destruction took considerable part
  of the lack of unemployment and lack of
  opportunities

10
Causes and contributing factors

• Institutional level engagement
• Cheap human resource that is easy mobilize and
  recruit
• Ideology, the Salafi-Wahabbism, which lies along
  Sayid Qutbs philosophy that emphasizes the
  implementation of an extremely strict version of
  sharia law
• al-Shabaab becomes the family of the youth where
  is relative security and order can be found
• Proliferation and the extremely easy access to
  small arms forms of currency
• Radio game shows, which were run by the Shabaabs
  in Southern Somalia, AK 47s, hand grenades and
  anti tank landmines were the prizes for the
  winners if they could correctly answer questions
  related to the Quran. The host of the quiz show
  has said
• The reason the young men were rewarded with
  weapons is to encourage them to participate in
  the ongoing holy war against the enemies of Allah
  in Somalia, AFP news agency quoted al-Shabab's
  Sheikh Abdullahi Alhaq on the prize-giving
  ceremony.

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DDR in Mogadishu

• Initiatives to decrease the number of
  participants in various armed groups have been
  taken since 2001 in the form of Disarmament
  Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
  programmes.
• Three DDR attempts took place solely in Mogadishu
  between 2001 and 2007.
• It is traditionally comes along with Security
  Sector Reforms (SSR) after when a peace agreement
  is signed and major direct violence is ended.
  (Negative peace -gt aiming toward positive peace
  decrease structural and cultural violence Galtung
  2003)

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DDR in Mogadishu

• First DDR in 2001
• Funded by the Italian Government through UNESCO
  it has demobilized and provided four months
  vocational training for 225 militiamen
• It has not contained any of the elements of DDR
  such as disarmament, demobilization or
  reintegration and was in fact purely the
  remobilization of militiamen into the police and
  official military forces after vocational
  training.
• The main desire of the militiamen was to find
  gainful employment after training where they were
  ready to participate

13
DDR in Mogadishu

• Second DDR 2003-2004
• Characters of the II. DDR bottom-up grassroots
  programming, with strong international
  partnership
• Three hundred participants 150 were from the
  civil society and half of them were women
• The aim of the involvement of the women was to
  encourage them not to buy guns for their sons and
  make them understand that there are other ways of
  earning living but encouraging them to join
• At least one, working automatic weapon had to be
  handed over, in order to be able to participate
  on the training

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DDR in Mogadishu

• Third DDR 2005- 2006
• 512 freelance militiamen were provided with micro
  credit and vocational training
• In 2008 when a Tracer survey was conducted forty
  percent of them were still employed despite the
  dire circumstances and extremely bad security
  situation (full-blown insurgency in the capital)
• It had a long-term effect because participants
  were saying I gave up robbing people, I care
  about myself now and dont like bad deeds, I
  have a free life and know between good and bad,
  I have character to live with people,
• Community-based and community-owned approach of
  the entire DDR programme.

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Arms Violence Reduction Project (AVRP)

• In spite of this success of the previous three
  DDR programmes the donor community is not
  committed of funding further DDR programmes in
  Somalia yet UNDP has further developed it into
  Arms Violence Reduction Project (AVRP).
• The main justification of AVRP is that Somali
  people are prisoners of a cycle of armed violence
  from, which is extremely hard to break out of.
  The community is influenced by impunity and weak
  justice system the sharia courts are no longer
  functioning in many places.
• Prevention would be realized in non-violent
  conflict management and cure in rehabilitation
  and reintegration of ex-militiamen into the
  society. The project would consist of three
  phases
• 1) Security diagnosis where the type of violence,
  the nature of conflict and the endogenous
  resources will be identified.
• 2) The set up of community security plan by
  consulting with community members on district
  levels.
• 3) Execution of the activities by entrusted local
  NGOs
• The plan has been prepared in 2008 but funding
  hasnt yet arrived. Instead the financial support
  goes towards the extremely week Transitional
  Federal Government. However the TFG is not in the
  position to implement any kind of DDR in Somalia.
  

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Conclusion

• Radicalization of youth is currently increasing
  due to the various individual, social and
  institutional external and internal push factors.
• DDR in a form of bottom-up approach with
  community based ownership could be one of the
  possible solutions for the mitigation of
  radicalization of youth in Somalia by targeting
  each push factors on the various levels, and
  aiming towards prevention, demobilization and
  reintegration.

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• Thank you for your attention
• l.Schumicky_at_bradford.ac.uk
• Lilla.schumicky_at_acted.org