Ramanuja (1017-1137 AD)

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Ramanuja(1017-1137 AD)
12/19/05
Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (Shri-Bhashya)
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(No Transcript)
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General outline of the text

• A critique of Shankaras metaphysical monism
  (non-dualism) (251-254)
• A critique of Shankaras metaphysical idealism
  (not in text)
• A critique of Shankaras theory of the Self
  (254-257)
• A critique of Shankaras theory of ignorance
  (257-261)

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The Classical Philosophical Systems of India

• The orthodox schools
• Samkhya Yoga
• Nyaya Vaisheshika
• Mimamsa Vedanta

• The unorthodox schools
• Buddhism
• Jainism
• Carvaka

(See Text, 233, fn 1)
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Shankara vs. Ramanuja

• Non-Dualism (Advaita)
• Brahman alone is real.
• Brahman Atman are identical (one the same).
• The phenomenal world is an appearance of Brahman
  caused by ignorance (avidya) illusion (maya).

• Qualified Non-Dualism (Vishishadvaita)
• Brahman alone is ultimately independently real,
  but
• in Brahman there are many individual material
  beings many individual conscious selves.
• Material things conscious selves are real, but
  not independently or ultimately so. They exist
  only in in relation to Brahman.

See fn 2 and fn 3 on p. 251
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Detailed outline of the text

• A critique of Ss metaphysical monism - Brahman,
  Pure Being, alone is real distinctions
  differences are unreal.
• Metaphysical monism is unprovable (251).
• Knowing requires objects that are distinct
  different from each other (251).
• Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical
  distinctions (251-2).
• Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (252).
• Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions
  (252-3).
• The process of inference implies metaphysical
  distinctions (253).
• There is no perception of Pure Being (253).
• Impermanent things are not necessarily unreal
  (contrary to Ss view that only that which is
  permanent is real) (253-4).

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Detailed outline, contd

• A critique of Ss metaphysical idealism (not in
  current edition of text)
• Being consciousness are not one the same.
• Consciousness can be an object of consciousness.
• Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self
  is).
• There is no consciousness without an object.

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Detailed outline, contd
A critique of Ss theory of the Self

• Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent
  Self Self consciousness are not one the same
  (254-6).
• The basic differences between Ramanuja Shankara
  on the nature of the Self (Editorial Comment,
  256).

• The individual conscious subject (the I-Self)
  persists in the state of release is the true
  Atman-Self (256-7).

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A critique of Ss theory of ignorance

• Ss theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya),
  which can neither be nor not be (257-8)
• Ramanujas critique
• What is the ground of beginningless ignorance?
  (258)
• How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor
  not-be? (258-260)
• How can Brahman be affected by ignorance?
  (260-261)

Detailed outline, contd
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Even more detailed analysis of the text
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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• Shankaras monism Brahman, Pure Being, alone is
  real distinctions differences are unreal
  (251). Individual entities are impermanent (
  therefore unreal) appearances of Pure Being.
  Pure Being alone is really real. The
  differences distinctions between individual
  entities are unreal (like the entities
  themselves) (251).
• Preliminary criticisms
• Metaphysical monism cannot be proved true but it
  can be proved false (251).
• Knowing requires objects that are distinct
  different from each other (251). Why?

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical
  distinctions (252-3)
• I see this. I distinct different from
  this vice versa.
• Consciousness itself has various ( different)
  attributes (permanence, oneness, etc.).
• Philosophical disputation presupposes differences
  between opposing philosophical views.

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (253)
• A word is a combination of root suffix - two
  different linguistic elements.
• The plurality of words is based on a plurality of
  meanings (each different from the others).
• A sentence is a series of words expressing a
  number of different meanings.

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism
Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions
(252-3)

• This is true of both determinate and
  non-determinate perception (i.e., perception
  that recognizes class membership generic
  differences perception that does not include
  such recognition).
• They both include recognition of differences
  distinctions.

• Even in non-determinate perception, there is
  recognition of the difference between substance
  and attribute in the structure of the object
  perceived (for the 1st time).

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• The process of inference implies
• metaphysical distinctions (253)
• Perception reveals a world marked by difference.
• Inference is a process of reasoning based upon
  perception.
• Inference must also reveal a world marked by
  difference.

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• Shankara claims that the true object of
  perception is Being-Itself (Pure Being) (see
  253).
• Ramanuja claims that there is no perception of
  Pure Being (253)
• All objects of perception are things
  distinguished from other things in various ways.
• There is a difference between substance
  attribute in all objects of perception.
• If the only true object of perception is Pure
  Being, then all judgments referring to different
  objects are meaningless false.
• If perceived differences distinctions are
  unreal, then a man searching for horse should be
  satisfied with finding a buffalo.
• None of the senses (sight, touch, hearing, etc.)
  have Pure Being for their object.

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
monism

• Another argument for monism by Shankara
• Brahman is permanent.
• Individual entities are impermanent.
• The permanent is real, the impermanent is
  unreal.
• Brahman alone is real.

• Rs response Impermanent things are not
  necessarily unreal - sublation persistence (see
  Text, 253-4).

(Is Rs response here a relevant reply to Ss
argument? Why or why not?)
(Text, 253)
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Even more detail, contd

• A critique of Ss metaphysical idealism (not in
  current edition of text)
• Being consciousness are not one the same.
• Consciousness can be an object of consciousness.
• Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self
  is).
• There is no consciousness without an object.

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Shankaras argument for metaphysical
idealism(according to Ramanuja)

• All differences distinctions are unreal
  (metaphysical monism).
• Being consciousness are both (obviously) real.
• There are no differences or distinctions between
  Being and consciousness. They must be one and
  the same (metaphysical idealism).

Again, R appeals to perception to counter the 1st
premise of this argument Perception (he claims)
shows that there is a real distinction
relationship between consciousness its objects.
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Consciousness can be an object of consciousness
Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
idealism

• Ramanuja claims that there are at least two
  situations in which consciousness is an object of
  consciousness
• Consciousness of the consciousness of others
• Consciousness of ones own past states of
  consciousness

• Shankara claims that consciousness cannot be an
  object of consciousness. (Why is this important
  to him? Is it a part of metaphysical idealism?)

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Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
idealism(continued)

• Shankara argues that consciousness is eternal on
  the ground that the antecedent non-existence of
  consciousness cannot be proved.

Ramanuja . . .
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reacts to Shankaras argument by trying to show
that

• the antecedent non-existence of consciousness
  can be known (by consciousness itself).

Ramanujas critique of Shankaras metaphysical
idealism (continued)
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Ramanuja also argues that

• there is no consciousness without an object (no
  pure, undifferentiated consciousness).

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Even more detail, contd
A critique of Ss theory of the Self (254-257 )

• Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent
  Self Self consciousness are not one the same
  (186-8).
• The basic differences between Ramanuja Shankara
  on the nature of the Self (Editorial Comment,
  256).

• The individual conscious subject (the I-Self)
  persists in the state of release is the true
  Atman-Self.

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A critique of Ss theory of ignorance (257-261)
Even more detail, contd

• Ss theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya),
  which can neither be nor not be (257-8)
• Ramanujas critique
• What is the ground of beginningless ignorance?
  (258)
• How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor
  not-be? (258-60)
• How can Brahman be affected by ignorance? (260-61)