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Title: Micro-Foundations of Insurgent Violence: Implications for Iraq


1
Micro-Foundations of Insurgent Violence
Implications for Iraq
  • Mark Smith, Janine Davidson, Peter Brooks
  • Center for Adaptive Strategies Threats
  • Hicks Associates, Inc.
  • Prepared for Presentation to the
  • Irregular Warfare Forum
  • Pentagon, VA
  • 5 October 2005

2
Agenda
  • How Insurgency Works The micro-dynamics of
    insurgency
  • Perspective of the civilian population (C.O.G.)
  • Insurgent and Government tactics and objectives
  • What To Do A Framework for Commanders
  • How to analyze the AOR and tailor tactics
    accordingly
  • Implications for Iraq
  • Audience Unit level commanders

3
Purpose
  • The purpose of this briefing is to provide
    unit-level commanders (Company Brigade) with
  • A deeper understanding of the micro-level
    motivations of insurgent and local civilian
    behavior
  • A framework for applying this knowledge to
    develop a counterinsurgent strategy tailored for
    their AOR

4
Brief Based on Wide Array of Scholarship
  • Bosnia
  • Kosovo
  • Vietnam
  • Uganda
  • Angola
  • Mozambique
  • Eritrea
  • Palestine
  • Greek Civil War
  • El Salvador
  • Cambodia
  • Soviet Partisans in Ukraine during WWII
  • Greek Partisans during WWII
  • Nicaragua
  • Guatemala
  • French Revolution
  • Cyprus
  • Liberia
  • Malaya

This brief describes the patterns of violence
observed in these other insurgencies, and then
applies these lessons to Iraq.
5
Insurgent Activity is Public
  • Insurgent activity is extremely public at the
    local level.
  • Caching weapons, recruiting fighters, punishing
    government collaborators, collecting taxes, etc
  • Actions are visible to locals -- civilians are
    the audience.
  • Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies are fought
    through the civilian population.
  • Most of the violence is against civilians.
  • Insurgents punish collaborators
  • Historically, government forces often engage in
    reprisals, although this is not currently the
    case in Iraq

Civilians are the eyes and ears of COIN
6
and THIS is What It Looks Like
A man, center, lying down, is punched before
being killed, while another man walks to execute
a second man, seen on his knees on the right, on
Baghdad's Haifa Street, Sunday Dec. 19 2004.
About 30 gunmen ambushed a car Sunday in central
Baghdad carrying employees of the Iraqi
organization running next month's elections,
killing three of the workers while two escaped
unhurt, an official from the election body said.
Adel al-Lami, a member of the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq, said the early
morning attack took place in downtown Haifa
Street, a thoroughfare running through central
Baghdad and the scene of repeated clashes between
security forces and insurgents. (AP Photo / Str)
7
Insurgents use Selective Violence
  • Silence Was a Weapon If they want to survive,
    insurgents must keep the civilian population from
    aiding the government security forces.
  • Reasons Insurgents Target
  • American troops
  • To drive them back into protected bases in order
    to allow insurgents to continue their public
    activities without fear of interruption.
  • Indigenous security forces
  • To allow insurgents to monopolize violence in the
    neighborhood.
  • Collaborators with those forces
  • To deter collaboration with security forces, in
    order to prevent identification of insurgents and
    their supporters.

As of March 2005, 24,865 Iraqi civilian deaths
were reported., 35.9 due to criminality, 12
due to insurgent targeting of govt.
collaborators, and only 7.7 due to terrorist
bombings. (IBC 2005)
8
Because they Understand Nagls Ninety Percent
  • LTC John Nagl points out that even if 90 of the
    civilians in Al Anbar support the Americans, they
    will not help if they are afraid of retaliation.

Insurgents can Identify and punish collaborators
IM NOT SAFE
Silence
I Like the Government
Government can protect civilians from
retaliation IM SAFE
DenunciationTips Collaboration
Insurgents need only for good people to do nothing
9
Civilian decisions rely primarily on security
  • In the civilians mind A marginal benefit to
    government forces is not worth the sacrifice in
    personal security it brings with it.
  • One persons aid to the government is not going
    to end the insurgency. It will make -- at best
    -- a small difference on behalf of the
    government.
  • Result The vast majority of civilians will not
    put their security at risk to help the
    government.
  • Creates a vicious cycle
  • A governments legitimacy depends on its ability
    to provide security.
  • Throughout history security has been the primary
    motivation and purpose for allegiance to a higher
    authority (E.g. feudal system, organized crime,
    etc.)

