Counter Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical NBC Operations

1

AFDD 2-1.8

• Counter Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
  Operations

2
BRIEFING OVERVIEW

• AFDD 2-1.8 Overview and Concepts
• Critical Comments

3
HISTORY

• First draft of US Air Force Master
  Counterproliferation Plan recommendation
• Research studies identified need
• Spring 1999 AFDWG approved development
• AFPD 10-26 grew out of initial doctrine
  development
• Family of AFIs based on structure in AFDD 2-1.8
• GAO called it an example of what DOD should be
  doing
• Development of JP 3-40, Counterproliferation
  Operations

4
CHAPTER TOPICS

• Counter NBC Operations
• Aerospace Power in Counter NBC Operations
• Command Relationships
• Planning and Support Operations
• Education, Training, and Exercises

5
BASIC CONCEPT

• AFDD 2-1.8 establishes operational doctrine for
  the United States Air Force to conduct operations
  to counter NBC weapons. Counter NBC operations
  range from deterring or preventing an adversary
  from acquiring or using these weapons, to
  disrupting and limiting an attack, to surviving
  and restoring operations if attacked.

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COUNTER NBC OPERATIONS EFFECTS

• Detect, Deter, Disrupt, Deny, or Destroy an
  adversarys NBC capabilities.
• Minimize the effects of an enemy NBC attack on
  friendly operations

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CHAPTER ONE NBC WEAPON
CHARACTERISTICS

• Nuclear
• Radiological
• Biological
• Chemical
• And the method of delivery of each

8
USAFs Integrated Approach
Prevent the development and employment of NBC
weapons in the first place
. . . is one less we must intercept . . .
. . . or absorb here
Every NBC weapon thats destroyed before its
used . . .
Proliferation Prevention
Passive Defense
Counterforce
Active Defense
9
Proliferation Prevention

• Proliferation Prevention seeks to deny attempts
  by would-be proliferants to acquire or expand
  their NBC capabilities by providing inspection,
  verification, and enforcement support for
  nonproliferation treaties and NBC control
  regimes supporting export control activities
  assisting in the identification of potential
  proliferants and, if so directed by the National
  Command Authorities (NCA), planning and
  conducting attack missions against NBC related
  targets prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

10
Counterforce

• Operations that are intended to divert, deny,
  degrade, or destroy an adversarys NBC capability
  before it can be used against friendly forces.
  Please note that the use of counterforce in this
  doctrine document is not the same as the term
  defined in JP 1-02

11
Active Defense

• Actions to detect, divert, or destroy enemy NBC
  weapons and delivery means while en route to
  their targets through the use of active aerospace
  defense and active force protection.

12
Passive Defense

• To protect US, allied, and coalition forces
  against NBC effects, including measures to detect
  and identify NBC agents, individual and
  collective protection equipment, NBC medical
  response, vaccines for BW defense, and NBC
  decontamination capabilities.

13
CHAPTER TWO (CONT.) Crosscutting Elements

• Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
  (C4ISR) requirements will vary. Flexibility and
  connectivity between strategic, operational, and
  tactical command and control systems are
  required.
• Counter NBC Terrorism To protect military and
  civilian personnel, facilities, and
  logistical/mobilization nodes from paramilitary,
  covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats and
  manage the consequences of these threats both in
  the US and abroad.

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CHAPTER THREE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPSCommand
Authority

• Counter NBC operations should be integrated into
  normal command relationships in peace or war.
• The JFACC integrates counter NBC operations into
  the master air attack plan and allocates sorties
  for counter NBC operations (though they may be
  designated OCA, DCA, etc).
• The area air defense commander (AADC) (who is
  normally the JFACC) will coordinate the aerospace
  operations part of active defense.
• The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the
  overall security of the joint rear area and will
  coordinate force protectionto include passive
  defenserequirements across the joint components.

