The military consequences of some revolutions in technology

1
The military consequences of some revolutions in
technology

• Professor David Kirkpatrick
• University College London

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Perspective shaped by experience

• Experience
• Research in aerodynamics and aircraft design at
  the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough
• Military operational analysis, cost forecasting
  and economic analysis in MoD
• Attache on the British Defence Staff Washington
• Delivery of postgraduate education in defence
  equipment acquisition at UCL
• Perspective Eurocentric, technological,
  financial
• There are valuable lessons from other cultures.
• Technological and financial factors are not
  always sufficient to ensure victory military
  forces also need a motivating cause, a valid
  doctrine and an effective military culture.

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Contents

• Rationale for the observed growth in the unit
  cost of defence equipment.
• Increase in the fixed/variable cost ratio in
  defence budgets.
• Consequences for UK policy
• Cause for concern?

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Impact of technology (1)

• Throughout history successive developments in
  technology have revolutionised warfare.
• Bronze and iron
• Chariots and composite bows
• Horseshoe, stirrup and built-up saddle
• Gunpowder
• During the 18th and early 19th centuries military
  technology remained essentially unchanged, and
  forces relied on
• Smoothbore muskets and cannon
• Cavalry with swords and lances
• Wooden sailing ships, firing cannon in broadsides

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Period of stasis

• In the period 1700-1850 when military technology
  was stagnant, all leading nations had the same
  weapons and victory was won by superior numbers.
• God was on the side of the big battalions.
• When high courage or clever generalship won
  against superior numbers, it was considered
  remarkable.
• Clausewitz ignored differences in weaponry.
• In that period the losses of a defeated army were
  rarely more than double the losses of the victors.

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Impact of technology (2)

• Since about 1850, a series of technological
  advances have transformed warfare.
• Rifled rapid-fire small arms, and rifled guns
  with recoil control
• Ironclad ships and vehicles, powered by steam or
  i/c engines
• Aircraft and submarines
• ICBM and WMD
• Microchips
• Developments in military technology in that
  period have enabled rapid improvements in weapon
  system performance.

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Improvements in weapon performance
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Better weapons win

• When military technology is advancing rapidly (as
  in 1850), there are often significant
  differences between the weaponry deployed by
  opposing forces and the outclassed army can
  suffer much higher losses it is futile and
  highly-dangerous to fight with obsolete weapons.
• Victory depends on marginal differences in the
  performance of weapons deployed by the opposing
  forces.
• The force with better weapons usually wins, and
  the loser suffers high losses.

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Loser/winner loss ratios
300
x
x
x
30
x
x
x
x
3
x
1700
2000
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Replacement of weapon systems

• To avoid dangerous inferiority, obsolete weapons
  must be replaced by new designs with higher
  performance, to maintain adequate effectiveness
  against hostile nations concurrently deploying
  new equipment.
• Replacement rates vary with -
• Performance improvements provided by technology
• Extra military effectiveness conferred by such
  improvements
• Level of threat (wartimepeacetime)
• National financial resources
• Successive generations of weapons in a particular
  class achieve higher performance and have higher
  unit costs.

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Increasing unit costs

• As a result of advances in technology, the unit
  cost of successive generations of military
  equipment has been rising rapidly since WWII
• Obscured by monetary inflation and short-term
  focus
• Sometimes attributed to gold-plated requirements
  and rapacious contractors
• Actually the inevitable result of military
  rivalry and technological development
• Real increases in equipment unit cost
• Affect most types of equipment, in medieval
  modern times
• Can be rapid, and can persist for many decades
• Unit cost of combat aircraft has risen at 10
  p.a.

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Combat aircraft UPC growth
UPC M
?
100
?
x
x
10
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
1
2000
1940
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Increasing unit costs

• Concurrently the UPC of most weapon systems has
  been growing at between 5 and 10 per year.
• For mature weapons (e.g. rifle, mg) cost grew
  more slowly.
• For weapons with rapidly-increasing capability
  (e.g. attack and ASW helicopters) cost grew more
  rapidly
• Cost grew even faster for weapons adopting new
  configurations (e.g. air-ground ordnance,
  infantry anti-tank weapons)
• The growth in the unit cost of capital ships
  (battleships, later aircraft carriers embarked
  aircraft) has continued from 1860-1980, and was
  only temporarily restrained by the Washington
  Treaty.

