Abortion

1
Abortion

• Vaughn Ch. 7

2
History

• Historically, abortion has been a controversial
  issue.
• Abortion and euthanasia are forbidden in the
  Hippocratic oath (written 400 BCE) p253
• Aristotle recommended abortion before life and
  sense have begun for families with too many
  children. p253

3
History

• Vaughn claims the Hebrew and Christian scriptures
  do not denounce abortion, citing Exodus 21.
• Whether those scriptures prohibit abortion is too
  difficult a question for here
• Vaughns interpretation is too quick, and it is
  not well done.

4
History

• Vaughn leaves out crucial information that
  provides context. He says
• Exodus 2122 says that if a man causes a woman
  to have a miscarriage, but she is not harmed
  in any other way, the penalty is just a fine.
  p253
• But, the passage actually says
• And if men struggle with each other and strike a
  woman with child so that she has a miscarriage,
  yet there is no further injury, he shall surely
  be fined -NASB
• Does Vaughns version seem equivalent?
• Might there be serious translation questions?

5
History

• Aquinas believed the ensoulment of a fetus
  happened in stages. At conception life is
• vegetative, then it develops
• lower sensitive life,
• more advanced sensitive life, etc.,
• until, at 40 days for males (90 days for
  females), God directly imparts a rational soul to
  the fetus.
• So, while Aquinas says abortion is always wrong,
  it is only murder after 40 days for males, 90
  days for females

http//www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
For a scholarly discussion of Aquinas on
abortion, see link
http//www2.franciscan.edu/plee/aquinas_on_human_e
nsoulment.htm
6
History

• In English Common Law, abortion was considered a
  crime only if performed after quickening p253
• Quickening df historically, when the mother can
  detect movement initiated by the fetus (20 weeks
  gestation)
• Anima Latin, breath anemos Greek, wind
• Animal soul is the principle of self-motion
• So, a fetus is quickened when it receives or
  develops the power of self-motion, an animal soul
  (9 weeks gestation, though not detectable by the
  mother)

http//www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
http//www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment
7
history

• In England, Henry de Bracton, who lived at the
  same time as Aquinas, affirmed the killing of a
  fetus after quickening was murder.
• But practically every major legal writer
  thereafter claimed it was not murder at common
  law. (see link below)
• Not until the early 1800s did England have a law
  saying abortion of a quickened fetus was murder,
  punishable by death. (see link below)

Warning unsure of quality of source
http//law.jrank.org/pages/445/Abortion-Abortion-i
n-English-law.html
8
Roe vs. Wade

• Roe vs. Wade is the landmark court case begun in
  Texas between Norma McCorvey (Jane Roe), and
  Texas (represented by the Dallas County District
  Attorney Henry Wade)
• Based on a disputed right to privacy found in the
  14th Amendment, the Supreme Court determined
  abortion should be
• legal by choice in the first trimester,
• restricted by therapeutic concerns in the second
  trimester,
• restricted by therapeutic needs in the third

9
Definitions
Whats wrong here?

• Abortion is the ending of a pregnancy. p255
• Spontaneous abortion or miscarriage abortion
  due to birth defects or injury.
• Induced abortion intentional abortion
• Therapeutic abortion intentional abortion for
  the life or health of the mother

10
Arguments

1. Who has the burden of proof in the battle over
   abortion rights?
2. Standing presumption?
3. Who asserted first?
4. What does conservative mean in this argument?
5. What does liberal mean here?

11
argument 1

• Vaughns first conservative argument
• Killing Innocents Argument (p258)
• The killing of an innocent human being is wrong
• the unborn is an innocent human being
• therefore, it is wrong to kill the unborn
• What does Vaughn find wrong with this argument?
• Which fallacy does he think is committed?

12
argument 2

• Vaughn presents this argument as an improvement
  of Argument 1
• Killing Innocent Persons Argument (p258-259)
• The killing of an innocent person is wrong
• the unborn is an innocent person
• therefore, it is wrong to kill the unborn
• For Vaughn, whats wrong with the argument?
• Which premise is disputed?

13
Noonan's defense of argument 2

• Receipt of genetic code is what makes someone a
  human or man (the equivalent of a person)
• Noonans Argument It is this genetic
  information which
• determines his characteristics
• is the biological carrier of the possibility of
  human wisdom
• makes him a self-evolving being. John C. Noonan
  (see Vaughn, p259, fn 5)

14
non-sequitur response to noonan?

• Vaughns Response to Noonans argument is to
  reject sorites arguments (p259).
• We can think of a sorites argument as a fallacy,
  an Argument to the Heap (soros means heap in
  Greek)
• How many grains of rice does it take to make a
  heap?
• Is two enough? No?
• Three? No.
• Can you ever get a heap by adding one grain? No?
• Then you can never make a heap!?
• Was Noonans argument an argument to the heap?
• What did Noonan argue exactly?

