Academic Success Program ExamPrep Workshop

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Academic Success ProgramExam-Prep Workshop

• Winter Semester 2007
• March 29, 2007

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Workshop Outline

• General Tips
• Strategies for Different Types of Exams
• Open Book vs. Close Book
• Multiple Choice Exams
• Essay Exams
• Other Things Coming Up

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General Tips to keep in mind

• Exam schedule and corresponding study/outlining
  schedule
• Outlining/Studying/Memorizing
• Practice Exams
• Review sessions
• Talk to your professors and TAs to get questions
  answered
• Talk to students who have taken your professor in
  the past

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Open Book vs. Closed Book

• Knowing how to use your materials vs. memorizing
  everything
• Examples of materials
• Wendy
• Brady

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Multiple Choice Exams

• Be disciplined and strategic with your time
• Move on and come back to difficult questions that
  are taking too much time
• Figure out the answer yourself and look for it
  among the answers
• Less likely to be fooled by wrong answers that
  look right
• Dissect overlapping answers
• If you must guess, eliminate as many wrong
  answers as you can and look for the most complete
  answer
• Never skip questions

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Multiple Choice ExamsPractice Helps

• Practice Exams from Professor
• Coverage/depth
• How answers are presented
• Commercial Outlines
• Kassie
• Commercial Flashcards
• Jared

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Essay Exams

• Techniques and Suggestions

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Components of Success

• Organization
• Knowledge
• Understanding

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Organization

• Focus on your talents
• Please the reader
• Five Steps
• Prioritize your time,
• Brain dump,
• Issue spot,
• Organize, and
• Write using IRAC

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Knowledge

• Find what works for you
• Typical Outline
• Lists of Cases/Charts
• Flowcharts
• Flashcards
• Approach may differ depending on type of exam
• Emphasis on issue spotting
• Emphasis on analysis

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Types of Exams

• IRAC
• IRAC
• CIRAC
• IRAC
• IRAC

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Understanding

• Collect outlines and review them
• Read the notes you took in class
• Commercial outlines
• Flashcards
• Ask your professor
• Study groups

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Practice Essay Question

• Skip, an amateur pilot, owns a small airplane
  that has been modified to allow significant
  storage space. Using contacts with a Columbian
  cartel, Guido arranges for the two to transport a
  large load of cocaine into the United States.
  Skip and Guido fly to a hidden airstrip in a
  Columbian jungle. The plane is loaded with 750
  kilos of high-grade cocaine. Skip and his
  partner are given 10,000 in cash on the spot
  with a promise of another 50,000 when the cargo
  reaches the drop off point outside of El Paso,
  Texas. Knowing that US Customs Agents will be
  monitoring the airspace along the US-Mexican
  border, Skip decides to drop to just 200 feet
  above the ground in hopes to avoid radar
  detection. As the plane crosses the Rio Grande,
  it is too heavily loaded to maneuver through the
  canyons at such a low altitude. The plane
  crashes and Guido is killed. Skip survives and is
  charged with murder in connection with the death
  of Guido. Analyze under both common law and MPC
  principles.

