Title: Chapter 11 Externalities and Property Rights
1Chapter 11Externalities and Property Rights
- Additional Questions,
- Q. 2, 3, 4, 10
2Externalities
- Negative Externality
- a cost of an activity falls on people other than
those who pursue the activity. - i.e., a person smokes near you, you breathe in
second-hand smoke . - Individuals who consider only their own costs and
benefits will tend to engage too much in
activities that generate negative externalities. - Thus, the private equilibrium quantity is more
than the social equilibrium quantity - QPVT gt QSOC
3Externalities
- Positive Externality
- a benefit of an activity received by people
other than those who pursue the activity. - i.e., a person take a flu shot, it reduces the
chances of infection. - Individuals who consider only their own costs and
benefits will tend to engage too little in
activities that generate positive externalities. - Thus, the private equilibrium quantity is less
than the social equilibrium quantity - QPVT lt QSOC
4Externalities
- Negative and positive externalities create
deadweight loss. - It results in a loss in economic efficiency.
5Externalities
- Tax and subsidy is a way to increase economic
efficiency resulting from externalities. - They induce producers to take account of a
relevant benefit and cost that they otherwise
would have ignored. - Thus, the private MB curve becomes the social MB
curve and the private MC curve becomes the
social MC curve. - As a result, improving economic efficiency and
reducing the deadweight loss
6Chapter 11, Problem 2
- Phoebe keeps a bee farm next door to an apple
orchard. She chooses her optimal number of
beehives by selecting the honey output level at
which her private marginal benefit from
beekeeping equals her private marginal cost. - a) Assume that Phoebes private marginal
benefit and marginal cost curves from beekeeping
are normally shaped. Draw a diagram of them.
7- a) Assume that Phoebes private marginal benefit
and marginal cost curves from beekeeping are
normally shaped. Draw a diagram of them.
/hive
Private MC
Ppvt
Private MB
Qpvt
Number of beehives
No external cost and benefit is involved. The
equilibrium price and quantity is socially
optimal.
8- Phoebes bees help to pollinate the blossoms in
the apple orchard, increasing the fruit yield.
Show the social marginal benefit from Phoebes
beekeeping in your diagram.
/hive
DWL
Private MC
Ppvt XB
P Soc
Ppvt
Social MB Private MB XB
XB
Private MB
Qpvt
QSoc
Number of beehives
External benefit (positive externality) is
involved in this case. The private market is
producing too little.
9- c) Phoebes bees are Africanized killer bees
that aggressively sting anyone who steps into
their flight path. Phoebe, fortunately, is
naturally immune to the bees venom. Show the
social marginal cost curve from Phoebes
beekeeping in your diagram.
Social MC Private MC XC
/hive
Private MC
XC
Ppvt XC
P Soc
Ppvt
Private MB
Qpvt
QSoc
Number of beehives
External cost (negative externality) is involved
in this case. The private market is producing too
much.
10- Indicate the socially optimal quantity of
beehives on your diagram, Is it higher or lower
than the privately optimal quantity? Explain. - If we combine the positive and negative
externality, the socially optimal number of
beehives could be greater or less than the
privately optimal number - depending on the magnitude of the social marginal
cost relative to the private marginal cost and - depending on the magnitude of the social marginal
benefit relative to the private marginal benefit.
11- If the negative externality is negligible and
the positive externality is large -
Social MC
/hive
Private MC
Social MB
Private MB
Number of beehives
Q soc
Q pvt
The socially optimal number of beehives, Qsoc ,
exceeds the privately optimal number, Qpvt.
12- If the negative externality is large and the
positive externality is negligible -
Social MC
/hive
Private MC
Social MB
Private MB
Number of beehives
Q soc
Q pvt
The socially optimal number of beehives, Qsoc ,
is smaller than the privately optimal number,
Qpvt.
13Chapter 11, Problem 3
- Suppose the supply curve of boom box rentals in
Golden Gate Park is given by P 5 0.1Q, where
P is the daily rent per unit in dollars and Q is
the volume of units rented in hundreds per day.