10
Even Mass Killings and Bombings by Insurgents are
often selective
  • What may at first appear to be indiscriminate
    violence is often highly selective.
  • Suicide car bombs often target police convoys,
    recruiting stations, government officials, and
    security forces.
  • Truly indiscriminate violence signals the
    inability of the insurgency to get good
    intelligence on who is and is not a government
    collaborator, and so they often resort to
    targeting by ethnic group, the only information
    available to them.

11
One week in Iraq (1 of 3) 7 July 2005 to 10
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
7-Jul-2005 Ihab al-Sherif, Egypt's ambassador-to-be in Iraq gunfire 1 kidnapped in Baghdad
7-Jul-2005 Police Station, Local Govt. HQ mortars 3 Mosul
7-Jul-2005 Shiite cleric Hashium Attiya al-Fahdli gunfire 1 Baghdad
7-Jul-2005 Bodies found decapitated 5 b/w Ramadi and Rawah
7-Jul-2005 Ali Ghalib Ibrahim, head of Salahuddinn provincial council gunfire 1 Tikrit
8-Jul-2005 Jumhour Karim Khammas, Sunni Muslim Basra Univ. professor gunfire 1 Basra
8-Jul-2005 taxi passengers gunfire 4 Mosul
8-Jul-2005 Bodies of 4 men found executed 4 Mosul
8-Jul-2005 policeman gunfire 1 Al-Yarmouk
8-Jul-2005 Ali Shakir, chief of Iraqi karate federation gunfire 1 Kut, body found in river
9-Jul-2005 Translator working for U.S. and his family gunfire 4 Al Ta'mim, Baiji
10-Jul-2005 U.S. military convoy suicide car bomb 1 near Fallujah
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
12
One week in Iraq (2 of 3) 10 July 2005 to 11
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
10-Jul-2005 truck drivers working for U.S. gunfire 3 Near Dujail
10-Jul-2005 security official gunfire 1 Kirkuk
10-Jul-2005 police colonel gunfire 1 Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 convoy of mayor suicide car bomb 3 Kirkuk
10-Jul-2005 army recruits suicide bomber 20 Muthanna airfield, Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 Sunni Arabs from northern Baghdad tortured, shot 12 Sadr City, Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 employees of Iraqna telecom co. gunfire 2 SW Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 convoy of police chief Brig. Gen. Salim Salih Meshaal suicide car bomb 5 near Mosul
10-Jul-2005 customs official 2 suicide car bombs 7 Walid crossing, Syrian border
11-Jul-2005 Shiite family gunfire 8 Baladiyat, Baghdad
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
13
One week in Iraq (3 of 3) 12 July 2005 to 14
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
12-Jul-2005 Office of International Org. for Human Rights gunfire 4 Jamaa, western Baghdad
12-Jul-2005 industrial area car bomb 3 Kirkuk
12-Jul-2005 Lt. Col. Amer Mozar, head of Ministry of Interior CSI gunfire 1 Wahda, southern Baghdad
12-Jul-2005 worshippers at Al-Kebir Sunni mosque suicide bomber 2 Jalowla, 50 mi. SE of Baquba
13-Jul-2005 US Base mortars 1 al-Siniyah, Bayji
13-Jul-2005 Army checkpoint gunfire 1 Sahrayn, Tuz
13-Jul-2005 US Patrol roadside bomb 1 eastern Baghdad
13-Jul-2005 unknown tortured, gunfire 10 bodies found in eastern Baghdad
14-Jul-2005 checkpoint at entrance to Green Zone suicide car bomber 1 Green Zone entrance, Baghdad
14-Jul-2005 policeman in car gunfire 3 near Kirkuk
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
14
Civilian Micro-decisions
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Government can protect me and I like the
    government
  • Denounce known insurgents
  • Collaborate with govt.
  • Provide Tips
  • Join Security Forces
  • Government will arrest or kill me if I help the
    insurgents, but I still like the insurgency
  • Silence

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Government cannot protect me, but I still like
    the government
  • Silence
  • Government cannot touch me and I like the
    insurgency
  • Join insurgency
  • Provide sanctuary
  • Provide materiel

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
15
Secure Environment, Support for Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
  • Government can protect me and I like the
    government
  • Denounce known insurgents
  • Collaborate with govt.
  • Provide Tips
  • Join Security Forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
16
Secure Environment, Oppose the Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Government will arrest or kill me, but I still
    dont like the government
  • Silence

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
17
Insecure Environment, Support for Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Government cannot protect me, but I still like
    the government
  • Silence

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
18
Insecure Environment, Oppose the Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Government cannot touch me and I like the
    insurgency
  • Join insurgency
  • Provide sanctuary
  • Provide materiel