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• State v. Skip
• FMRCommon Law
• Under the FMR, D can be convicted of 1st degree
  murder under the common law if, in the course of
  committing a felony, someone is killed. The mens
  rea to commit murder is satisfied by showing an
  intent to commit the felony. Some scholars
  explain the FMR mens rea requirements by
  suggesting that either the Ds intent to commit a
  felony transfers to the intent to commit the
  murder, or the commission of the felony is so
  heinous, it eliminates the need to establish mens
  rea to commit murder. Under either theory, FMR
  imposes a strict liability on defendants who, in
  the commission of a felony, cause the death of
  the victim. For this reason, most states
  disfavor the FMR, (although nearly every state
  has adopted some form of it). The actus reus is
  satisfied by the commission of the felony and the
  resulting death. The mens rea is satisfied if D
  intended to commit the felony. D can be charged
  with first degree murder if the felony committed
  is enumerated in his jurisdiction, or if it is
  un-enumerated, he may be charged with second
  degree murder instead.
• In this case, Skip, the D, is charged with
  murder for the death of Guido because Guido was
  killed during and in the course of the commission
  of a felonydrug trafficking. If the prosecutor
  can establish that Skip had the requisite mens
  rea to commit a felony, he need not prove that
  Skip had the specific intent to kill Guido.
• However, because courts disfavor the FMR as a
  means of charging a person with murder, certain
  limitations have been placed on the rule. For
  example, some courts have used causation to
  limit the application of the FMR, where Ds
  actions must be both the but for (factual)
  cause, and the proximate cause (meaning it must
  be natural and probable or at least a foreseeable
  consequences) of the victims death. In this
  case, it is certain that but for Skips drug
  trafficking endeavors, Guido would not have died
  in the plane crash. However, it is not equally
  certain that Guidos death was the natural and
  probable consequence of Skips actions. Guido
  died because the plane crashed in the canyons and
  the plane crashed into the canyons because Skip
  was flying it low Skip was flying it low because
  he did not want to be detected by the radar.
  This causal chain may be too attenuated to be
  considered a natural and probable consequence of
  Skips drug trafficking. However, although not
  the natural and probable consequence, it was
  likely a foreseeable consequence that a small
  airplane, loaded with 750 kilos of cocaine,
  flying low through the canyons to avoid radar
  detection, might crash and someone might get
  hurt.
• Another limitation that has been placed on the
  FMR is the inherently dangerous doctrine.
  Under the inherently dangerous doctrine, the FMR
  applies only to inherently dangerous felonies.
  Jurisdictions disagree in determining what is
  inherently dangerous. California, for example,
  looks at the felony in the abstract rather than
  the particular facts of the case to determine if
  the felony is inherently dangerous. If Skip were
  tried in California, his activities of drug
  trafficking would likely not be considered
  dangerous. Felony offenses that have typically
  been considered inherently dangerous are
  burglary, rape, robbery, and arson. Distribution
  of drugs is not typically an inherently
  dangerous felony in some jurisdictions. If Skip
  was tried in Rhode Island, on the other hand, the
  court will look at the facts of the particular
  case and the manner and circumstances in which it
  was committed. In this case, Skip was doing more
  than simply distributing drugs he was
  trafficking drugs, and most would agree that
  trafficking drugs, particularly 750 kilos of
  high-grade cocaine, in a small airplane dodging
  US customs agents radar, involves a certain
  degree of danger. Thus, Skip will not likely be
  able to avoid conviction under this limitation.
• Another limitation is that the FMR applies only
  where the victim is someone other than a
  co-felon. In this case, Guido, the victim, was a
  co-felon. In fact, Guido is the one who arranged
  for the transport of the cocaine into the U.S.,
  and together Skip and Guido flew to a hidden
  airstrip in a Columbian jungle. While the
  majority of jurisdictions would impose this
  agency theory and limit liability for Skip, a
  minority of courts, on the other hand, subscribe
  to the proximate cause theory and hold that any
  death proximately resulting from the unlawful
  activityeven if the death is a co-felonshould
  result in a conviction or murder. (Note,
  however, that the agency theory is most often
  applied when the victim/co-felon is killed not by
  the actions of his comrade-in-arms, but by the
  intended victim, as a means of self-defense. In
  this case, Guido was not killed by any intended
  victim. Skips actions alone led to Guidos
  death, so even in a majority of jurisdictions
  that allow the agency theory to limit guilt under
  the FMR, Skip might not be able to use the agency
  theory to escape guilt.)
• The MPC does not officially recognize the FMR.
  However, under the MPC, it is a rebuttable
  presumption that if death occurred in the
  commission of any of six limited felonies
  (robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
  felonious escape), D acted recklessly, which mens
  rea is sufficient to prove murder. In this case,
  however, Skip was not engaged in any of these six
  limited felonies. Therefore, if Skip was in a
  jurisdiction that operated under the MPC, he
  would likely not be convicted of murder for
  Guidos death.

