Philosophy, Intuition

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Philosophy, Intuition

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Title: Philosophy, Intuition

1
Philosophy, Intuition CultureAn Overview of a
Research Program

Stephen Stich
Dept. of Philosophy
Center for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
sstich_at_ruccs.rutgers.edu

2
Introduction

Philosophers use intuitions in a variety of ways
in a variety of projects
For the last several years, my collaborators I
have been
exploring the extent to which intuitions vary
across cultural groups
attempting to explain why that cultural
variation exist

3
Introduction

In this talk I want to offer an overview of this
work
The talk will
present some of our findings about the cultural
variation in intuition
sketch some of our work aimed at explaining that
variation
explore the implications, for some philosophical
projects, if our findings and explanations are
correct

4
Introduction

Three cautionary notes
1. In exploring the philosophical implications of
our work, the devil is in the details
and often those details are debatable since many
philosophers who use intuitions are less than
explicit about their methodology
2. The empirical work Ill be recounting is very
much work in progress
often the studies that wed most like to see
havent yet been done

5
Introduction

Three cautionary notes
3. Since I want to offer a survey of a lot of
ongoing work, I will be painting with a very
broad brush.

6
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
7
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
8
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Intuition Driven Romanticism A family of
methods aimed at generating or testing explicitly
or implicitly normative epistemic claims
9
Intuition in Epistemology

Necessary Features of an IDR Method
(i) Must take epistemic intuitions as data or
input. (It can also exploit various other
sorts of input.)
(ii) Must produce normative claims (explicit
or implicit) about matters epistemic.
(iii) The output of the strategy must depend,
in part, on the epistemic intuitions it takes as
input.
Epistemic Intuition a spontaneous judgment
about the epistemic properties of some specific
case.

___________________________
10
INTUITIONS
other stuff (optional)
I.D.R. Method
normative claims!
11
Intuition in Epistemology

Some examples of projects using an IDR method
Goodmans reflective equilibrium account of
justification of a rule of reasoning (and many
similar accounts)
L. J. Cohens narrow reflective equilibrium
account of rational or normatively appropriate
reasoning
Just about all the literature on the analysis of
knowledge, justification, warrant, etc. (assuming
these analyses have normative implications thus
are implicitly normative)
Goldmans account of justification in
Epistemology Cognition.

12
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

Gettier Cases have played a major role in the
analysis of knowledge for the last 50 years
In a typical Gettier Case, a person has good
evidence for a true belief, though what makes the
belief true is not causally linked to the
evidence
The standard intuition in these cases is that
the person does not really have knowledge
We set out to explore whether these standard
intuitions were cross culturally consistent
Our first experiment compared Gettier intuitions
in Americans with European and East Asian
cultural backgrounds
N.B. All subjects were students at Rutgers
University were fluent in English

13
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick
for many years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill
drives an American car. He is not aware,
however, that her Buick has recently been stolen,
and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced
it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of
American car. Does Bob really know that Jill
drives an American car, or does he only believe
it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES

14
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition
Gettier CaseWestern East Asian
15
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

Intrigued (indeed, amazed!) by these findings we
then looked at the Gettier intuitions of
Americans with South Asian cultural backgrounds.

16
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition
Gettier Case Western South Asian
17
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

In another study, we looked at Gettier intuitions
across a different kind of cultural divide
philosophy students vs. students with little
philosophy

18
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

On March 3, Bob turns on the TV and sees a
broadcast of the London Symphony Orchestra
playing at Carnegie Hall. The commentator on the
TV says that the program is being broadcast "live
on March 3, from Carnegie Hall", so Bob comes to
believe that in fact the London Symphony
Orchestra is playing on that day. He does not
look at any newspapers, or listen to the radio,
or look for any other information about the
London Symphony Orchestra that day.
But it turns out that the broadcast he saw was
a recording from the March of last year, and so
the concert he saw on TV was not actually from
the day he was watching. Nonetheless, the London
Symphony Orchestra was giving a concert that day
- - just not one that was being televised - - so
Bob's belief is true. Does Bob really know that
the London Symphony Orchestra is playing on that
day, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES