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CHAPTER THREE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS Operations
on United States Territory

• Counter NBC operations on US territory will be
  conducted by civilian agencies with support from
  military forces
• In the event of an NBC incident on a military
  base in US territory there will likely be
  parallel lines of command over concurrent aspects
  of the operation
• Military forces will remain under military
  command at all times
• Domestic counter NBC operations for military
  forces will normally fall into two areas
• Crisis management measures to identify, prevent,
  and respond to an attack.
• Consequence management measures to provide
  emergency relief to governments, individuals, and
  businesses in response to an incident involving
  NBC weapons or devices.
• The Air Force must be prepared to conduct
  counter NBC operations in concert with other
  Services, civilian agencies, coalition partners,
  and host nations.

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CHAPTER FOUR PLANNING AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

• Operational Risk NBC threats can come from
  multiple sources. They can be unexpected and
  employed through a broad range of tactics from
  clandestine operations to large-scale attacks.
• Targeting Considerations
• Types Planned, Immediate, Time-sensitive targets
  (TST)
• Accurate ISR required
• Consider types of agent, containment facility,
  target hardening, target defenses, and proximity
  to population centers.
• Logistics Deliberate planning and implementation
  processes must be employed to ensure that
• the flow of critical mission essential
  consumables proceeds in a timely manner
• the exposure of required materiel to NBC
  environments is minimized
• logistics personnel are appropriately trained and
  equipped for NBC environments
• the support system retains its agility while
  minimizing its footprint in the targetable area
• support operations are coordinated with
  counterforce, active defense, and passive defense
  measures, as required.
• Health Service Support Ops Medical
  intelligence, casualty management, aeromedical
  evacuation
• Legal Issues Evidence of enemy use, legal
  repercussions of collateral damage

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CHAPTER FIVE EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXERCISES

• Education all must understand the nature of
  operating in the NBC environment
• Training
• Accession
• Operational
• Continuation or recurring
• Exercises and Wargames Should be realistic

18
CRITICAL ISSUE 1 PACAF-3

• Page 1, line 16. Change to read Counter NBC
  operations are those activities taken to detect,
  deter, disrupt, deny, or destroy
• Rationale Denial is a key counter NBC
  technique.
• AFDC Response Accepted

19
CRITICAL ISSUE 2 AC2ISRC-5

• Chapter Two, Pages 10-11. Not enough
  development of Counterforce Operations and Active
  Defense. Need to describe what is needed to
  effectively conduct these missions. Perhaps, for
  Counterforce, separate paragraphs on Time
  Critical Targeting (see the TCT CONOPS), Hard and
  Deeply buried targets, Agent Defeat, Nodal
  Analysis to determine points to attack NBC
  production without causing catastrophic
  collateral effects, as well as the extensive
  tactical and strategic ISR required to support
  these effectively. For Active Defense, separate
  paragraphs on DCA (aircraft and cruise missile),
  BMD, and Force Protection. I am working on a
  project which may help refine these thoughts as
  it matures. I may then be able to suggest more
  extensive content for consideration. I would
  also be interested in participating in a forum to
  develop these areas more . POC is Maj Aaron
  Frankland, AC2ISRC/C2N, aaron.frankland_at_langley.af
  .mil

20
CRITICAL ISSUE 2 AC2ISRC-5

• Rationale No further rationale given
• AFDC Response This was worked by a Comment
  Resolution Working Group on 1-2 February, 2000.
  See revised sections. Maj Frankland participated
  as well as representatives from HQ AF/XONP/IL and
  ACC

