U.S. Navy Mining Capability

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UNCLASSIFIED
ENGAGE
RESPOND
PROJECT
MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS BRIEF TO MINWARA
Spring Conference, May 11 MajGen T. C. BT
Hanifen, USMC Director, Expeditionary Warfare
Division
UNCLASSIFIED
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OPNAV N85

• In-service Amphibious Ships
• Future Amphibious Ships
• NBE
• NSFS
• MPF(F)
• LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV

• Airborne
• Surface
• RMS
• ABS
• Unmanned MCM Vehicles
• Mining

• NSW Requirements
• Information Warfare

• NECC
• NCF
• MESF
• EOD/JEOD
• COMCAM
• ECRC
• ELSG
• NEIC
• JNLW
• MCAST

• Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare
• CNOs Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare
• Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the
  Fleet

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Agenda
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--American
Style -Stand Off -Blockades
-UUVS/Submarines -Advanced Underwater Weapon
Systems (AUWS) MCM In Support Of Maritime
Homeland Defense -LCS Transition
-Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense -MCM
for Homeland Defense Requirements -Fly Away
Capability Mine Counter MeasuresThinking
outside the box -Additional Thoughts on MCM
-Guinea Pig Ships -Budget
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Opening Thought
Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what
Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to
think he is suddenly going to turn a double
somersault, land in our rear, and on both of our
flanks at the same time Go back to your command,
and try to think what are we going to do
ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do!
---U. S. Grant
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A2/AD, American Style
Sub Base
A2 / AD Minefields
Sub Base
The Navy should develop smart mobile mines
capable of autonomous movement to programmed
locations over extended distances --AirSea
Battle Concept
Deploying smart mobile mines might prove
particularly effective in attriting submarines
and/or blocking them from access to their bases
--AirSea Battle Concept
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A2/AD American Style

• In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime
  domain
• The seas are ours we must control our
  adversaries ability to access that domain
• Exit and chokepoint control techniques
• Submarines
• Airpower
• Mining
• Boundaries and shielding techniques
• Mining
• Investment and current capability is not aligned
  with level of warfighting contribution of mining
• Current stockpile of mines only covers the
  shallow water
• No significant ST investment in recent years
• USN proficiency in mining has declined

Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential
Adversaries
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Concepts for the Future
Long-range Weapons
Unmanned Vehicles
Expendable Target Detection Devices
Encapsulated Weapons
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From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater
Weapon System (AUWS)

• Weapons
• Wide Area Coverage
• Stand Off Delivery
• High Volume Placement
• Sensors
• Target Detection
• Target Discrimination
• UUV
• Delivery / Re-position
• On Demand Command Control
• RECO, Change Mission, IFF
• Dual Mode weapons
• Long Duration
• Rechargeable Power source
• In theatre rearming

Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes)
Current
Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads
Near-Term
LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads
Far-Term
Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility
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Value of an AUWS
Traditional Mining (strategic, autonomous)
Transformational AUWS (tactical, controlled)
Quickstrike
SLMM (through FY12)
LD-UUV w/ Mobile Mines or Torpedoes
UAV, USV, UUV, UGV
SHALLOW
INTERMEDIATE
DEEP
INTERMEDIATE
DEEP
SHALLOW
Distributed Sensors
1 Transformational Mine
400 Traditional Mines
Adapt to new Goal
Sterilize/ Destruct
Arm / Engage
Decide
Clear
Deliver
Destruct/ DisArm
Arm
Decide
Extract
Deliver
Engage
Days
Days - Months
Months
Days
Minutes
Hours
Hours
Minutes
Minutes
Eases Delivery Clean-up Provides Tactical
Flexibility
Risky Delivery Extensive Clean-up
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Transition from Mining to an AUWS
Now Manned delivery, Estimated emplacement,
Ambiguous engagement
Future Autonomous delivery, Precision
positioning, Cooperative engagement
Next Unmanned delivery, Precision emplacement,
Controlled engagement
Improved Standoff / Precision
Quickstrike
AUWS
UAV
Improved Standoff / Precision
USV
SLMM
AUWS
UUV
Capability
Technology
Distributed Sensors / TDDs
Sensors Vehicles Weapons
LCS
SDV
LD-UUV
CDV
SSN/SSGN
LWT
Next Gen Mine
Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned
Vehicles
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Mine Countermeasures Roadmap
MCM Force in Transition
Removing the Sailor from the Minefield To
Increase Clearance Rates
MCM VISION Field a Common Set of Unmanned,
Modular MCM Systems Employable from a Variety of
Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can Quickly
Counter the Spectrum of Mines to Enable Assured
Access with Minimum Risk from Mines

