The Existence of Matter

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The Existence of Matter

• The Problem of Perception and the External World

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Bertrand Russell
Whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn
not to be frightened by absurdities. ------Bertra
nd Russell, Problems of Philosophy
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An Old Problem
Skepticism about the External World

• Are things as they seem?
• Are there objects independent of me?
• Are there other minds?
• And even if there are
• how could I ever know any of these things?

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Causes of my experiences?

• External objects?
• Berkeleys God?
• Updated version of Berkeleys God Im a brain in
  a vat and a computer is feeding in experiences?

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It was at that precise moment that Stanley
realized that he may very well be a brain in a
vat.
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Problem how to avoid skepticism
The Classic Alternatives

• Direct (Naïve) Realism physical objects are
  directly (immediately) perceived
• We dont need to justify an inference from
  sensory experience to physical reality because
  physical objects are the objects of sensory
  experience.

• Sense Data Theoriesthe objects of immediate
  experience are sense dataprivate, non-physical
  entities, ideas
• Representationalism (indirect realism) the
  immediate objects of experience represent the
  physical objects which cause them
• Phenomenalism physical objects are reducible to
  the occurrence of the immediate objects of
  experience

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Direct Indirect Realism fail
Russell argues that neither direct realism nor
indirect realism can get us out of skepticism.

• Direct Realism we do need justification for
  beliefs about physical objects.
• Argument from illusion cases of non-veridical
  perception
• Argument from perspectival differences
• Argument from the scientific account of
  perception the intervening medium affects
  experience, the finite speed of light.

• Representationalism we cant know either that
  there are objects outside of experience that
  cause experience or that whatever objects there
  are out there resemble the objects of immediate
  experience (i.e. sense data)
• We cant observe the alleged causal connection.
• We cant observe the alleged resemblance.

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Representationalism

Whats the problem with this picture?
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What we need to do

• Avoid skepticism give good reason for our
  commonsense belief that there is an external
  world
• Why? Because thats what philosophers do
  philosophy leaves everything as it is.
• Explain the relation between our sense data and
  physical objects
• Phenomenalism physical objects are logical
  constructions out of sense-datapermanent
  possibilities of sensation (Mill)
• Explain the relation between our sense data and
  usand other peoples sense data and them
• Neutral Monism physical objects and selves
  (minds) are constructed out of the same
  (neutral) items but in different ways.

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What Russell Will Do

• Russell will rehearse the case for skepticism
• Hard and soft data logical facts and facts about
  sense data are all that are certain
• How the question should be put independent of
  ourselves wont do because
• What is the self?
• What is meant by independent?
• An hypothesis to fit commonsense talk
• physical objects as logical constructions

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What is given in sense

• The first thing that appears when we begin to
  analyze our common knowledge is that some of it
  is derivative and some of it is primitivethe
  immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or
  hearing do not need to be proved by
  argumentbut what is actually given in sense is
  much less than most people would naturally
  suppose andwhat at first sight seems to be given
  is really inferred.
• Sense perception is constructive not all is
  given
• We fill in the details listening to English vs.
  foreign language, seeing faces, reading peoples
  expressions, etc.
• We (unconsciously) make assumptions, e.g. about
  the persistence of unperceived objects
• For what is not given we need arguments

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Hard and Soft Data

• I mean by hard data those which resist the
  solvent influence of critical reflection, and by
  soft data those which, under the operation of
  this process, become to our minds more or less
  doubtful.
• Russell will attempt to sort out the hard data,
  which requires no argument from the soft data
• And to produce arguments in support of the soft
  data of science and common sense.
• The aim is to avoid fruitless skepticism.
• Hard Data the facts of sense (i.e. of our own)
  sense-data and laws of logic
• Soft Data persistence of unsensed objects and
  other minds.

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Stating the Problem

• The Problem Can the existence of anything other
  than our own hard data be inferred from the
  existence of those data?
• In the past the problem has not been stated in a
  non-question-begging way
• Wrong way of asking the question Can we know of
  the existence of any reality which is independent
  of ourselves?
• This is a bad formulation because it begs the
  question of
• What the self is
• bundle of psychological states or the bare
  subject which has them
• How independent is to be understood
• logically independent or causally independent?

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The Self

• Why we cannot appeal to the self in posing the
  question
• Suppose the self is understood as the subject
  of psychological states
• The self in this sense is inferred, not
  immediately experienced (vide Hume!)
• Experience of the self is not hard dataand we
  agreed to start with hard data
• Suppose the self is the whole assemblage of
  things that would necessarily cease to exist if
  our lives came to an end.
• What are these things? Back to the question of
  sorting out the given
• In what sense are they dependent on us s.t.
  theyd cease to exist if our lives came to an
  end?