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• STATE v. SKIP
• Common Law Felony Murder Rule
• Under the FMR, D can be convicted of 1st degree
  murder under the common law if, in the course of
  committing a felony, someone is killed. The mens
  rea to commit murder is satisfied by showing an
  intent to commit the felony. Some scholars
  explain the FMR mens rea requirements by
  suggesting that either the Ds intent to commit a
  felony transfers to the intent to commit the
  murder, or the commission of the felony is so
  heinous, it eliminates the need to establish mens
  rea to commit murder. Under either theory, FMR
  imposes a strict liability on defendants who, in
  the commission of a felony, cause the death of
  the victim. For this reason, most states
  disfavor the FMR, (although nearly every state
  has adopted some form of it). The actus reus is
  satisfied by the commission of the felony and the
  resulting death. The mens rea is satisfied if D
  intended to commit the felony. D can be charged
  with first degree murder if the felony committed
  is enumerated in his jurisdiction, or if it is
  un-enumerated, he may be charged with second
  degree murder instead.
• Skip In this case, Skip, the D, is charged with
  murder for the death of Guido because Guido was
  killed during and in the course of the commission
  of a felonydrug trafficking. If the prosecutor
  can establish that Skip had the requisite mens
  rea to commit a felony, he need not prove that
  Skip had the specific intent to kill Guido.
• Causation However, because courts disfavor the
  FMR as a means of charging a person with murder,
  certain limitations have been placed on the rule.
  For example, some courts have used causation
  to limit the application of the FMR, where Ds
  actions must be both the but for (factual)
  cause, and the proximate cause (meaning it must
  be natural and probable or at least a foreseeable
  consequences) of the victims death. In this
  case, it is certain that but for Skips drug
  trafficking endeavors, Guido would not have died
  in the plane crash. However, it is not equally
  certain that Guidos death was the natural and
  probable consequence of Skips actions. Guido
  died because the plane crashed in the canyons and
  the plane crashed into the canyons because Skip
  was flying it low Skip was flying it low because
  he did not want to be detected by the radar.
  This causal chain may be too attenuated to be
  considered a natural and probable consequence of
  Skips drug trafficking. However, although not
  the natural and probable consequence, it was
  likely a foreseeable consequence that a small
  airplane, loaded with 750 kilos of cocaine,
  flying low through the canyons to avoid radar
  detection, might crash and someone might get
  hurt.
• Inherently dangerous doctrine Another
  limitation that has been placed on the FMR is the
  inherently dangerous doctrine. Under the
  inherently dangerous doctrine, the FMR applies
  only to inherently dangerous felonies.
  Jurisdictions disagree in determining what is
  inherently dangerous. California, for example,
  looks at the felony in the abstract rather than
  the particular facts of the case to determine if
  the felony is inherently dangerous. If Skip were
  tried in California, his activities of drug
  trafficking would likely not be considered
  dangerous. Felony offenses that have typically
  been considered inherently dangerous are
  burglary, rape, robbery, and arson. Distribution
  of drugs is not typically an inherently
  dangerous felony in some jurisdictions. If Skip
  was tried in Rhode Island, on the other hand, the
  court will look at the facts of the particular
  case and the manner and circumstances in which it
  was committed. In this case, Skip was doing more
  than simply distributing drugs he was
  trafficking drugs, and most would agree that
  trafficking drugs, particularly 750 kilos of
  high-grade cocaine, in a small airplane dodging
  US customs agents radar, involves a certain
  degree of danger. Thus, Skip will not likely be
  able to avoid conviction under this limitation.
• Co-felon limitation Another limitation is that
  the FMR applies only where the victim is someone
  other than a co-felon. In this case, Guido, the
  victim, was a co-felon. In fact, Guido is the
  one who arranged for the transport of the cocaine
  into the U.S., and together Skip and Guido flew
  to a hidden airstrip in a Columbian jungle.
  While the majority of jurisdictions would impose
  this agency theory and limit liability for
  Skip, a minority of courts, on the other hand,
  subscribe to the proximate cause theory and
  hold that any death proximately resulting from
  the unlawful activityeven if the death is a
  co-felonshould result in a conviction or murder.
  (Note, however, that the agency theory is most
  often applied when the victim/co-felon is killed
  not by the actions of his comrade-in-arms, but by
  the intended victim, as a means of self-defense.
  In this case, Guido was not killed by any
  intended victim. Skips actions alone led to
  Guidos death, so even in a majority of
  jurisdictions that allow the agency theory to
  limit guilt under the FMR, Skip might not be able
  to use the agency theory to escape guilt.)
• MPC
• The MPC does not officially recognize the FMR.
  However, under the MPC, it is a rebuttable
  presumption that if death occurred in the
  commission of any of six limited felonies
  (robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
  felonious escape), D acted recklessly, which mens
  rea is sufficient to prove murder. In this case,
  however, Skip was not engaged in any of these six
  limited felonies. Therefore, if Skip was in a
  jurisdiction that operated under the MPC, he
  would likely not be convicted of murder for
  Guidos death.

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Counter-balance

• Monica

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Other Things Coming Up

• Write-on/Co-curricular
• ASP applications