• Slow
• Heavy
• Large footprint
• Stovepiped
• Primarily CONUS-based
• Manpower Training Intensive

• Fast and Agile
• Precise
• Lethal
• Modular
• Organic
• Optimized Manpower Requirements

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LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept
LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept
Engage (Sweep)
Detect, Classify Identify
Engage (Neutralize)
LCS 2 (GD)
LCS 2 (GD)
MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV
LCS 1 (LM)
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
ALMDS
LCS 1 (LM)
UISS
AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE
AMNS
RMMV
AQS-20A
OASIS
AQS-20A
OASIS Organic Airborne and Surface Influence
Sweep / AMNS Airborne Mine Neutralization
System RMMV Remote Multi Mission Vehicle /
UISS Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
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Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures
(OMCM)Mission Package (MP) Systems
LCS Based MCM System Components
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
Laser (Hunt)
Minefield Detection and Neutralization
Airborne Mine Neutralization Near-Surface
Upgrade IOC FY13/FOC TBD
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System IOC
FY13/FOC FY25
Assault Breaching System IOC FY13/FOC FY22
Buried Mine Promising Potential with Low
Frequency Broad Band
Remote Minehunting System MH-60S AN/AQS-20A
Airborne Mine Neutralization System
Unmanned Surface Sweep System / Organic Airborne
and Surface Influence Sweep
Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Underwater
Vehicle and Low Frequency Broadband
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill) IOC
FY13/FOC FY25
Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Sweep
Sonar (Hunt) IOC FY15/FOC
Buried Mine Detection IOC FY16/FOC FY24
OASIS IOC FY14/ FOC FY26
UISS IOC FY16/FOC TBD
AN/AQS-20A IOC FY12/ FOC FY25
RMS IOC FY15/FOC FY25
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MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense Why is this
important?

• In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly
  7.6 billion tons of cargo
• International trade via our ports accounts for
  more than 32 percent of the U.S. GDP
• There is 3.8B worth of goods moving in and out
  of U.S. seaports each day
• All U.S. ports are minable

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MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense

• Responsibilities for defending our ports is
  prescribed in Presidentially directed and
  validated Maritime Operational Threat Response
  (MOTR)
• USCG lead in port defense against terrorist
  attack
• DOD support for MCM
• Navy is only DOD MCM capability
• DOD lead in port defense against state actors
• Navy is only DOD MCM capability
• Response time, capacity and prioritization being
  defined by NORTHCOM
• N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with
  rapid fly-away capabilities to counter this
  threat

Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS
solutions
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UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland Defense
Mission
Fielded Capability
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Mid-Term UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland
Defense Mission
Delivered through the FYDP
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Other Thoughts on MCM

• In-Stride Neutralization
• Non-traditional methods
• Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching
  Systems
• Real Time Communications to allow for real time
  MIW analysis
• UxV decoy systems

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Mine Resistant Vessel a.k.a. Guinea Pig

• COTS solution?
• Command and Control Solution?
• Hardening of Existing Vessels for Use

• We can do this with an out of service tanker?
• Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel?

Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance,
reduces risk
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Navy Budget

• PB12 is currently on the Hill
• Navy TOA for PB12 is 161.4B, .8B more than
  FY11
• N8 Warfare Sponsors control 54B 33 of Navy
  TOA
• N85 PB12 TOA is 6.2B in 76 Programs of Record
  which is 4 of overall budget
• Mine Warfare budget is 930M across 14 programs,
  which is .6 of Navy TOA
• LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded
• N852 allocated 33 of FY11 budget to legacy
  systems this decreases to 20 by FY17 as
  organic systems enter fleet

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Questions
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Backup
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Small Diameter UUV Schedule - POM-12 Basis