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
19
Control Precedes Collaboration
  • Control precedes collaboration, not the other way
    around
  • Once local security was achieved, if only
    partially, real flow of intelligence began. This
    is the second point to stress, for, without
    intelligence, the security forces are blind and
    cannot possibly pursue the selective tactics
    demanded by this type of warfare. (Asprey 571)
  • Professor Stathis Kalyvas identifies the
    mechanisms
  • Control deters coercion and intimidation.
  • Recruitment generates cascades of support because
    families of fighters tend to support the side
    their family member is on.
  • Control affects peoples belief in the ultimate
    outcome.
  • Control makes it easier to monitor the
    population.

But control everywhere requires a huge military
commitment. Is this mission impossible?
20
How to Do More With Less Amplifying COIN Force
Presence
  • Counter-insurgents can use techniques that
    multiply their effect
  • Manipulate civilian perceptions
  • Change expectations about who will win.
  • Psychological operations (eagle-tagging)
  • Multiply presence by publicizing patrols and
    raids.
  • Selectively target insurgents and their
    infrastructure
  • Demonstrate an ability to discriminately target
    insurgents.
  • Publicize selective captures of insurgents, as it
    demonstrates a high level of control and
    convinces people it is safe to collaborate.
  • Build political-security-economic-social
    institutions simultaneously (oil-spot approach)
  • Prior to moving to the next fight,
    counter-insurgents need to build civil
    administration and domestic capacity, which
    greatly reduces the military requirements of
    control.

21
Selective Targeting Requires Civilian Tips
  • Tips and denunciations are how COIN operators
    know who the insurgents are..
  • Anonymous denunciations protect collaborators,
    but make it impossible to judge the quality of
    the tip.
  • Public denunciations are more dangerous, but more
    credible.

Local tips are the key to COIN identification of
insurgents and their infrastructure.
22
Solving the ConundrumTips are Essential but
Usually False
  • Many denunciations are false
  • Usually motivated by personal or clan feuds and
    vendettas.
  • Must have a local system for vetting tips that
    examines motives
  • Other civilians often know whether tips are
    credible.
  • Map and understand existing tribal and clan
    networks
  • Enlist cooperation of trusted locals to vet tips
  • Secret village or tribal committees can evaluate
    accuracy of denunciations, as in Vietnam, Greece,
    and elsewhere
  • Must have system to act on tips
  • QRFs, Decentralized decision-making, command and
    control

23
Which has Implications for Intelligence
  • Intelligence about insurgency is very local and
    has a very short half-life
  • Captured insurgents must be exploited locally
  • Rather than arresting insurgents and sending them
    up to division headquarters
  • The number of tips coming in is a good Measure of
    Effectiveness because it demonstrates civilian
    faith in govt.

24
Good COIN looks like Good Policework.
  • The key is the social interaction of police
    officers with the community.
  • Permanent presence
  • Ability to bring in tips
  • Ability to extract information from suspects to
    lead them to new suspects
  • The legitimacy that comes with a permanent
    presence in the community.
  • Using tips to make arrests, then using the
    interviews to generate more tips, to make more
    arrests, leading to a raid on the ultimate
    target. following the chain of clues
  • For example, you get a tip about a drug dealer,
    arrest the drug dealer, turn him to get his
    distributor, turn the distributor to give up the
    drug manufacturing house, which you raid with
    SWAT.

Indigenous forces will be better at these
techniques
25
Micro-Foundations to Macro Strategy
  • Up to this point, we have talked about the nature
    of insurgent violence at the micro level.
  • Now we apply this knowledge to the development of
    a COIN strategy.

26
How do unit leaders know where they are?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Security Indicators
  • Low of Direct Attacks
  • High of tips from civilians
  • High degree of presence
  • High number of recruits
  • Attitude Indicators
  • Improved Polls, focus groups
  • Improved Quality of life measures
  • Security Indicators
  • High presence/access
  • Low-Med Direct Attacks
  • Low-Med of tips
  • Low of Recruits
  • Attitude Indicators
  • Poor Polls and focus groups
  • Poor Quality of Life Measures

Secure
Present-day Kurdistan Most of Baghdad
Sadr City, Prior to Chiarelli actions
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Security Indicators
  • Some Direct Attacks, frequent IED attacks
  • High level of violence that looks like
    criminality
  • Low/Sporadic Presence/Access
  • Low-Med Tips, Mostly Anon
  • Attitude Indicators
  • People express support tacitly, but are reluctant
    to help openly
  • Security Indicators
  • Frequent Direct Attacks
  • Low/Sporadic Presence/Access
  • Low-No Tips
  • Attitude Indicators
  • Civs. celebrate insurgent attacks
  • Little ability to measure attitude.

