Launch Operations from

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The 10th Annual IMPROVING SPACE OPERATIONS
WORKSHOP

• Launch Operations from
• Heritage to EELV

Lt Col Greg Schiller Delta II Program
Manager SMC/CL
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Agenda

• Characterization of Heritage Launch Systems
• Titan, Delta II, Atlas II/III
• Characterization of EELV Launch Systems
• Delta IV, Atlas V
• The Changing Environment
• EELV System Evolution to Date
• Mission Assurance Lessons
• Summary and Closing Thoughts

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Titan Characteristics

• Titan Space Launcher developed from existing USAF
  ICBM systems
• Titan Gemini, Titan II, III, 34D, and finally
  Titan IV systems emerged over the last 40 years
• Developed to support US National Security and DoD
  requirements
• Launched from both Cape Canaveral AFS
  Vandenberg AFB
• Titan III considered operational with Integrate,
  Transfer, Launch (ITL) approach
• West Coast Titan III had a 20 day call-up rqmt
  and 90 day launch centers
• Titan IV became a highly complex system with
  multiple satellite interfaces and configurations
  (caused by Shuttle transition)
• Maintained by significant support staff with
  extensive experience very demanding day of
  launch processing
• Multiple, extensive, and rigorous reviews H/W,
  S/W, and launch site
• Substantial Government oversight required
• Initiated a substantial rehearsal process to keep
  team trained
• Required extensive on pad processing 5 month
  turn time currently

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Atlas II/III Characteristics

• Atlas Systems developed in the 1950s as an ICBM
  and competed with Titan
• Was evolved, like Titan, into a space launch
  system
• Utilized to carry medium size payloads (DSCS,
  Commercial, and NRO missions)
• The Atlas III system served as a transition
  between Atlas II and Atlas V
• Utilized the Russian RD-180 engine for higher
  performance and reliability
• Went to a structurally stable versus a pressure
  stabilized core vehicle
• Improved reliability and processing with use of a
  single engine Centaur configuration
• Atlas has simpler interfaces and processing
  requirements

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Delta II Characteristics

• Described as the most operational of current
  launch systems
• Two Pads East Coast (AF owned), One west Coast
  (NASA owned)
• Single AF customer - GPS (2 new customers
  recently)
• Main supplier of NASA launch needs
• Stack on Pad (5 weeks on pad)
• Final checkout accomplished at launch site (not
  quite ship and shoot)
• Govt oversight with formal deliverables
• Fairly rigorous AF review process
• Fewer rehearsals than Titan due to higher launch
  rate
• Very few hardware changes less complex
  interfaces, standard configuration for USAF GPS
  missions, and standard launch-to-launch
  procedures
• NASA interplanetary missions more demanding, but
  still within Delta experience

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EELV Characteristics

• Lockheed Martin - Atlas V
• Common booster core hardware proven by Atlas
  III missions
• Designed to support 1 to 5 solids depending on
  mission needs
• Heavy Launch design ready to build upon demand
• Ship and shoot from the factory
• Stack in the Vertical Integration Facility for
  final integration/processing
• Clean Pad approach less than one day on the pad
  (East Coast)
• Boeing - Delta IV
• State of the art factory in Decatur modeled after
  commercial aircraft
• Common booster core with multiple solids
  configuration
• Heavy launch available - demo mission to prove
  concept
• Ship and shoot from factory concept
• Booster upper stage stacked horizontally in
  HIF encapsulated payload at pad
• Move to pad 8 days prior to launch depending on
  configuration
• Both Contractors
• Commercially owned/operated facilities providing
  commercial type of launch service

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EELV Initial Environment

• EELV Paradigm Commercial (No Independent
  Assessment)
• Numerous commercial launches to mitigate later
  government launch risk and prove out new
  configurations
• Very limited government involvement (insight with
  limited staff technically, programmatically)
• Few formal Government reviews scheduled at key
  milestones
• No formal deliverables information gained via
  pull from central database structure (Genisys,
  Webvue) and attending contractor reviews
• Minimal rehearsal process experience gained
  through normal processing flow
• Assured Access for Government missions gained
  through two launch vehicle providers
• 100 Contractor run launch countdown and problem
  resolution

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So What Changed?
1998
Present
Launch market dominated by commercial market
Government remains the dominant customer
Tremendous growth potential in commercial market
Commercial market potential dissipated
Sufficient market to support two EELV families
Business case inadequate to support 2 providers
without Govt help
Share development costs between government and
commercial
Work with industry to retain industrial base
assure access to space
Mature reliability through commercial launches
Government prime customer on early missions
Reliance on contractors mission assurance process
Six launch failures in 1998 1999
BAR recommended additional government involvement
Must mitigate increased risk with more robust
mission assurance
Space operating in an RD environment
Warfighters dependence on space assets
Adding Independent Mission Assurance to gain
confidence in early government missions
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Evolution Timeline
1998-1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

• Commercial Market drawdown

• Shuttle Columbia Accident
• CAIB Report
• Lessons from CAIB

• Numerous Government
• and commercial launch failures
• Space Launch BAR
• Boeing BMAR
• LMA IAT
• Aerospace Independent
• Assessment Teams

• Current systems Titan/Atlas/DII increased focus
  on mission success objectives
• Implemented many relearned best practices