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Contrasting time trends in real unit cost

• Costs of many consumer goods and services fall.
• Electronic goods
• Air transport
• Cost of goods in limited supply rise.
• Works of art
• Land
• Costs of tournament goods, services and
  personnel rise, often rapidly,
• Weapon systems
• First-rate sporting equipment
• Electoral campaigns
• Promotion of mass media products
• Talented individuals

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Proposed countermeasures to unit cost growth in
defence equipment?

• Economies of scale via
• More emphasis on exports
• International collaboration in development and
  production
• Increased industrial productivity through
• Computer-aided operations
• Leaner management
• Improved organisation
• Reforms in government procurement strategies e.g.
• More competition
• Integrated project teams, and other Smart
  initiatives
• More (or possibly less) oversight and regulation
• All these savings are insignificant relative to
  recent growth rates.

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Future unit cost growth e.g. for aircraft

• Diminishing returns from speed and agility
• Increasing use of commercial components
• Replacement of humans by electronics
• Requirement for invulnerability (via stealth?)
• Need to avoid collateral damage (CNN factor)
• Varied scenarios
• Network-centric warfare
• It is prudent to plan for persistence of the
  historic trend.

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Increasing fixed costs within projects

• As unit costs rise, the number of weapon systems
  procured falls from one generation to the next.
• British fighters - 1954 1000 Hunters, 1983 165
  Tornado
• US bombers 1955 680 B52, 1986 100 B1B
• Modern projects are increasingly reliant on
  software, which has a high ratio of
  fixed/variable cost.
• JSF may have 5 million lines of code
• For both these reasons, the proportion of
  fixed/variable cost in modern weapon systems is
  rising
• During the Cold War the development/production
  cost ratio for European aircraft projects was
  10-20. Now ratio is 30-50.

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Increasing fixed cost in force structure

• Formerly many weapon systems operated
  autonomously, with limited inter-communication
  and cooperation. Then a nations military power
  rose with the number of weapon systems deployed.
• Today weapon systems are increasingly
  interdependent, and their operations are directed
  by an electronic network, incorporating sensors
  communications and control. The network requires
  large investment, but acts as a force multiplier.
• In future conventional warfare, rich nations
  which have a network will have an enormous
  advantage over poorer nations which have not.

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Advantage from networks
Weapons, linked by network
Force capability
Weapons only
Expenditure
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Responses to increasing unit cost

• Second-rate weapons systems?
• Guarantees bloody defeat
• Smaller fleets
• Fragile forces
• Diseconomies of scale
• Withdrawal from one or more classes, or from a
  major military role
• Consequent inability to undertake some military
  missions
• Role specialisation within an alliance
• Develop new weapon systems but produce only to
  match emergent threat
• Production surge may lag threat
• Under-equipped forces

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Responses to higher fixed/variable cost

• Slower replacement cycles
• High cost of maintenance for geriatric equipment
• Danger of impotence
• Larger groups of nations collaborating on
  procurement, to share fixed cost
• Delay and dissention?
• Incremental acquisition, to spread costs
• Heterogeneous equipment mix
• Successive problems of subsystem integration?
• Availability
• Fewer projects, procuring multi-role equipment
• Even greater complexity

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Future outcomes

• Development of first-rate weapons will be
  concentrated in those nations which can afford
  the up-front costs.
• Within these nations, design and production work
  on such systems will be concentrated in a few
  prime contractors
• expert in all relevant aspects of network-centric
  warfare
• wealthy enough to bear financial risks.
• Only large rich nations can afford networks, so
  the forces of smaller and poorer nations become
  increasingly outclassed.
• US, with a research budget far exceeding those of
  potential rivals, can be a very dominant
  superpower

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Alternative national policies, for smaller
nations, like the UK

• Independence
• Limited capability for some second-division
  warfare
• Alliance with a larger power
• Common weapon systems, training and doctrine
• Alliance with other, similar powers
• Integrated planning and budgets
• Payment to a superpower or trans-national
  alliance to provide global security
• Most nations prefer not to decide, but have no
  real alternative.

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Cause for concern?

• Rising unit costs and rising fixed/variable cost
  ratios concentrate power in the wealthiest
  nation.
• The current system of democracy and diplomacy was
  born when military technology was stagnant and
  widely-diffused weapons favoured superior numbers
  (Saratoga, Valmy), and when several nations could
  afford first-rate military forces.
• The system may be at risk when only the wealthy
  have access to the latest combat and information
  technologies, and power is concentrated in elite
  forces
• Royal siege train, panzer division, stealth
  aircraft, spooks?