The Vote of Confidence

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The Vote of Confidence

• The executive is responsible to the legislature
  in parliamentary systems
• Exceptions
• France PM also responsible to the President
• Switzerland The executive can not be removed
• All other The Cabinet needs the Legislatures
  support

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The Vote of Confidence

• When does the Cabinet need the support of the
  legislature?
• During formation
• Investiture Vote
• If challenged
• Vote of no-confidence
• Figure 4.1 Lifecycle of government

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The Lifecycle

• Various types of rules/institutions exist
• Role of Head of State
• Formal Investiture Vote
• Resignation after a loss of Vote of No-Confidence
• Cabinets ability to dissolve the Legislature
• The Legislatures ability to dissolve itself
• Maximum time between elections

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Votes of Confidence

• A formal Investiture Vote is not required
  everywhere
• A Vote of No-Confidence always exists (except
  Switzerland)
• A loss on a normal vote is not fatal
• Often, however, followed by a confidence vote

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Votes of Confidence

• The Vote of Confidence is a double edged sword
• Allows the legislature to remove cabinet
• Allows the cabinet to raise the stakes of the
  legislative game
• Fianna Fail minority cabinet in 1998
• Haughey (PM or Taoiseach) threatens to resign if
  the legislature rejects the cabinets proposal
• Role of threat and popularity
• Elsewhere, e.g., in France, formal procedures
  exist

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Viable Effective Government

• The ability to win votes of no confidence is
  crucial
• Viable governments/cabinets
• The ability to win other votes is also important
• Effective governments/cabinets
• A cabinet may be viable but not effective

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Viable vs. Effective

• Politically it is unlikely to observe a viable
  but ineffective cabinet
• Electoral costs of ineffectiveness
• What determines viability?
• Legislative support
• Cabinet parties role of cohesion
• Non-cabinet parties - ?
• Cabinet vs. legislative coalitions
• A party in legislative coalition but not cabinet
  coalition is called a support party

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Viable vs. Effective Cabinets

• Sometimes non-cabinet parties abstain
• What does abstaining mean?
• Parties/legislators can vote for, against or
  abstain.
• Only two outcomes are possible
• When an absolute majority is required, abstaining
  has the same effect as voting for.

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Legislative vs. Cabinet Coalitions

• Legislative and Cabinet Coalition may differ in
  composition
• The only need to coincide on votes of
  confidence
• A focus on cabinet coalitions downplays the
  importance of the legislature
• Threats of votes of no-confidence, committee
  influence, etc.

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Legislative vs. Cabinet Coalitions

• Equating winning with a legislative majority
• Minimal winning coalitions
• Policy motivation public goods production
• Implications for minority surplus cabinets
• Minority cabinets can be viable
• If parties are policy motivated

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Minority cabinets are quite frequent
• 33 of all cabinets
• 37 of all cabinets when no cabinet holds a
  majority
• Only 42 are minimal winning
• Differences across countries
• Sweden, Denmark, Norway Minority
• Finland, Italy - Surplus

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Minority cabinets as deviations
• Waiting for a new majority (caretaker)
• Immobilisme thesis
• Almost a majority
• The Almost a majority explanation accounts for
  many coalitions
• But why?
• Office seeking politicians will never tolerate a
  minority cabinet

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Policy-Seeking and Minority Cabinets
• Policy benefits both parties in and out of
  cabinet
• Parties out of cabinet may support cabinet if it
  favors the cabinets policies
• How much better of is the party if in the cabinet
• Opportunities to influence policy in opposition
• Cost of governing
• Long term goals (waiting for defeat)

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Oppositional influence
• Extra-governmental institutions
• Legislative structures and norms (Strom)
• Helps account for Scandinavian countries, France,
  Italy
• Does not help explain Belgium, Iceland Portugal

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Luebbert Party leaders want to remain party
  leaders
• Consensual vs. Unconsolidated Systems
• Consensual -gt Corporatism
• Under Corporatism policy is made, to a greater
  degree, outside the legislature
• Allows party leaders to take firm stands on
  policy but stay outside the policy bargaining
• Explains Scandinavia but fails in Austria
  (corporatist but no minority coalitions)

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Viable Minority Cabinets

• An alternative approach
• Focus on policy-viable coalitions
• Policy-viable coalitions are preferred to other
  potential coalitions because of their policy
  preferences

Socialist 40
Conservative 40
Center 20
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Viable Minority Cabinets

• Italy
• Christian Democrats
• Hold a sizeable share of the legislative seats
• Centrally located in the policy spectrum
• Single-party minority DC cabinets ruled Italy for
  much of the period

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Surplus Majority Cabinets

• Office-seekers -gt no extra parties
• Surplus coalitions almost as common as minority
  coalitions
• Finland, Italy, the Netherlands
• Some reasons
• Constitutional amendments
• Low party discipline/cohesion
• Are they surplus?

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Surplus Majority Cabinets

• Some (bad) explanations
• Governments of national unity
• Often called form, rarely form
• The Italian pentapartito cabinets
• Formed in 1981
• Surplus three non-essential parties
• Yet coalition form, fell, formed again (..
  again)

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Surplus Majority Cabinets

• How do we then explain surplus cabinets?
• Role of policy
• In the Italian pentapartito, the smaller parties
  are located, ideologically, between the larger
  coalition parties
• Luebbert More likely in dominant party
  systems
• Dominant partys attempt to lessen the blackmail
  potential of minor parties
• Depends on rules about cabinet resignation
  (influences costs)

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Surplus Majority Cabinets

• Luebbert (cont.)
• What is a dominant party?
• In terms of votes, no minority party is
• We have to look to policy to clarify the idea of
  a dominant party
• Basically, a party located in the center of the
  policy space
• Basically the same argument as for the existence
  of minority cabinets!
• Italy Finland fit the bill

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Summary

• The vote of confidence the link between the
  executive and the legislature
• Viable vs. Effective Government
• -gt Minority Cabinets are possible
• -gt Surplus Cabinets exist
• -gt Bargaining positions is important in
  explaining both