Title: Implementing Network Security Wireless Security Segway
1Implementing Network Security Wireless Security
Segway!
- Steve Lamb
- Technical Security Advisor
- http//blogs.msdn.com/steve_lamb
- stephlam_at_microsoft.com
2So whats the problem?
- WEP is a euphemism
- Wired
- Equivalent
- Privacy
- Actually, its a lie
- It isnt equivalent to wired privacy at all!
- How can you secure the air?
- Thus WEPs v.poor
- http//www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.htm
l
3WLAN Security ChallengesUnsecured WLAN
Company Servers
WLAN Access Point
Mobile Employee
mailtoboss_at_company.tld
mailtoboss_at_company.tld
Evil Hacker
N
- Most wireless LANs are unsecured
4WLAN Security Challenges Weak Security in 802.11
Static WEP
X7!gk0j3754bf(jv8gF
X7!gk0j 3754bf(jv 8gB)F..
5Other 802.11 Challenges
- Access Points are dim!
- Key Management (!!!!)
- Manual update never changed!
- Access Control with MAC address filtering
- NO SECURITY!
- Neither is scalable
Authentication
Authorization
Data Protection
Audit
6WLAN Security Challenges Weak Security in 802.11
Static WEP
- Static WEP key easily obtained for encryption /
authentication
X7!gk0j3754bf(jv8gF
X7!gk0j 3754bf(jv 8gB)F..
X7!gk0j 3754bf(jv 8gB)F..
N
7WLAN Security ChallengesWeak Security in 802.11
Static WEP
- Man in the middle attacks are difficult to detect
prevent
X7!gk0j37
X7!gk0j37
N
Rogue Network
8Alternatives to WEP
9VPNs
- Pros
- Familiarity
- Hardware Independent
- Proven Security
- Cons
- Lacks user transparency
- Only user logon (not computer)
- Roaming profiles, logon scripts, GPOs broken,
shares, management agents, Remote desktop - No reconnect on resume from standby
- Complex network structure
10VPNs
- More Cons
- No protection for WLAN
- Bottleneck at VPN devices
- Higher management hardware cost
- Prone to disconnection
- Yet more cons! (non-MS VPNs)
- 3rd party licensing costs
- Client compatibility
- Many VPN auth schemes (IPsec Xauth) are as bad as
WEP!
11PEAP encapsulation
1. Server authenticates to client
2. Establishes protected tunnel (TLS)
3. Client authenticates inside tunnel to
server
- No cryptographic binding between PEAP tunnel and
tunneled authN method - Fix constrain client (in GPO) to trust only a
specific corporate root CA - Foils potential MitM attacks
12EAP architecture
MS-CHAPv2
TLS
SecurID
TLS
GSS_API Kerberos
PEAP
IKE
MD5
method layer
EAP
EAP layer
PPP
802.3
802.5
802.11
Anything
media layer
13802.1X over 802.11
AuthenticationServer
Supplicant
Authenticator
Access blocked
Gotta get on!
Calculating my key (Wow I just dont understand
this new maths!)
Calculating this guys key
14Session Summary
- Windows XP has great wireless security features
- Theres extensive prescriptive guidance available
from our website - Dont be scared of wireless!
15Next Steps
- Find additional security training events
- http//www.microsoft.com/seminar/events/security.
mspx - Sign up for security communications
- http//www.microsoft.com/technet/security/signup/
default.mspx - Check out Security360
- http//www.microsoft.com/seminar/events/series/mi
kenash.mspx - Get additional security tools and content
- http//www.microsoft.com/security/guidance
16Resources
- Microsoft Wi-Fi Page http//www.microsoft.com/wif
i - The Unofficial 802.11 Security Web Page
http//www.drizzle.com/aboba/IEEE/ - Intercepting Mobile Communications The
Insecurity of 802.11 http//www.drizzle.com/aboba
/IEEE/wep-draft.zip - Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir WEP Paper
http//www.crypto.com/papers/others/rc4_ksaproc.pd
f - WiFi Planet http//www.wi-fiplanet.com/
- Microsoft Solution for Securing Wireless LANs
with PEAP and Passwords (lt 1 week)
http//www.microsoft.com/technet/security/guidance
/peap_0.mspx - Microsoft Solution for Securing Wireless LANs
with Certificates - http//www.microsoft.com/technet/security/prodtech
/win2003/pkiwire/swlan.mspx - Wifi for SOHO Environments http//www.microsoft.co
m/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/maintain/wifisoho.m
spx
17Credits
- Thanks to Ian Hellen(MCS) Steve Riley(Corp) as
I borrowed several of their slides!
18Questions and Answers