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Dependence

• Logical independence it is logically possible
  for one thing to exist without the other
• logical possibility conceivability, doesnt
  involve a contradiction
• Russell claims one thing is logically dependent
  upon another only when it has the other as a
  part e.g. the book is logically dependent on its
  pages. Is this true?
• This brings us back to the question of what the
  Self is.
• Causal independence there is no causal relation
  between the two such that the one only occurs as
  the effect of the other.
• We cant determine this because were stuck
  behind the Veil of Perception!

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Setting the Question

• The Problem Can the existence of anything other
  than our own hard data be inferred from the
  existence of those data?
• We need to distinguish two separate questions
• Can we know that objects of sense, or very
  similar objects, exist at times when we are not
  perceiving them?
• If this cannot be known, can we know that other
  objects, inferable from objects of sense but not
  necessarily resembling them, exist either when we
  are perceiving the objects of sense or at any
  other time?
• We cant answer (2) because both the
  thing-in-itself of philosophy and the matter of
  physics present themselves as causes of sensible
  objects
• Russell is offers a response to (1)

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Logical Constructions and Inferred Entities

• Whenever possible, substitute constructions out
  of known entities for inferences to unknown
  entities.

Objects of a kind, F, are said to be logical
constructions out of objects of another kind, G,
if the facts about Fs reduce to facts about Gs,
or everything said using the F vocabulary may be
said in a more basic or fundamental way referring
only to Gs.
The Average Plumber has 2.3 children.
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Logical Constructions and Inferred Entities

• The Average Plumber is a logical construction.
• There is no such being as the Average Plumber
  over and above regular plumbers!
• The form of the sentence the Average Plumber has
  2.3 children is misleading the Average
  Plumber does not refer to any individual.
• What we mean is that if we divide the number of
  plumbers children by the number of plumbers we
  get 2.3.

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Logical Constructions and Analysis

• The method of postulating what we want has
  many advantages they are the same as the
  advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us
  leave them to others and proceed with our honest
  toil. Russell Introduction to Mathematical
  Philosophy
• We prefer logical constructions to (postulated)
  inferred entities in the interests of epistemic
  security
• We get into trouble with talk about the average
  plumber because of a mistaken understanding of
  language we imagine that wherever theres a noun
  or noun it must be the name of some object.
• We need to distinguish surface grammar from
  logical form to paraphrase away the Average
  Plumber and other weird non-entities

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Surface Grammar vs. Logical Form

• Al did the wash for Bettys sake
• Surface grammar suggests that this sentence is
  about 4 things Al, the wash, Bettyand a sake
  that somehow Betty has.
• But there are no such things as sakes, as the
  true logical form of this sentence shows
• Al did the wash in order to help Betty.
• Doping out the true logical form beneath the
  surface grammar is taken to be one of the chief
  projects of analytic philosophy by Russell this
  is analysis.

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Physical Objects as Logical Constructions

• Russell is going to suggest that we understand
  physical objects as logical constructions out of
  the hard data of sense experience.
• E.g. to say that theres a table in front of me
  is to say something about the various experiences
  I and others have or would have to talk about a
  certain structure of sensory experiences.
• There is no table over and above that structure
  of experiences if we understand claims about
  physical objects correctly
• And so we can avoid skeptical worries about the
  existence of objects behind the Veil of
  Perception!

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Sense Data

• When I speak of a sensible object, it must be
  understood that I do not mean such a thing as a
  table, which is both visible and tangible, can be
  seen by many people at once, and is more or less
  permanent. What I mean is just that patch of
  colour which is momentarily seen when we look at
  the table, or just that particular hardness which
  is felt when we press it, or just that particular
  sound which is heard when we rap it.
• Sense Data
• We need to state the external world problem
  without assuming an answer (i.e. begging the
  question) so we have to state it in terms of the
  appearances of the table
• The problem is that there are so many and theyre
  so different!
• Perspectival variation
• Illusion

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Perspectival Variation

• A table viewed from one place presents a
  different appearance from that which it presents
  from another place. This is the language of
  common sense, but this language already assumes
  that there is a real table of which we see the
  appearancesWhat we ought to say is that, while
  we have those muscular and other sensations which
  make us say we are walking, our visual sensations
  change in a continuous wayWhat is really known
  is a correlation of muscular and other bodily
  sensations with changes in visual sensations.
• This perspectival variation is supposed to show
  that the sensible objects we immediately
  experience are not physical objects
• Different appearances of the table are different
  in size and shapethe one physical object cant
  have all those different properties
• Why do we privilege certain appearances as the
  real sizes or shapes of physical objects?

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Illusion

• We can shut one eye, or put on blue
  spectaclesPhysiological changes also alter the
  appearances of thingsExperience has taught us
  that where we see certain kinds of coloured
  surfaces we can, by touch, obtain certain
  expected sensations of hardness or softness,
  tactile shape, and so onBut the mere fact that
  we are able to infer what our tactile sensations
  would be shows that it is not logically necessary
  to assume tactile qualities before they are felt.
• Arguments from illusion too are supposed to show
  that the sensible objects we immediately
  experience are not physical objects
• Things dont always appear to be as the really
  are.
• Things that really arent appear to us in dreams,
  hallucinations, mirages, etc.
• Why do we privilege some appearances as veridical
  while dismissing illusions, dreams, etc. as
  non-veridical?