15
Better response to noonan?

• Warrens Response Mary Ann Warren argues that
  the conceptus, or fertilized ovum,
• cannot be identified with the embryo because
  it is a mass of undifferentiated cells, any of
  which could give rise to an embryo. This
  pre-embryo may spontaneously divide, resulting
  in twins or triplets alternatively, it may
  combine with another pre-embryo giving rise to a
  single fetus. (see Vaughn, p259, top right)
• Does this argument show pre-embryos are not
  persons in Noonans sense, or that we cant tell
  which part is a person or persons? Both? Neither?
• Is the use of spontaneously question begging?

16
Devines defense of argument 2

• Devines Defense Philip Devine provides a
  defense of valuing adults and fetuses the same
• What makes it wrong to kill someone is the
  stealing of their future (their potential?)
• But a fetus has a future no less than an adult
• So, killing a fetus is wrong for the same reason
  killing an adult is wrong (supplied conclusion)
  (see Vaughn, p259, fn 7)
• Does a fetus have a future the way an adult has a
  future?

17
Is Devine's argument a potentiality argument?

• Vaughn characterizes Devines argument as a
  potentiality argument
• A common response to this potentiality argument
  is that there is a world of difference between
  (1) possessing a particular trait that gives you
  a right and (2) having the potential to develop a
  trait that gives you that right. p259
• Is that a fair characterization of Devines
  argument?

18
potentiality arguments

• If someone argues,
• only persons have rights
• fetuses are potential persons
• therefore, fetuses have rights
• they will be susceptible to Warrens and Tooleys
  criticisms
• potential persons are not persons
• having the potential to drive at 18 years old
  does not give you a right to drive when youre 12
• But did Devine ever claim such a thing?

19
personhood

• Is merely being a human being, a member of Homo
  Sapiens, sufficient for personhood?
• Vaughn says, to think so is to be guilty of a
  prejudice called speciesism.
• The liberal argues that since the properties that
  make us persons could be exhibited by non-humans,
  merely being a member of the human species cannot
  be sufficient for personhood.
• And speciesism is a close cousin to racism.
  p260 (bottom)
• Is this right?
• Isnt the conservative position that being Homo
  Sapiens is sufficient, but not necessary, for
  personhood?
• That leaves open the possibility that other
  species are persons too, right?
• Speciesism avoided?

20
personhood

• Warren lists features she thinks most central
  to personhood
• consciousness and capacity for feeling pain
• reasoning
• self-motivated activity
• capacity to communicate
• self-concepts, and self-awareness, individual,
  racial, or both
• Warren thinks any being missing all of those is
  certainly not a person. -p260
• What about someone in a coma?
• Vaughn mentions the mentally impaired, who may
  lack all 5.
• Are they not persons? Can they be killed?

21
personhood

• The liberal admits their view of personhood makes
  killing the hopelessly mentally impaired or
  vegetative permissible.
• Nonetheless, we protect them for other reasons
  because
• their families care about them
• uncertainty about their mental status
• concern to avoid a general devaluing of life
  p261
• Wouldnt the last reason, especially, also be a
  reason to prohibit abortion?

22
personhood

• 2 reasons for why the liberal position does not
  justify infanticide
• infants are very close to being persons
• social utility (we, by nature, love babies, and
  killing them would coarsen us, and it is wrong to
  coarsen society) p261
• Does that sound like a sufficient account of what
  would be wrong with killing a baby?

23
personhood

• Between conservative and liberal views, Vaughn
  mentions moderates. Moderates view personhood as
  appearing somewhere during fetal development
• brainwaves
• viability
• gradually on a scale of increasing personhood
  p261
• Vaughn seems to view these are arbitrary.
• Is there anything specially relevant about
  brainwaves or viability?
• Is the gradual development position reasonable?

24
rights

• Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that even if we
  grant fetuses person status, their rights do not
  necessarily trump the rights of others.
• Read p262, the example of the violinist.
• What abortion case is this similar to?

Judith Jarvis Thompson
Michael Tooley
25
Rights

• Consider Michael Tooleys argument based on an
  analysis of rights
• to have a right you must be the kind of thing
  that can have an interest (the newspaper has no
  right not to be torn up because it has no
  interest in not being torn up isnt the kind of
  thing can can be interested in not being torn up)
• to have an interest in something, you must desire
  it
• fetuses cannot have an interest in continued
  existence because they cannot desire it
• fetuses cannot desire continue existence because
  they cannot have a concept of themselves existing
  in the future (because they cannot form the
  concept of a self at all)
• therefore, the unborn (and some infants), have no
  right to continued existence (see Tooley, p316)
• Can a fetus form a concept of itself existing
  through time?
• Is such an enduring self necessary for personhood?