• BAR II, III, IV
• Other Independent Assessments

• EELV Program Today
• Future Buy in progress
• Changing contracting Strategy
• Justification for 2 Launch
• Providers
• Assured Access to Space Money
• IRRT/MAT for every Govt mission

• EELV Contract restructure

• EELV Buy I (28 missions awarded)

• EELV Buy II (3 missions awarded)

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EELV Evolution

• Assured Access through two providers AND
  Government Mission Assurance process
• Failure is not an option for either provider
• Increased government oversight vice previous
  insight
• Substantial increase in govt manpower funding
  resources to support additional mission assurance
  objectives
• Hardware pedigrees on high priority components
• Extensive IVV of software and mission analysis
• Rigorous rehearsal process
• Addition of Govt Mission Director and increased
  teaming during launch operations
• Future
• Contract structure more favorable to govt
  mission assurance objectives with adequate
  funding to ensure two viable providers

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EELV Value Added Tasks
CY01 CY02 CY03
CY04 CY 05
Launch Certification Planning Non-Recurring
Certification Tasks Recurring Certification
Tasks
EV / NRO

• Define launch certification process NRO
  non-NRO missions
• Define launch certification criteria
• Allocate certification and management
  responsibilities

Atlas V / Delta IV

• Manufacturing and quality processes review
• LV hardware design, manufacture test
• LV software design test
• LV design and mission analysis
• LV ground hardware, software and processing

Atlas V / Delta IV

• Build paper / pedigree / acceptance test reviews
• Mission specific LV software design test
• Mission specific LV design and mission analysis
• Mission specific LV ground hardware, software
• and processing

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Mission Assurance Lessons

• Mission success is the 1 priority
• Wear it as a banner on your sleeve
• Leadership is paramount to the 1 priority
• Robust risk management maintains focus on
  critical concerns
• Systems engineering puts it all together
• Collaboration ensures all parties are on the same
  page
• Apathy, Entropy, and Atrophy are your enemies
• Maintaining critical launch system talent and
  expertise are your friends

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Summary

• Leadership must embrace the idea thatMission
  Success is the 1 one priority
• Mission Assurance is everyones job
• You can and must make a difference!

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Info slides
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Leadership

• Leaders must balance program influences
  (schedule, budget, political pressure, etc.), but
  keep priorities clear Mission Success is 1
  priority
• Must be willing to stand up and say "no" when
  tasked to operate without sufficient resources
• Must promote and encourage the airing of minority
  opinions, regardless of (un)popularity
• Must avoid insulating themselves (or giving
  perception of insulating themselves)
• Must avoid over-simplification of problems
  learn to think worst case and develop issues from
  there
• Focus on employees needs
• Must be prepared to STOP the train when
  questions arise

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Risk Management

• A disciplined, rigorous, useful risk management
  process is necessary at all levels
• Risk management must be embraced by management as
  a resource management tool
• Evaluate and document overall vehicle reliability
  and associated failure risk during all
  hardware/software modification reviews
• Tradeoff improvements against failure risk
• Increase emphasis on test and analysis
• Minimize qualified by similarity approach
• Consider a demonstration flight or a highly
  instrumented first flight of a non-critical
  payload when launching first of a kind vehicle
  configuration

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Systems Engineering

• Systems engineering is a key component of mission
  assurance
• Systems Engineering is everyones job!
  (explicitly by design, implicitly by function)
• Ensure engineering accountability from design
  through postflight analysis
• Design engineering presence, oversight, and
  approval of first-time issuances and subsequent
  changes of
• Key supplier products, processes, and procedures
• Field site procedures, test, assembly, and
  postflight analysis
• Assure adequate/formal communication exists
  between engineering and manufacturing
• Communicate engineering intent for design
• Elimination of ambiguous language in work
  instructions
• Strong communication between engineering and
  technicians
• Ensure truly closed loop requirements
  traceability and verification

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Collaboration

• Goal is to share program status, issues, test
  objectives,
• Create opportunities to compare notes
• Formulate consistent government
  direction/feedback to contractor base
• Resolve issues without undue duplication or
  burden on launch providers
• Share costs/opportunities across government
  organizations
• Share IVV data
• Partnership teaming for product assurance and
  quality objectives

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Causes Of Launch Failures
1983 - Present
Design failures are more common for new
vehicles. Process failures are more common
for mature vehicles.
Note Domestic and foreign launch vehicles.
Data from Space System Engineering Database
maintained by The Aerospace Corporation.
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Evolution of Delta Family
Flight-proven Delta heritage upper
stages, software, and fairings
Modified Delta III second stage
Stretched Delta III second stage tank
Streamline launch pads and equipment
RL10B-2
RL10B-2
Low-cost, high-margin, low-complexity engine
Common booster core
IsogridfirststageLO2 tank
Strap-on graphite epoxy motors to allow
greater payload range
4 GEM 60s
Modular, producible booster core
RS-68 main engine
2 GEM 60s
RocketdyneRS-27mainengine
LEO 17.9 22.6 17.2 24.9 50.7 GTO 9.2 12.9
10.4 14.5 29.6
lbs
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Evolution of Atlas Family
Implementing a Low Risk Evolution Process
GTO 10.9-13.1 8.75-19.12 29.0 GSO 15.06 5.91-8.58
14.0 LEO(dual) 16.85-21.72 22.7-45.2 42.0
lbs