The demand curve for boom boxes is 20 0.2Q. If
each boom box imposes 3 per day in noise costs
on others, by how much will the equilibrium
number of boom boxes rented exceed the socially
optimal number?
14P 8 0.1Q
/unit
P 5 0.1Q
20
XC
PSOC
Ppvt
8
P 20 0.2Q
5
Number of rentals
Q pvt
Q SOC
Market Equilibrium 5 0.1Q 20 0.2Q Q
pvt 50 P pvt 10
- Imposition of 3 noise cost (external cost)
- Social supply curve original supply curve 3
- Social supply curve 8 0.1Q
- 8 0.1Q 20 0.2Q
- Q pvt 40
- P pvt 12
-
- If the negative externality (noise) is
internalized into the rental, the equilibrium
rental is greater than the social equilibrium
rental by 10 (50 40)
15Chapter 11, Problem 4
- Refer to problem 3. How would the imposition of
a tax of 3 per unit on each daily boom box
rental affect efficiency in this market? - Tax is a way to increase economic efficiency
resulting from externalities. - Tax forces the producers to take into account the
costs impose on others. - Tax has the effect of raising each producers MC
curve by the same amount as the external cost
therefore, Private MC shifts up and equals to the
Social MC. - Thus, the resulting private equilibrium quantity
equals to the socially optimal quantity.
16- The government can use taxes as an incentive for
producers to cut back on externalities, i.e.
pollution. - Taxes used in this way are called Pigou taxes.
- By setting the tax rate equal to the marginal
external cost, firms can be made to behave in the
same way as they would if they bore the cost of
externality directly. - Thus, the imposition of a 3 per unit tax is
efficiency-enhancing - It actually internalizes the noise cost into the
private supply curve - After the imposition of tax, the supply curve
becomes the social supply curve - It helps bring the inefficient rental of boom
boxes to the (socially) efficient rental of boom
boxes
17Additional Question
- Affordable housing is seen as a way to reduce
crime rates and raise the quality of life of
lower income neighborhoods. - A) Given this information, what economic concept
do you think is relevant to the analysis of the
affordable housing market?
18- Affordable housing gives a positive externality
- It reduces the crime rates and raises the quality
of life of other people in the neighborhood - Therefore, the marginal social benefit of
affordable housing is greater than the marginal
private benefit for owners of affordable housing
19- B) Graphically show the market for affordable
housing. What is the market equilibrium? What is
the social optimum? - C) Graphically show any deadweight loss in this
market.
20- As the marginal social benefit is greater than
the marginal private benefit for affordable
housing, the equilibrium quantity from a
competitive market at Q1 is lower than the
socially optimal quantity of Q2.
DWL
P2
P1
21- D) Discuss potential ways of reducing deadweight
loss in this market. - To reduce deadweight loss in this market, the
government can subsidize the ownership of
affordable housing by the same amount as the
external benefit, so that the number of
affordable homes increases toward Q2 - Subsidy is a way to increase economic efficiency
resulting from externalities. - It induces producers to take account of a
relevant benefit that they otherwise would have
ignored. - Subsidy has the effect of raising each producers
MB curve by the same amount as the external
benefit therefore, Private MB shifts up and
equals to the Social MB. - Thus, the resulting private equilibrium quantity
equals to the socially optimal quantity
22Chapter 11, Problem 10
- A village has six residents, each of whom has
accumulated savings of 100. Each villager can
use this money either to buy a government bond
that pays 15 percent interest per year or to buy
a year-old llama, send it onto the commons to
graze, and sell it after 1 year. The price the
villager gets for the 2-year-old llama depends on
the quality of the fleece it grows while grazing
on the commons. That in turn depends on the
animals access to grazing, which depends on the
number of llamas sent to the commons, as shown in
the following table
23- The villagers make their investment decisions one
after another, and their decisions are public. - If each villager decides individually how to
invest, how many llama will be sent onto the
commons, and what will be the resulting net
village income? - He will send llama onto the commons if the
benefit is at least as large as the interest he
could have earned on government bonds.