19
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition
LSO Gettier
20
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition

Fernando has lots of good reasons to believe
that his co-worker, Paul, legally owns a car.
Paul has driven Fernando around in a Lexus Paul
keeps a Lexus in his own garage Fernando has
even seen ownership papers for the Lexus in
Paul's name. And Paul seems a generally honest
and decent citizen. So, Fernando believes that
Paul legally owns a car.
Fernando is unaware that Paul actually stole
the Lexus the papers were all fakes. But, even
though Paul does not legally own the Lexus, he
has just also legally bought a Toyota. Fernando
only knows about the Lexus, but nonetheless his
belief that Paul legally owns a car is true.
Does Fernando really know that Paul legally owns
a car, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES

21
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Epistemic
Intuition
Lexus Gettier
22
Explaining the Cultural Variation

There are various possible explanations of the
differences between philosophy students and
students who have taken no philosophy, including
The effects of teaching
which could work in a variety of ways
Selection effects
Students with intuitions that instructors dont
share do poorly and dont go on in philosophy
But we know of no evidence that will enable us to
make a choice between these (and other)
explanations

23
Explaining the Cultural Variation

We suspect that the differences between Asians
Westerners are related to a suite of deep,
systematic quite startling differences that
Nisbett, Peng, Norenzayan others have found in
Western Asian cognitive processing
In figure / ground perceptual processing tasks,
Ws focus on the figure As are much more
attentive to the ground
In categorization tasks, Ws are more inclined to
rely on rules, As are more inclined to rely on
similarity
In explanatory inferences, Ws focus on objects,
As focus on the field or surround As do not
make the fundamental attribution error!
In structuring memory, Ws rely much more heavily
on causation, Ws rely on similarity
For an overview see R. Nisbett, The Geography of
Thought (2003)

24
Explaining the Cultural Variation

It is clear that these differences are culturally
transmitted, since, after about 3 generations,
Asians in the USA respond the way Americans of
European ancestry do
It is likely that these differences form stable
clusters, though available explanations for this
clustering are speculative
It is far from clear how, exactly, these
clustered differences lead to differences in
epistemic intuitions, though we suspect that the
central role of causation in Western cognition
of similarity in Asian cognition may be an
important part of the story

25
Philosophical Implications

Suppose we are right that
epistemic intuitions differ systematically across
cultures
these differences are explained by deep, stable,
systematic, culturally transmitted differences in
a cluster of cognitive processes
What would be the philosophical implications?
One obvious suggestion is that, in conjunction
with Intuition Driven Romanticism, it would lead
to epistemic relativism

26
INTUITIONS
other stuff (optional)
I.D.R. Method
normative claims!
27
Asian Intuitions
Western Intuitions
other stuff (optional)
I.D.R. Method
Asian normative claims
Western normative claims
28
Philosophical Implications

One way to flesh this idea out, given the data
weve collected, would be as follows
There is a tradition stretching from Plato, who
tells us that knowledge is the highest of human
things to Chisholm Pollock who urge that,
ceteris paribus, we should revise our beliefs in
a way that maximizes the chance of ending up with
knowledge.
However, the data suggest that Asians
Westerners have different concepts of knowledge

29
Philosophical Implications

So the highest of human things would be
different for Asians Westerners
And Asians Westerners who sought to follow
Chisholms advice would end up (at least
sometimes) revising their beliefs in quite
different ways
But this sort of relativism might just be the
beginning, since other cultures might well have
different intuitions and different concepts

30
Asian Intuitions
Western Intuitions
other stuff (optional)
I.D.R. Method
Asian normative claims
Western normative claims
31
Asian Intuitions
Western Intuitions
Culture Es Intuitions
Culture As Intuitions
Culture Fs Intuitions
Culture Ds Intuitions
I.D.R. Method
Culture Bs Intuitions
Culture Cs Intuitions
Fs normative epistemology
As normative epistemology
Asian Normative Epistemology
Western Normative Epistemology
Bs normative epistemology
Es normative epistemology
Cs normative epistemology
Cs normative epistemology
32
Philosophical Implications

