Title: Ways of Understanding Urban EQ Risks
1Ways of Understanding Urban EQ Risks
ESA 7 Torun, Poland 8-12 September 2005
- Murat Balamir
- Middle East Technical University
- Ankara Turkey
2 The Conventional Spiral Model propogates
the conviction that? societies are subject to
recurring disasters? no control powers are
available on events? action is possible only
after the event ? preparations could
target only for SAR and Recovery? If any
action is to be taken, that is the public
authority
Conceptualizing EQ Related Events
3The Dual Model? Differentiates Mitigation
Activities / Emergency Activities (risk
management / crisis management)? Defines
Mitigation Activities as a continuous and
separate concern? Gives special emphasis
to Mitigation Planning
Conceptualizing EQ Related Events
4National and Urban Risk Prevention Policies
- ... Building a culture of prevention is not
easy. While costs of prevention have to be paid
in the present, its benefits lie in a distant
future. Moreover, the benefits are not tangible
they are the disasters that did not happen..
Kofi ANNAN 1999 - Landmarks for Mitigation Commitments
- IDNDR (1990-2000) Yokohama Strategy (1994)
Millenium Declaration (2000) KOBE Conference
Resolutions and HYOGO Declaration (2005) -
- USA Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Public Law
106-390) - Mitigation Planning, Mitigation Fund, Public
Private Partnerships, Multihazard Maps,
Cost-Effective Methods of Mitigation, Safe
Land-Use and Construction Practices, etc.
5Sociological Accounts of EQ Related Events
- Analyses are almost totaly confined to post-event
circumstances, and the recovery period - Usually the difficulties of survival and
breakdowns in local communities are surveyed,
rather than particular inequalities generated by
the disaster impact - Pre-event studies are fewer and mostly deal with
historical cases of disaster prediction,
individuals perception and assessments of risks,
risk communication, social amplification of
risk
6Istanbul provides a unique context for the
analyses of pre-disaster social interactions?
High probability (65 for a within 30 years) of
an impending EQ of magnitude 7.4 ?
Extreme Vulnerability due to the poor ground
conditions, low standard environmental/
structural/ infrastructural assets ?
High risks due to large scale and quantities
involved 800 000 bldgs 60 000 bldgs to be
heavily damaged/collapsed, causing 63 000
loss of life, 120 000 casualties? No
experience/ provisions for mitigation? No single
organization or authority to monitor
comprehensive mitigation efforts
The Case of Istanbul
7ISTANBUL and Seismic Hazards
Model A L119km, M7.5 65 probability in 30
years
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10Province of Zeytinburnu
90 Unauthorized Stock
11ISTANBUL 1950salmost free of EQ risks
12ISTANBUL 2004 High-Risk Mega-City
- Multi Hazard Environment
- Low Planning Standards
- Unauthorised Stock
- Multiple Changes in Existing Bldgs
- Highly Vulnerable Infrastructure
- Vulnerable Emergency Facilities
- Low level of Social Awareness and Knowledge of
Mitigation
13ISTANBULhigh-risk megacity
14ISTANBULhigh-risk megacity
15ISTANBULhigh-risk megacity
Narrow Streets
Hazardous Spacing of Buildings
Culs-de sac (dead-ends)
16The Legal and Organizational Context
- Appointed Governor is responsible and sole
authority for Emergency Operations and
preparations according to Disasters Law (7269) - Elected Municipal Administration and Mayor
responsible for urban physical development.
However mitigation functions are not yet
regulated. - Two major regulations after 1999 EQs are
Building Supervision, and Compulsory EQ
Insurance
17Social Processes Observed
- 3 years of contraversial discussions by
earth-scientists in the media after 1999 EQs,
about the likely magnitude in Istanbul - In the information-hungry phase after 1999,
many earth-scientists became popular public
figures EQ grandpa, and others whose private
lives turned into assets for the media industry - Some of such figures attempted to exploit the
media credits for carreer promotion At least 2
enjoyed inclusion in the political party lists in
the local and national elections (without
success). - The media had an influential role, but with many
adverse impacts - - tendency for producing sensational news
- - overemphasis in the moment of EQ and
emergency context - - generation of high expectations
- - disinformation
- - pseudo scientism
- - distortions in property markets
18Social Processes Observed
- Many voluntary local community action groups
emerged, yet dissipated in time in the absence of
formal support - Independent measures are undertaken by a
multiplicity of authorities yet without coherent
vision - Almost all measures taken are related to
emergency action - MMI supported the EMPI by 4 universities which
produced the principles for an integrated road
map - International interest is high especially in
carrying out technical research - The funds and projects imposed by the WB has
distorted the road map proposed by the
universities - Citizens are exhausted and would prefer it happen
soon and over extended periods of loose
management has led to attitudes of underresponse
in the low-income - There are varied understandings of what
constitutes the risk the professional circles
tend to professionalize their own scenaria
19Competing Theses Discourses with latent
ideologiesthat generate inequalities/equalities
- It is the Buildings that kill people therefore
it - is Necessary and Sufficient to Retrofit the
- Buildings (engineers)
- It is possible to maintain all necessary
Mitigation - Measures through the Market System (WB,
- insurance industry)
- Comprehensive and Integrated Mitigation
- Planning is an Imperative (EMPI)
20The Engineers Approach
- The Procedure Envisaged
- Survey the Whole Stock (800 000 buildings)
- Identify and Remove the most Vulnerable buildings
- (65 000 estimated)
- Transfer Households involved to previously
developed stock (almost a population of 2
million) - Identify buildings that could be retrofitted
- Campaign for Enforcement of retrofitting
- Develop new Technical Regulation for Retrofitting
- Change Flat Ownership Law for compulsory
retrofitting - Campaign for the provision of Credits to
Households (WB)
21WB Projects for Istanbul (PIU)
22EMPI Principles To Enhance Urban Resilience
- Involve many groups of the urban society as
possible, for collective management of risks
(Total Mobilization) - 2. - Consider all possible sets of urban risk
sectors extra to natural hazards - - Identify parties and stake-holders in each
sector to draw protocols for - safer conduct
- - Interrelate/ integrate all risk sectors,
protocols, and projects as - components of an integrated Mitigation
Plan - Designate High-risk localities for immediate/
intensive-care - - promote planning of participatory local
regeneration projects - - organize partnerships within planning
procedures - - devise new tools for enforcement and finances
23MAJOR RISK-SECTORS of EMPI
- Risks in Macro-Form and Growth Tendencies
- Urban Fabric (buildings, plots, coverage, roads,
car-parks, etc.) - Incompatible Land-Use Risks (buildings and
districts) - Risks of Productivity Losses (industrial plants,
SMOs) - Risks in the Building Stock and Infrastructure
- Risks in Hazardous Uses (LPG and petrol stations,
etc.) - Special Risk Areas/ Special Buildings (historic
bldgs) - Risks in Emergency Facilities (hospitals,
schools, etc) - Emergency Scenario-based Risk Determination
- Administrative Incapacities (infrastructure,
experts, training, etc.) - External Vulnerabilities (Accidents, Terrorism,
Climatic Extremes)
24Forces in the Background
- The Material Context
- - incentives and funds advanced for
preparations - - high competition for generating market
- opportunities, and for potential jobs in
the - market
- The Mental Context
- - the contradictions generated by the spiral
and - dual models
- - the implicit personalizations of risks
according to - interest groups as expressed in the 3
hypotheses
25Thank You for Your Attention