24-
- To buy a 100 government bond, 15 of interest
will be earned, or 115 in total. - Villager should send a llama on the commons if
and only if that llama will command a price of at
least 115. - Therefore, 3 llamas will be sent onto the
commons, 3 villagers will buy the government
bond. - Total village income 48 3(15) 93
Construct the table
25- What is the socially optimal number of llamas for
this village? Why is that different from the
actual number? What would net village income be
if the socially optimal number of llamas were
sent onto the commons? - To maximize the income received by the group as a
whole. -
- We need to compare the marginal income.
-
- Recall, the amount that could be earned from a
government bond is 15. -
- Villagers should send llama onto the commons only
if its marginal income is at least as large as
15.
26The socially optimal number is to send 1 llama
onto the commons and buy 5 government bonds
instead of sending 3 llamas onto the commons and
buy 3 government bonds as in part a. This is
different from the actual number because in
deciding whether or not to send a llama, each
villager ignores the impact of his llamas
presence on the other llamas fleece quality.
The total village income would then be 22
5(15), 97. That amount is 4 more than the
total amount that resulted when villagers made
their investment decisions individually.
27- The village committee votes to auction the right
to graze llamas on the commons to the highest
bidder. Assuming villagers can both borrow and
lend at 15 percent annual interest, how much will
the right sell for at auction? How will the new
owner use the right, and what will be the
resulting village income? -
- If a single villager could control access to the
commons, the most profitable way to use this land
is to send only a single llama, and earn 22 per
year. - The opportunity cost of 100 spend on llama is
the interest could have earned from buying
government bond, 15. - If the land were free, the owner would thus earn
22 per year by raising one llama per year on it,
or 7 more than she would have earned had she
used her 100 to buy a bond. -
28- The price of the land will be bid up until it
owning the land is no better than putting the
same amount in the bank at 15 percent interest. - That price is the amount of money that would
yield 7 per year if deposited at 15 percent
interest, that is, - 0.15x 7
- x 46.67
- Therefore, the new owner will graze one llama.
- The village income will be 97 22 5(15).
29Additional Question 1
- A cost or benefit that falls on people other
than those pursuing an activity is called a(n) - Â
- positive externality.
- negative externality.
- externality.
- external cost.
- external benefit
Ans C
30Additional Question 2
- Which of the following is an example of a
negative externality? - Your neighbors enjoying the loud music you play.
- A firm dumping waste into a stream.
- Bees pollinating flowers on adjacent property.
- Whales swimming in international waters.
- None of the above.
Ans B
31Additional Question 3
- A negative externality will result in an
equilibrium quantity of an activity that is
_____________ the socially optimal quantity. - Â
- above
- below
- above or below
- equal to
- it can not be determined
Ans A
32Additional Question 4
- A positive externality will result in an
equilibrium quantity of an activity that is
_____________ the socially optimal quantity. - Â
- above
- below
- above or below
- equal to
- it can not be determined
Ans B
33Additional Question 5
- Which factor, if it were present, would lessen
the ability of the Coase Theorem to solve an
externality? - The situation is already efficient.
- Negotiating requires hiring a lawyer.
- The parties are all self-interested.
- The potential gain in surplus is high.
- Property rights have already been assigned to one
of the parties.
Ans B
34- Coase Theorem if at no cost people can negotiate
the purchase and sale of the right to perform
activities that cause externalities, they can
always arrive at efficient solutions to the
problems causes by externalities. - Hiring a lawyer is a kind of transaction costs
one has to spend time to find a lawyer, as well
as paying the lawyer to do the negotiation. In
other words, in order to exercise ones right,
the person has to incur some transaction costs. - Therefore, Option B is the answer.
35Additional Question 6
- Suppose there are ten people playing cards in a
room. One of them wants to smoke a cigar nine
of them dislike the smell of cigar smoke. The
smoker values the privilege of smoking at 5, and
each of the other nine occupants of the room
would be willing to pay fifty cents for clean air
in the room. The rules governing use of the room
state that smoking is not allowed unless everyone
agrees to allow smoking.