At this point we know almost nothing about the
epistemic intuitions, concepts and norms that
prevail in non-Western societies, particularly in
small scale societies
Learning more about these is a central goal of
the Culture and the Mind Project

33
(No Transcript)
34
Philosophical Implications

What would be the philosophical implications?
One obvious suggestion is that, in conjunction
with Intuition Driven Romanticism, it would lead
to epistemic relativism
Another suggestion is that we no longer rely on
intuition in epistemology
This is the strategy I favor, though (obviously)
it raises lots of problems

35
Philosophical Implications

Philosophers who make claims about other peoples
intuitions should not be too quick to generalize
from their own case
I am sometimes asked in a tone that
suggests that the question is a major objection
why, if conceptual analysis is concerned to
elucidate what governs our classificatory
practice, dont I advocate doing serious opinion
polls on peoples responses to various cases? ?

36
Philosophical Implications

My answer is that I do when it is
necessary
Everyone who presents the Gettier cases to a
class of students is doing their own bit of
fieldwork, and we all know the answer they get in
the vast majority of cases. But it is also true
that often we know that our own case is typical
and so can generalize from it to others. (Frank
Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, 36-7)

37
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
The Reference of Proper Names
38
Intuition in Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Language 101
Descriptivism, championed by Frege and others
maintains that
competent speakers associate a description with
every proper name this description specifies a
set of properties
an object is the referent of a proper name if and
only if it uniquely or best satisfies the
description associated with this proper name

39
Intuition in Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Language 101
The Causal / Historical theory, championed by
Kripke and others maintains that
a name is introduced into a linguistic community
for the purpose of referring to an individual it
continues to refer to that individual as long as
its uses are linked to the individual via a
causal chain of successive users
speakers may associate descriptions with names
but after a name is introduced, the associated
description does not play any role in the
fixation of the referent the referent may
entirely fail to satisfy the description.

40
Intuition in Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Language 101
It is widely agreed that in deciding between
these two theories, appeal to intuition is
crucial. The correct theory is the one which
best comports with our intuitions in actual and
hypothetical cases.
Kripkes masterstroke was to propose cases that
elicited widely shared intuitions that were
inconsistent with traditional descriptivist
theories.
Since almost all philosophers share the
intuitions elicited by Kripke's fictional cases,
it was widely conceded that the description
theory was in trouble and (at least) would need a
sophisticated patch.

41
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Semantic
Intuition

The findings of Nisbett et al., along with our
own findings about epistemic intuitions led us to
wonder whether there might be cross cultural
differences in these intuitions.

42
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Semantic
Intuition

Asians are more inclined than Westerners to make
categorical judgments on the basis of global
similarity Westerners, on the other hand, are
more disposed to focus on causation in describing
the world and classifying things.
This differential focus led us to hypothesize
that there might be a related cross-cultural
difference in semantic intuitions. For, on a
description theory, the referent has to satisfy
the description, but it need not be causally
related to the use of the term. On Kripkes
causal-historical theory, the referent need not
satisfy the associated description. Rather, it
need only figure in the causal history (and in
the causal explanation of) the speakers current
use of the word.

43
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Semantic
Intuition

To test the hypothesis we designed an experiment
using intuition probes modeled on the Gödel case,
one of Kripkes most famous cases.
Subjects were
English speaking students, with European cultural
backgrounds, at Rutgers University
English speaking students, with Chinese cultural
backgrounds, at the University of Hong Kong
(where the language of instruction is English)
Two versions of the Gödel case were presented,
one adopted to the Chinese context

44
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Semantic
Intuition

Suppose that John has learned in college that
Gödel is the man who proved an important
mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness
of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics
and he can give an accurate statement of the
incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to
Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only
thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose
that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A
man called Schmidt whose body was found in
Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years
ago, actually did the work in question. His
friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript
and claimed credit for the work, which was
thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus he has been
known as the man who proved the incompleteness of
arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name
Gödel are like John the claim that Gödel
discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only
thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When
John uses the name Gödel, is he talking about
(A) the person who really discovered the
incompleteness of arithmetic?
or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and
claimed credit for the work?