21
CRITICAL ISSUE 3 USAFE-25

• Page 13, line 11-13 Change to read For
  example, if the nature of the threat is
  biological, only respiratory/eye protection may
  be required and the added encumbrance of full
  protective equipment can be avoided. This would
  not apply though in the case of an open wound and
  protective gear should definitely be used if the
  individual has an abrasion or cut on the skin
  which could provide a passageway for a biological
  agent to enter the body.
• Rationale Although true that the primary
  danger of a biological agent is respiratory, the
  assumptions made in this paragraph do not take
  into account the possibility of an open wound.
  (POC HQ USAFE/CEXC, CMSgt Patrick, DSN
  480-6726)
• AFDC Response The phrase avoided as long
  as the individual does not have any cuts or
  abrasions on the skin was added to the sentence
  in question.
• Follow up

22
CRITICAL ISSUE 3 USAFE-25 (Follow-up)

• USAFE CE/CEXC change to MAJOR and word the
  paragraph as such
• "The joint task force (JTF) or installation
  commander may choose to increase or reduce the
  level of protective posture based upon mission
  requirements and the exact nature of a threat.
  Certain threats are more persistent or may have
  multiple hazards such as Mustard Agent, but
  others may only be dangerous if inhaled.
  Therefore, the hazards may require different
  types/levels of protection. For example, if the
  nature of the threat is respiratory, only the
  protective mask may be required and the added
  encumbrance of full protective equipment can be
  avoided. Therefore, the commander can optimize
  the performance of his forces and balance the
  personnel protection level used based upon the
  proper identification of the threat agents
  available, the specific hazard of the agents, the
  amount of the threat agent available and the
  threat means of agent weaponization."

23
CRITICAL ISSUE 3 USAFE-25 (Follow-up)

• RATIONALE is basically the same. You cannot
  assume away the problem, and the protective gear
  is meant to keep agents off of the skin. I would
  not appreciate a biological agent entering
  through an open cut.
• AFDC Response Accepted with minor revision.

24
CRITICAL ISSUE 4 PACAF-12

• Page 13, line 18. Change to read disease
  prevention measures and traditional
  chemical-biological contamination avoidance and
  
• Rationale Traditional measures are not only
  associated with CW. Bio is a major threat.
• AFDC Response Accepted.

25
CRITICAL ISSUE 5 PACAF-13

• Page 13, line 20. Add new last sentence as
  follows Decontamination, a subset of
  contamination control, involves four levels -
  immediate, operational, thorough, and
  reconstitution.
• Rationale Completeness.
• AFDC Response Accepted with some revision.
  Sentence will read Decontamination is a subset
  of contamination control.
• Follow up

26
CRITICAL ISSUE 5 PACAF-13

• Follow up After much discussion, we
  determined that the four levels of
  decontamination belong at the TTP level, and are
  sufficiently covered by various Air Force
  documents. Therefore they will not be discussed
  here. Section is revised to read
• Contamination Control. Contamination
  control is a combination of standard disease
  prevention measures and traditional
  chemical-biological contamination avoidance and
  decontamination measures. This includes
  procedures for avoiding, reducing, removing,
  waiting for evaporation, or rendering harmless,
  the hazards resulting from the contamination.
  Decontamination is a subset of contamination
  control. As part of the contamination control
  process, decontamination operations are intended
  to help sustain or enhance conduct of military
  operations by preventing or minimizing
  performance degradation, casualties, or loss of
  material.

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CRITICAL ISSUE 6 PACAF-14

• Page 14, top. Change box to read
• Four types of decontamination
• Immediate - those actions done by personnel on
  themselves or their personal equipment to provide
  immediate operational capability.
• Operational - those actions required to prevent
  mission degradation due to restore mission
  capability degraded by contamination
• Thorough - those actions required to remove or
  neutralize further cross contamination (e.g.
  medical patient decontamination) in order to
  reduce protective posture.
• Reconstitution - those actions required to bring
  contaminated items into full compliance with
  national work and occupational hazard standards
  after termination of conflict.
• Rationale Recognizes four levels of
  decontamination and clarifies definitions as
  currently used in AFI 32-4001

