Title: Government Intervention in Markets
1Lecture 19
2Government Intervention in Markets
- Except for taxes, have thus far ignored effects
of government policies on market outcomes - Major areas of government intervention
- antitrust law
- regulation
3Antitrust Law
- laws that make monopolization, collusion, and
certain pricing tactics illegal - economic justification
- since welfare loss exists with price searchers,
could potentially gain by reducing monopoly power
or by restricting monopolistic pricing
4Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Sherman Act (1890)
- Section 1
- Prohibits contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade - Explicit agreement to restrict output or fix
prices - Implicit collusion through parallel conduct
5Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
Examples of Illegal Combinations
- 1996
- Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) pleaded guilty to
price fixing for lysine -- three sentenced to
prison in 1999 - 1999
- Roche A.G., BASF A.G., Rhone-Poulenc and Takeda
pleaded guilty to price fixing of vitamins --
fined more than 1 billion
6Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Sherman Act (1890)
- Section 2
- Makes it illegal to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize a market - example Microsoft case
7Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Clayton Act (1914)
- section 2
- outlaws price discrimination that substantially
reduces competition - section 7
- makes illegal mergers that substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly
8Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Federal Trade Commission Act (1914, amended 1938,
1973, 1975) - Created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
- Prohibitions against deceptive advertising,
labeling, agreements with retailer to exclude
competing brands
9Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
- Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
- A part of the executive branch--the
administration can influence enforcement - Fines levied on businesses fines and
imprisonment levied on individuals
10Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
- Federal Trade Commission
- Enforces through voluntary understanding or
formal commission order
11Limiting Market Power The Antitrust Laws
- Antitrust laws are enforced three ways
- Private proceedings
- Lawsuits for damages
- Plaintiff can receive treble damages
12Regulation
- Rationale
- public interest view
- can reduce welfare loss associated with monopoly
by regulating prices below monopoly levels - can promote economic efficiency by eliminating or
reducing negative third party effects
(externalities)
13Regulation
- rationale
- capture view
- regulatory mechanism is used by special interests
to gain an advantage - producers, having lower costs of organizing, are
more likely to influencing legislators/regulators
so end up capturing the regulatory process
14Regulation
- traditional or economic regulation
- general
- regulations that fix prices and/or limit the
number of sellers - natural monopolies and utility regulation
- in the past, argued that utilities like
telephone, gas, and electric are natural
monopolies - may only be true for some aspects of these
businesses - with a natural monopoly, economies of scale lead
to one firm surviving in the market - firm will take advantage of monopoly position and
charge monopoly price which results in a welfare
loss
15Regulation
- natural monopolies and utility regulation
- policy dilemma want to enjoy cost savings
associated with economies of scale but avoid the
welfare loss associated with monopoly pricing
16Regulation
- natural monopolies and utility regulation
- rate regulaton solution
- set price MC
- since MChave to leave the industry in the long run
- hard to know what marginal cost is
- firm has reduced incentive to minimize cost
- firm may have incentive to pad cost if it makes
management better off
17Regulation
- natural monopolies and utility regulation
- rate regulation solution
- set price ATC
- sustainable since firm covers its opportunity
cost (earns zero economic profit) - ATC is easier to measure than is MC
- still have reduced incentive to minimize cost
- PMC so still have some welfare loss
18Regulation of a Monopolist
Price
- An unregulated monopolist with the costs
indicated here will produce where MR MC
(Q0) . . .
and charge
price P0.
P0
- From an efficiency viewpoint, this output is
too small and the price is too high. Can you
explain why?
- If a regulatory agency forced the monopolist
to reduce its price to P1 (Average Cost
pricing) . . .
LRATC
P1
the monopolist would expand
output to Q1.
MC
P2
- Ideally, we would like output to be expanded
to Q2
where P MC (Marginal Cost pricing), but
regulatory agencies do not usually attempt
to keep prices as low as P2. Can you explain
why?
D
MR
Q0
Q1
Q2
Quantity / Time .
19Regulation
- Regulation in Practice
- An alternative pricing technique---rate-of-return
regulation allows the firms to set a maximum
price based on the expected rate or return that
the firm will earn - equivalent to average cost pricing if allowed
rate of return is the typical market return - using this technique requires hearings to arrive
at the respective figures. - The hearing process creates a regulatory lag that
may benefit producers (1950s 60s) or consumers
(1970s 80s).
20Regulation
- natural monopolies and utility regulation
- alternatives to rate regulation of natural
monopolies - have government run enterprise
- reduced incentive to operate efficiently since
managers are not residual claimants - government may want to maximize profit rather
than minimize welfare loss - auction off monopoly rights
- while only one firm ex-post, can take advantage
of competition ex-ante - firms would be willing to bid as low as PATC
21Regulation
- alternatives to rate regulation of natural
monopolies - auction off monopoly rights
- advantages
- --- avoids problem of estimating costs
- --- firm still has incentive to minimize cost
once it - obtains contract
- problems
- --- need sufficient number of bidders to get
- competitive outcome (with few bidders may
- collude and rig bids)
- --- risk associated with fixed assets
- --- incentive to ceat on quality
- --- hold-up problems
22Regulation
- social regulation
- general
- regulations that restrict the quality of products
and services - rationale
- public interest
- consumers may be harmed by unsafe products or
by incompetent suppliers of services (quacks) - too costly for consumers to know quality of all
products and services - if government can collect information at a lower
cost than consumers and uses it to ban low
quality goods and services, consumers may benefit
23Regulation
- social regulation
- rationale
- public interest
- in absence of regulation, low quality is
constrained by competition among sellers and
repeat purchase mechanism - capture
- sellers may be concerned with low quality sellers
tarnishing industry brand name - existing sellers can gain from restricting entry
of new producers or products into the market
24Regulation
- social regulation
- costs of social regulation
- restricted choices for consumers
- sometimes prefer lower quality (and a lower
price) - requiring high quality leads some to choose less
desirable substitutes or no service at all - moral hazard problems
- as increase safety of products, reduce incentive
to guard against loss - unintended effects
- costs of verifying compliance
- costs of running regulatory agencies
25Regulation
- social regulation
- examples
- state-level professional licensing
- many professions, from barbers to morticians,
are licensed - public interest case for licensing varies
across occupations - many professions ask to be licensed
- suggests capture may be occuring
- current practitioners almost always
grandfathered in when a profession is licensed - local building codes
- externality argument
- federal product safety regulation
26Regulation
- regulation of intellectual property
- patents
- grants monopoly right to produce and sell a good
for 17 years - intended to encourage innovation
- chance for monopoly profits encourages innovation
- protects against free riding on research and
development - creates a welfare loss
- traditional welfare loss associated with monopoly
27Regulation
- regulation of intellectual property
- patents
- additional possible loss from wasteful activities
to obtain monopoly rights - rent seeking
- noteoutright bribes efficient
28Regulation
- Rent Seeking
- Firms may spend to gain monopoly power
- lobbying
- advertising
- building excess capacity
- the incentive to engage in monopoly practices is
determined by the profit to be gained. - example
- 1996 Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) successfully
lobbied for regulations requiring ethanol be
produced from corn - Why only corn?
29EndLecture 19