45
Percentage of participants giving
causal-historical responses
? 2 (1, N72) 6.023, p
46
Some Evidence for Cultural Variation in Semantic
Intuition

Ivy is a high school student in Hong Kong. In
her astronomy class she was taught that Tsu
Chung Chih was the man who first determined the
precise time of the summer and winter solstices.
But, like all her classmates, this is the only
thing she has heard about Tsu Chung Chih. Now
suppose that Tsu Chung Chih did not really make
this discovery. He stole it from an astronomer
who died soon after making the discovery. But
the theft remained entirely undetected and Tsu
Chung Chih became famous for the discovery of
the precise times of the solstices. Many people
are like Ivy the claim that Tsu Chung Chih
determined the solstice times is the only thing
they have heard about him. When Ivy uses the
name Tsu Chung Chih, is she talking about
(A) the person who really determined the solstice
times?
or
(B) the person who stole the discovery of the
solstice times?

47
Percentage of participants giving
causal-historical responses
? 2(1, N72) 3.886, p
48
Philosophical Implications

It has been widely assumed in philosophy that
reference fixation is a linguistic universal.
What determines the reference of a kind of
expression in one language determines the
reference of that kind of expression in other
languages.
It has also been widely assumed that the correct
theory of reference is the one that does the best
job of capturing intuitions.
If our results prove to be robust if reference
intuitions really do vary across cultures then
at least one of these assumptions will have to be
abandoned.

49
In Brief

Three inconsistent theses
Cross-cultural diversity.
Universality of reference.
Semantics is based on intuitions.
No easy way out!
As long as this problem has not been solved, we
should be skeptical of philosophical semantics.

50
Philosophical Implications

Indeed, if our results are robust, and if the
method of intuitions is the right way to
determine which theory of reference is correct,
then far from being a linguistic universal, the
reference for a give type of term may be
determined in different ways for different
speakers of the same language!

51
Philosophical Implications

Metaphysical teaser
Theories of reference have played an important
role in recent metaphysical debates about
the existence of commonsense mental states
(Churchland, Stich, Lycan, etc.)
scientific realism (Kuhn, Boyd, Kitcher, Devitt,
etc)
the reality of race (Appiah, Andreason, Taylor,
Mallon, etc.)
and many others.
If the theory of reference is in trouble, so are
these parts of metaphysics.

52
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
53
Intuition in Philosophy

Philosophical Projects That Invoke Intuition

Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language

Rawls Linguistic Analogy
Fundamental Moral Disagreement

54
Intuition in Moral Philosophy

Rawls Linguistic Analogy
One may think of moral philosophy at first (and
I stress the provisional nature of this view) as
the attempt to describe our moral capacity. This
enterprise is very difficult. A useful
comparison here is with the problem of describing
the sense of grammaticalness that we have for the
sentences of our native language.
See Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of
Syntax

55
Intuition in Moral Philosophy

Rawls Linguistic Analogy
To discover the principles underlying the sense
of grammaticalness that we have for the sentences
of our native language Chomsky relies on
linguistic intuitions.
While Chomsky famously argues that there are
important universal features shared by the
grammars of all natural languages, he also
recognizes that there will be important
differences between the grammars of distinct
natural languages

56
Intuition in Moral Philosophy

Rawls Linguistic Analogy
If the linguistic analogy is a good one, we would
expect to find both
important universal features shared by the moral
capacities of people in different cultures
and
systematic variation between cultures.

57
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

A number of investigators, most notably Mark
Hauser and his colleagues, have been exploring
moral universals.
Hausers group has been using trolley problems
in a large international web based study
Their preliminary findings suggest that there are
indeed deep structural universals underlying the
moral judgments they have been considering

58
http//moral.wjh.harvard.edu/
sponsored by the Primate Cognitive Neuroscience
Laboratory, Harvard University
59
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

Meanwhile, our group has been exploring the other
half of the linguistic analogy systematic cross
cultural variation in moral intuition.
Inspired (yet again) by Nisbetts finding that
Asians are tend to focus on groups and context,
while Westerners tend to focus on individuals,
we looked at a series of scenarios in which
the benefits to the group and the rights of an
individual come into conflict.