28
CRITICAL ISSUE 6 USAFE-26

• Page 14, Three types of decontamination
  graphic. Recommend changing the three types of
  decontamination to the four types of
  decontamination described in AFMAN 32-4005, 1
  Mar 99, Personnel Protection and Attack Actions,
  Atch 1, page 30 and adding reconstitution
  decontamination and its definition
  Decontamination that involves eliminating
  contamination to restore mission critical
  resources (such as mission critical aircraft,
  equipment, material, work areas and terrain) to a
  condition which permits unrestricted use,
  handling, or operation, and release from military
  control. Conducted after hostile actions have
  terminated, when the commander determines it is
  in the units best interest, or when directed by
  higher authority.
• Rationale The AF has adopted immediate,
  operational, thorough, and reconstitution
  decontamination. Each of the four types has its
  own definition.
• AFDC Response Four types of decontamination
  were deleted since they are more appropriately
  discussed at the TTP level.

29
CRITICAL ISSUE 7 AF/XP-5

• Page 23, lines 1 2. Change to read, "When
  directed by the NCA, the US Commander-in-Chief
  Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM) within
  CONUS...
• Rationale Accuracy. USACOM recently
  changed its designation to USJFCOM.
• AFDC Response This is an administrative
  rather than a critical comment. However, the
  change is accepted for obvious reasons (it was
  correct when initially written). Two other staff
  agencies submitted this as an Administrative
  comment

30
CRITICAL ISSUE 8 AFSPC-08

• Page 25, Line 19. Add Establish MOAs/MOUs
  with local civil authorities.
• Rationale None given
• AFDC Response After discussion with AFSPC,
  this was downgraded to a MAJOR. However, MOAs
  and MOUs are not always appropriate.

31
CRITICAL ISSUE 9 PACAF-20

• Page 30, lines 23-24. Change to read
  Civil Contract and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
  (CRAF) are not trained and equipped to operate in
  a contaminated environment. Under current USAF
  policy, civil contract and CRAF will not operate
  in hazardous areas. This may include areas that
  are or have experienced contamination.
• Rationale This formulation reflects
  current policy. CRAF/civil carriers may in fact
  be able to operate in areas that have been
  subject to contamination (ref DTRA sponsored Air
  Mobility Studies). This policy needs to be
  looked at carefully and evaluated in light of the
  new science. Then CRAF needs to be made aware of
  the expected operating conditions. CRAF then
  makes the decision. USAF should not write policy
  into doctrine.

32
CRITICAL ISSUE 9 PACAF-20

• AFDC Response Contract Airlift and
  Transload sections changed and merged to read
  Planning should consider circumstances that
  might preclude civil/ Civil Reserve Air Fleet
  (CRAF) aircraft from operating in a theater.
  Alternatives may need to be identified where
  civil cargo/passengers may be transferred to
  other transportation means (sea, rail,
  intratheater, etc.) for onward movement.
  Additionally, if a significant number of military
  airlift aircraft become contaminated, segregation
  of clean and contaminated assets should be
  considered.

33
CRITICAL ISSUE 10 PACAF-21

• Page 31, line 11. Change to read
  Personnel may have to assume appropriate
  Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level
  prior to entering the exchange and contaminated
  areas.
• Rationale Appropriate MOPP depends upon the
  degree of hazard and commander's risk assessment.
• AFDC Response Sentence not used and deleted
  in revision of paragraph for PACAF-20.

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CRITICAL ISSUE 11 AFSPC-10

• Page 40 41. Add paragraph for training
  current active duty Air Force personnel who are
  not accessions.
• Rationale The paragraph does not explain
  how AF will train personnel who have not received
  NBC training to date.
• AFDC Response Coord by telephone and
  e-mail. Reduced to Major comment. Sentence
  added to paragraph that states Locating and
  training personnel bypassed by accession NBC
  training is vital to this ability. There is not
  enough material for a paragraph, and how it is
  done is too detailed for this document.

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AFDD 2-1.8, Counter Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Operations

• Questions or Comments?