36- If the cigar smoker paid each other occupant
0.50 for the right to smoke, the cigar smoker
would be ? and the other occupants would be
? . - Better off worse off.
- Better off just as well off as before the
payment. - Better off better off.
- Just as well off as before the payment better
off. - Worse off just as well off as before the
payment.
37- According to the story
- The smokers reservation price for smoking is 5.
- Each of other occupants reservation price for
clean air is 0.50. - Now the smoker is paying to compensate the other
occupants from the smoky air.
38- There are 9 other occupants. Each of them is
paid 0.50, which is their reservation price. - Before the payment, they were enjoying clean air
which was valued also at 0.50. - Therefore, they are equally well off as before
the payment.
39- The smokers reservation price for a drag is 5.
- He is paying 0.50 x 9 to smoke, which amounts to
4.50. - There is a 0.50 surplus.
- Hence, he is better off.
- Ans B
40Additional Question 7
- The reason drivers would prefer building new
roads to a 5 toll to reduce commute times is
because - Building roads is the only solution.
- They know a toll would not alter commuting
behaviour. - Cities always need new roads.
- The cost of new roads falls on all taxpayers the
toll only falls on those who use the existing
road. - Of the commitment problem.
- Ans D
41- Options A and B are not right. We know that by
setting a toll, the congestion on the highway can
be reduced (and solved entirely). - Option C does not make any economic sense at all.
- Option E is also not right, as we are not talking
about competition or game theory.
42- If a toll of 5 is imposed, users of the highway
will have to pay money out from their pocket on a
pay as you use basis. - Which means the users will have to pay for what
they use. - This is not a problem until rational consumers
realise that they can actually shift the
financial burden to other people, spreading the
contribution among all people in the city.
43- By having the government building more roads, all
taxpayers in the cities are financing the
project. - Probably not all taxpayers are users of that
highway anyway. - Frequent highway users will find out that instead
of paying 5 every single day, commuting on other
peoples money (including theirs, but the cost is
spread) is a bargain. - And hence, Option D is the answer.
44Additional Question 8
- Explain the following situations by using the
concept Tragedy of the commons. - Harvesting timber on public land
- Picking strawberries in a public park
- Harvesting whales in international oceans
- Environmental pollution
45- Tragedy of the commons the tendency for a
resource that has no price to be used until its
marginal benefit falls to zero. - When no one has the private ownership to own any
kind of property, i.e., land, ocean, swimming
pool, he/she has no incentive to take the
opportunity cost of using it into account. - The cause of it is the fact that one persons use
of commonly held property imposes an external
cost on others by making the property less
valuable. - Solutions to the tragedy of commons are to place
a clearly defined property ownership and to place
a regulation of the use of property.
46- Harvesting timber on public land
- Each tree cutter knows that a tree not harvested
this year will be bigger, and hence more valuable
next year. - But he also knows that if he doesn't cut the tree
down this year, someone else will. - Solution Laws regulated the amount of harvests
- b) Picking strawberries in a public park
- Each individual knows that the strawberries would
taste better if allowed to ripen for another week - But each also knows that strawberries not eaten
today may not be there next week. - Solution assign ownership on strawberries park
47- Harvesting whales in international oceans
- Each individual whaler knows that harvesting an
extra whale reduces the breeding population of
whales - Hence reduce the size of future whale
populations, but he also knows that any whale he
fails to harvest today will just be taken by some
other whaler. - Solution Fishing license
- d) Environmental pollution
- Each individual polluter has no incentive to take
into account the cost his pollution imposes on
others. - Solution Tax
48Additional Question 9
- People can purchase and sell the right to
perform activities that cause externalities to
arrive at efficient solutions. This describes - Â
- the Tragedy of the Commons.
- a positional externality.
- an external benefit.
- the Coase Theorem.
- the problem of unpriced resources.
Ans D