60
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy
An unidentified member of an ethnic group is
known to be responsible for a murder that
occurred in a town. . . . Because the town has a
history of severe ethnic conflict and rioting,
the town's Police Chief and Judge know that if
they do not immediately identify and punish a
culprit, the townspeople will start anti-ethnic
rioting that will cause great damage to property
owned by members of the ethnic group, and a
considerable number of serious injuries and
deaths in the ethnic population. . . . The Police
Chief and Judge are faced with a dilemma. They
can falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr.
Smith, an innocent member of the ethnic group, in
order to prevent the riots. Or they can continue
hunting for the guilty man, thereby allowing the
anti-ethnic riots to occur, and do the best they
can to combat the riots until the guilty man is
apprehended. . . . the Police Chief and Judge
decide to falsely accuse, convict, and imprison
Mr. Smith, the innocent member of the ethnic
group, in order to prevent the riots. They do
so, thereby preventing the riots and preventing a
considerable number of ethnic group deaths and
serious injuries. (Peng, Doris, Nichols Stich)
61
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

The (Western!) philosophical consensus on cases
like this is clear.
Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in
order to prevent riots in the street, period.
(Bloomfield 2001)
Someone who really thinks, in advance, that it
is open to question whether such an action as
procuring the judicial execution of the innocent
should be quite excluded from consideration-- I
do not want to argue with him

62
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

The (Western!) philosophical consensus on cases
like this is clear.
Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in
order to prevent riots in the street, period.
(Bloomfield 2001)
Someone who really thinks, in advance, that it
is open to question whether such an action as
procuring the judicial execution of the innocent
should be quite excluded from consideration-- I
do not want to argue with him he shows a corrupt
mind. (Anscombe 1958)
Compare (even!) Smart (1973)

63
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

Some preliminary data
East Asian subjects were more likely to think the
police chief and judge did the right thing.
Westerners were more likely to think the
officials should be punished for doing it.
Westerners were more likely to find the
officials, as opposed to the potential rioters,
responsible for the false imprisonment.
Similar results were obtained in for several
other scenarios.

64
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

Some preliminary data
These data are from English speaking students, of
Asian European background, at Berkeley
All the probes were in English
In another series of experiments we collected
data from Chinese students in Beijing with probes
that were translated into Chinese
The results were much the same, though the
differences between Asians Chinese were
significantly greater

65
Evidence for the Linguistic Analogy

VERY Tentative Conclusions
At a relatively superficial level, the linguistic
analogy seems to be a good one
If, following Rawls, we understand moral
capacity as the system of rules, principles or
knowledge structures underlying moral judgment,
then
There is some evidence for BOTH
deep structural universals that constrain the
sorts of moral capacities that people can have
and
systematic cross-cultural variation in peoples
moral capacities

66
Philosophical Implications

If this is right, what are the implications for
Rawls project?
Rawls tells us that If mens conceptions of
justice finally turn out to differ, the ways in
which they do so is a matter of the first
importance. (TJ 50)
But is it less than clear (to me!) what, exactly,
the implications would be for Rawls project.
Rather than trying to settle the question, lets
turn to another issue in moral theory where the
implications of systematic cross-cultural
variation are easier to discern.

67
Philosophical Implications

Fundamental Moral Disagreement
No one doubts that moral views differ both within
and across cultural groups
But would that diversity of views persist under
idealized circumstance in which people are
rational
impartial
agree on all relevant non-moral issues
If the answer is yes, Ill say that moral
disagreement fundamental, if the answer is no,
Ill say moral disagreement is superficial?