Nagls Al-Anbar Najaf during Sadr Uprising
Fallujah Prior to USMC Assault
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
27
How do we win?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Goal Build Legitimacy
  • Tasks
  • Increase Quality of Life
  • Build legitimate institutions.
  • Create upward trend in economic development
  • Transfer to indigenous forces
  • Goal Win Hearts and Minds
  • Tasks
  • Infrastructure development
  • Reward civilians that help
  • Work on econ development
  • Good policework is key
  • Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Goal Improve Security
  • Tasks
  • Combined selective targeting and police work,
    being careful not to alienate population while
    establishing security.
  • Manipulate perceptions
  • Build permanent police presence
  • Goal Improve Security
  • Tasks
  • Security must be reestablished before anything
    else.
  • Kinetic COIN
  • Direct action against insurgents
  • Heavy patrols and garrisons

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
28
Eliminate Insurgent Sanctuaries, Gain Control
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Goal Improve Security
  • Tasks
  • Security must be reestablished before anything
    else.
  • Kinetic COIN
  • Direct action against insurgents
  • Heavy patrols and garrisons

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
29
Win Hearts and Minds and Construct Legitimate
Institutions
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Goal Win Hearts and Minds
  • Tasks
  • Infrastructure development
  • Reward civilians that help
  • Work on econ development
  • Good policework
  • Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
30
Restore Security without alienating population
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Goal Improve Security
  • Tasks
  • Combined selective targeting and police work,
    being careful not to alienate population while
    establishing security.
  • Manipulate perceptions
  • Build permanent police presence

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
31
Build legitimate institutions and transfer power
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • Goal Build Legitimacy
  • Tasks
  • Increase Quality of Life
  • Build legitimate institutions.
  • Create upward trend in economic development
  • Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
32
How to Mess it Up - Security
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If Govt. takes security for granted and does not
establish permanent policing.
If Govt. minimizes footprint to regain popular
support.
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • Then
  • Insurgents will move in and fill power vacuum
    because of existing popular base.

Then Insurgents will undermine govt. authority
with violence against civilians and
infrastructure.
Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt.
Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
33
How to Mess it up Hearts and Minds
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If Civilians dont see continual improvement and
there is no transfer to indigenous authorities
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt.
Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If In attempts to restore security, Govt. is too
heavy-handed
If Tanks roll in to restore security and then
leave without establishing a presence.
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
34
COIN Forces Need the Capability to
  • Selectively target insurgents and their
    supporters.
  • Gather, vet, and act on tips.
  • Act on them locally.
  • Teach officers role of tips and their
    motivations.
  • Evaluate the quality of tips before and after
    acting on them
  • Go back and check on number and effectiveness of
    past tips.
  • Maintain networked records to get the big picture
    of the insurgency.
  • Maintain records even if informant is
    confidential.
  • Interoperability
  • Protecting security of database
  • Exploit captured insurgents locally.
  • Interrogate locally.
  • Promise benefits in exchange for information.
  • Turn a series of local arrests and interrogations
    into a raid.
  • Acquire, maintain, and demonstrate control.
  • Rapidly mass troops on a contested area.
  • Establish and maintain presence.
  • Patrols Both mounted and dismounted.
  • Permanent police stations or garrisons in
    community.