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Digression The Molyneux Problem

• A Man, being born blind, and having a Globe and
  a Cube, nigh of the same bignes, Committed into
  his Hands, and being taught or Told, which is
  Called the Globe, and which the Cube, so as
  easily to distinguish them by his Touch or
  Feeling Then both being taken from Him, and Laid
  on a Table, Let us Suppose his Sight Restored to
  Him Whether he Could, by his Sight, and before
  he touch them, know which is the Globe and which
  the Cube?
• ---------Willaim Molyneux to John Locke

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On Not Begging the Question

• We cannot speak legitimately of changes in the
  point of view and the intervening medium until we
  have already constructed some world more stable
  than that of momentary appearances.
• We cannot appeal to sciencee.g. to optics and
  the science of perspective, to neurophysiology or
  physicsbecause science assumes that there is a
  world more stable than that of momentary
  appearances.
• Philosophy is not
• an alternative worldview to the scientific or
  commonsensical worldview
• a body of doctrines that conflict with science or
  commonsense

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The External World Problem

• Can the existence of anything other than our own
  hard data be inferred from these data?
• The hard data of sense experience are sense data,
  which cannot be identified with ordinary physical
  objects given perspectival variation and the
  possibility of illusion.
• We cant assume that our experiences are caused
  by concurrently existing objects outside of
  experience.
• We cant appeal to the testimony of others
  because this assumes the existence of objects
  outside of our experience, viz. other minds.
• We cant appeal to science or commonsense because
  we are looking for explanation and justification
  of scientific and commonsensical claims!

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Russells Provisional Solution

• Instead of inquiring what is the minimum of
  assumption by which we can explain the world of
  sense, we will, in order to have a model
  hypothesis as a help for the imagination,
  construct one possible (not necessary)
  explanation of the facts.
• The system of perspectives all views of the
  universe, perceived and unperceived, including
  the private spaces of actual perceivers.
• There are as many private spaces as there are
  perspectivesbut there is only one
  perspective-space, whose elements are single
  perspectives, each with its own private space.
• Our problem is that of constructing our common
  worldincluding physical space and its
  occupantsfrom these private perspectives, whose
  occupants constitute the hard data of experience.

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The Penny Example
The penny is here!

• Private spaces are ordered by means of their
  similaritieswe start from one which contains the
  appearance of a circular diskthen form a whole
  series of perspectives containing a graduated
  series of circular aspects of varying sizes.
• We can form another straight line of perspectives
  in which the penny is seen end-on and looks like
  a straight line of a certain thickness.
• These two lines will meetwhere the penny is.

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A Way the World Could be

• We may define here as the place, in perspective
  space, which is occupied by our private worldA
  thing is near to here if the place where it is
  near to is my private world.
• Two places in perspective space are associated
  with every aspect of a thingEvery aspect of a
  thing is a member of two different classes of
  aspects, namely (1) the various aspects of the
  thing, of which at most one appears in any given
  perspective (2) the perspective of which the
  given aspect is a member.
• The physicist naturally classifies aspects in the
  first way, the psychologist in the second.
• The world we have constructed can, with a certain
  amount of trouble, be used to interpret the crude
  acts of sense, the facts of physics, and the
  facts of physiology. It is therefore a world
  which may be actual. It fits the facts, and there
  is no empirical evidence against it it also is
  free from logical impossibilities.

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What is real?

• Russells view may be interpreted as a version of
  Neutral Monism according to which what there is
  in the world is neither intrinsically mental nor
  physicalhence neutral.
• The same things belong to two different classes
  one way of classifying them is of interest to
  physicists the other way to psychologists.
• Real things are aggregates of the worlds
  constituents that hang together in a coherent
  waya way of classifying them thats useful for
  explanation and prediction. For example
• The hypothesis that other people have mindsis a
  hypothesis which systematizes a vast body of
  facts and never leads to any consequences which
  there is reason to think false. There is
  thereforegood reason to use it as a working
  hypothesis.

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Against Skepticism

• Our hypothesisshows that the account of the
  world given by common sense and physical science
  can be interpreted in a way which is logically
  unobjectionable, and finds a place for all the
  data, both hard and soft. It is this hypothetical
  construction, with its reconciliation of
  psychology and physics, which is the chief
  outcome of our discussion.
• By understanding sense-data, the objects of
  direct acquaintance, as the fundamental
  constituents of the world we take as our starting
  place the hard data of experience, which is
  self-evident and requires no argument.
• By eliminating inferred entities in favor of
  logical constructions we avoid skepticism
• And provide an account of the world that is
  consistent with science and common sense.

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The Elephant is Constructed