68
Philosophical Implications

Why is it philosophically important to know
whether moral disagreement is fundamental or
superficial?
Because if moral disagreement is fundamental,
then Moral Realism is in trouble

69
Philosophical Implications

Moral Realism
defended by Boyd, Brink, Railton, Michael Smith,
Sturgeon many others
there are lots of important differences between
these theorists
but for most of them, the persistence of moral
disagreement that does not depend on non-moral
disagreement (or other distorting factors, like
self-interest or irrationality) would pose a
significant problem

70
Philosophical Implications

Richard Boyd

"careful philosophical exam- ination will reveal
that agreement on nonmoral issues would
eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts
of issues which arise in ordinary moral
practice. "(1988)

71
Philosophical Implications

David Brink

It is incumbent on the moral realist . . . To
claim that most moral disputes are resolvable at
least in principle. (1984)
72
Philosophical Implications
The notion of objectivity signifies the
possibility of a convergence in moral views
(1994 6)

Michael Smith

73
Philosophical Implications

Many Moral Realists and many Moral Anti-Realists
would agree that
Fundamental moral disagreement (i.e.
persisting diversity under idealized conditions
entails (or at least strongly suggests) that
Moral Realism is False

74
Philosophical Implications

We believe that our data (along with studies
which Id love to talk about if time permits!)
strongly suggest that there are fundamental moral
disagreements on important matters.

75
Philosophical Implications

Lets consider some possible distorting factors
that might have lead our subjects to offer
judgments different from those they would have
offered if ideally situated
Rationality
It is singularly implausible that systematic
irrationality has led 1.2 billion Chinese to
offer judgments which differ from those of
Western subjects
and which some Western philosophers take to
indicate a corrupt mind

76
Philosophical Implications

Impartiality
In the Peng et al. study, subjects are plausibly
understood to be in the position of disinterested
impartial observers.

77
Philosophical Implications

Disagreement on Non-Moral Issues
In the Peng et al. study, there was no East/ West
difference in response to questions about a set
of non-moral issues including the following
Being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned
caused Mr. Smith to suffer.
Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted, and
imprisoned caused Mr. Smiths friends, family,
and loved ones to suffer.
If the riots occurred, they would have caused
members of the ethnic group to suffer.

78
Philosophical Implications

Yes, but
We are under no illusions that this study (and
others that point in the same direction) will
convince those who think there is little or no
fundamental moral disagreement.
Those skeptical about fundamental moral
disagreement might raise a variety of objections
focusing on the details of these studies
including possible sources of superficial
disagreement that have not been ruled out
or they might suggest that these cases are
outliers exceptions to the rule that in general
moral views will converge under idealized
circumstances

79
Philosophical Implications

To address these Yes, but objections and move
the debate forward, we believe that we need an
empirically supported theory of the psychological
mechanisms underlying the acquisition
utilization of moral norms and of how those
mechanisms might have evolved.
Chandra Sripada I have recently published a
theory aimed at doing that

80
Philosophical Implications

Sripada Stich, A Frame-work for the
Psychology of Norms, in The Innate Mind
Culture Cognition, ed. by Carruthers, Laurence
Stich, Oxford Univ. Press, 2006

81
Execution Mechanism
Acquisition Mechanism
norm data base r1---------- r2----------
r3---------- rn----------
infer contents of normative rules
identify norm implicating behavior
emotion system
Rule-related reasoning capacity
explicit reasoning
Proximal Cues in Environment
causal links that are well
supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little
evidence
82
Philosophical Implications

Anyone interested in the details of the theory,
and the empirical support for it, can find a copy
on my website
http//www.rci.rutgers.edu/stich/

83
Conclusion

I do not claim that any of the philosophical
questions touched on in this talk have been
resolved by the experimental theoretical work
Ive sketched

84
Conclusion

What I do claim is that a multi-disciplinary
research program that includes
well designed experiments aimed at exploring the
extent of cultural variation in philosophically
important intuitions
and
empirically informed theoretical work aimed at
understanding the psychological mechanisms that
give rise to those intuitions and how those
mechanisms evolved
can play an important role in moving the
philosophical debates forward.

85
Collaborators