35
Questions? (and Suggested Readings)
  • Mueller, John. 2000. The banality of ethnic
    war. International Security 25, 142-70.
  • Gates, Scott. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance
    The Microfoundations of Rebellion. The Journal of
    Conflict Resolution 46, 1111-130.
  • Johnson, Chalmers A. 1962. Civilian loyalties and
    guerrilla conflict. World Politics 14,4 646
    661.
  • Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. The Organization of
    Rebellion in Africa. Unpublished Paper.
  • Herrington, Stuart. Stalking the Vietcong Inside
    Operation Phoenix.
  • Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. New and Old Civil
    Wars A Valid Distinction? World Politics, 541,
    99-118.
  • Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. Warfare in Civil Wars.
    Unpublished Paper.
  • Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Urban Bias in
    Research on Civil Wars. Security Studies 133,
    1-31.
  • Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Paradox of
    Terrorism in Civil War. Journal of Ethnics 81,
    97-138.
  • Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1999. Wanton and Senseless?
    The Logic of Massacres in Algeria. Rationality
    and Society 113, 243-285.
  • Ben-Zeev, Efrat. 2002. The Palestinian Village
    of Ijzim During the 1948 War Forming an
    Anthropological History Through Villagers
    Accounts and Army
  • Documents. History and Anthropology 13, 113-30.
  • Deininger Claus. 2003. Causes and Consequences of
    Civil Strife. Microlevel Evidence from Uganda.
    Unpublished Paper.
  • Loizos, Peter. 1988. Intercommunal Killing in
    Cyprus. Man, 23639-653.
  • Lucas, Colin. 1983. Themes in Southern Violence
    After 9 Thermidor. In Gwynne Lewis and Colin
    Lucas (eds), Beyond the Terror Essays in French
    Regional and Social History, 1794-1815.
    Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 152-194.
  • Paul, Benjamin D. and William J. Demarest. 1988.
    The Operation of a Death Squad in San Pedro la
    Laguna. In Robert M. Carmack (ed.), Harvest of
    Violence The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan
    Crisis. Norman University of Oklahoma Press,
    119-154.
  • Schroeder, Michael J. 1996. Horse Thieves to
    Rebels to Dogs Political Gang Violence and the
    State in the Western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the
    Time of Sandino, 1926-1934. Journal of Latin
    American Studies 28, 2383-434.
  • Bax, Mart. 2000. Warlords, Priests and the
    Politics of Ethnic Cleansing A Case Study from
    Rural Bosnia Hercegovina. Ethnic and Racial
    Studies 23, 116-36.
  • Aschenbrenner, Stanley. 1987. The Civil War from
    the Perspective of a Messenian Village. In Lars
    Baerentzen, J.O. Iatrides, and O.L. Smith (eds.),
    Studies on the History of the Greek Civil War,
    1945-9. Copenhagen Museum Tusculanum Press,
    105-125.
  • Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows The Guerrilla
    in History. William Morrow Company. 1994.

36
BACKUP
37
What Capabilities do you need for each of these
tasks?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
  • DoD in a Supporting Role
  • Indigenous forces
  • Police / Law Enforcement
  • USAID, State, Rest of Inter-Agency
  • Civil Affairs
  • DoD in a Supporting Role
  • USAID
  • State
  • Rest of Inter-Agency
  • Indigenous forces
  • Civil Affairs

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
  • DoD is primary actor
  • Indigenous Security Forces
  • DoD Military Forces
  • Civil Affairs
  • Police / Law Enforcement
  • DoD is primary actor
  • DoD Military Forces
  • Indigenous Security Forces

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
38
Foreign Involvement in Insurgency
  • Historically Most insurgencies have had
    significant external support, especially
    insurgencies during the Cold War.
  • The COMINTERN brought together insurgent
    movements and coordinated them around the globe.
  • Islamist insurgencies have attracted strong
    diaspora support, as did many Communist
    insurgencies.
  • Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan during Soviet
    invasion.
  • In Afghanistan, the Arab fighters were
    ineffectual despite getting most of the money
    from Pakistani ISI. Local commanders were able
    to do much more damage to the Soviet occupation
  • Afghan commanders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud (the
    Lion of Panjshir) often derided the quality and
    effectiveness of the Arab fighters.

39
What About Foreign Jihadis in Iraq?
  • Most suicide bombers are foreigners, although
    this is beginning to change.
  • These non-Iraqi Arabs require local assistance
    and knowledge to be effective at all.
  • A Saudi in Baghdad is like an American in London
    their clothes, their accent, their dialect, and
    their lack of local knowledge give them away to
    local Iraqis.
  • Local insurgent commanders will use suicidal
    foreigners like any other weapon. They are
    especially useful against hard targets, and for
    situations where it is better to blame the
    carnage on a foreigner.
  • Zarqawi has had time to build a network inside
    Iraq since before the war, so he is less visible.
    His alliance to Bin Laden came at the price of
    putting off his quest to foment a civil war in
    favor of attacking Americans and their allies.

40
and Perceptions Become Reality
  • For the Government
  • If civilians see government patrols out in force,
    they perceive the government as being able to
    protect them, and they feel safe to denounce
    insurgents and provide tips. This allows the
    government forces to make progress against the
    insurgents, turning the perception of control
    into reality.
  • Every effort must be taken to multiply presence
    through psychological and information operations,
    and the constant publicizing of patrols, raids,
    captures, and other successes.
  • For the Insurgents
  • Insurgent activity that creates the perception of
    a strong presence can undermine civilians faith
    in the governments ability to protect them. This
    reduces cooperation with the government,
    resulting in greater freedom of action for the
    insurgents and eventually greater control.
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