god

1
god

• 6.26.06

2
for tomorrow

• read
• (CP) Rachels, Euthyphro's Dilemma
• (CP) Metz, Could Gods Purpose be the Source of
  Lifes Meaning?
• (CP) Metz, pp. 784-788 in Recent Work on the
  Meaning of Life

3
a potential problem

• p1. God does not exist.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  a God.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• today is p1 true?
• tomorrow is p2 true?

4
the meaning of god exists

• what does it mean to say God exists?
• its to say that there is (1) something such that
  it is God, and (2) it exists.
• ignore the second half (existence) for a moment.
• this leaves us with something such that it is
  God.
• but whats that? what would it be for something
  to be God?
• to ask this question is to ask about the nature
  of God
• what would something have to be like in order to
  be God?
• what are Gods defining characteristics?
• what are Gods attributes (essential properties)?

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can we define god?

• in order to say anything meaningful, we need to
  have a grip on what it is were talking about.
• so, we must try to get a grip on what it is were
  talking about when we say things like god
  exists or god does not exist.
• if we dont know what God means (if we cant
  say what it would be to be God -- i.e., what
  attributes God possesses), we have just said
  something meaningless.
• consider mystery-mongers who say We cant
  understand God. He cant be defined, and it is
  blasphemous to try. Blah blah blah.
• basically what these folks are saying is that
  they have no clue what it is they believe god
  exists is no different from squadger exists
  (since squadger is undefined).
• in short, theyre basically saying that their
  belief in God is meaningless!

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the nature of god

• surely the belief that god exists is different
  than the belief that squadger exists.
• this is because God, if she exists, is perfect.
• consequently, she has 3 (4?) attributes which
  distinguish her from all other beings
• omniscience (maximal knowledge)
• omnipotence (maximal power)
• omnibenevolence (maximal goodness)
• call the view that God has these 3 attributes the
  theistic conception of God, or TCG.
• on TCG, to claim that God exists is to claim that
  an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being
  exists.

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5 arguments for theism

• THEISM God (as conceived by TCG) exists.
• cosmological argument
• first cause arg
• dependence arg
• teleological (design) argument
• ontological argument
• argument from religious experience
• moral argument
• were going to focus on (1) (3).
• but first lets look at the question of whether
  it is appropriate to use reason to decide
  religious matters

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fideism, or blind faith

• FIDEISM faith is distinct from reason so, its
  mistaken to reason about religious matters.
• there are three degrees/versions of FIDEISM all
  of them are false
• strong it is blasphemous or impious to reason
  about religious matters.
• problem saints and extremely devout religious
  leaders (including prophets, saints, and
  allegedly God himself) have reasoned about
  religious matters.
• moderate there arent any reasons for/against
  religious claims.
• problem there are many arguments for and against
  religious claims.
• weak reason is inconclusive (i.e., neutral with
  respect to religious matters).
• problem we couldnt know such a thing until we
  looked at all the available reasons, so rather
  than showing that its mistaken to reason about
  religious matters, this view actually establishes
  that we must reason about religious maters (in
  order to determine whether or not the reasons are
  neutral).
• (note also that faith is not distinct from, but
  actually requires, belief.)

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first cause arg

• p1. there are effects.
• p2. any effect derives eventually from a first
  cause.
• c1. so, there is a first cause.
• p3. if there is a first cause, then it is God.
• c2. so, God exists.

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vs. p2

• p2. any effect derives eventually from a first
  cause.
• its possible that there is an infinite series of
  causes.
• in such a case, each cause in a series has its
  own cause, with no beginning cf. an infinite
  series of integers.
• unless this possibility is entirely ruled out, we
  have no reason to accept p2.

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vs. p3

• p3. if there is a first cause, then it is God.
• this premise assumes that only God could play the
  role of first cause.
• presumably, this is because the first cause needs
  to be able to cause itself to exist, or needs no
  cause at all, and the only candidate for this
  role is God.
• but it seems possible that something other than
  God a quantum fluctuation which resulted in the
  big bang, perhaps could occur without a cause.
• unless this possibility is entirely ruled out, we
  have no reason to accept p3.

12
dependence arg

• p1. there are ontologically dependent things.
• p2. anything ontologically dependent derives its
  existence eventually from something ontologically
  independent.
• c1. so, something ontologically independent
  exists.
• p3. if something ontologically independent
  exists, then God exists.
• c2. so, God exists.

13
vs. p2

• p2. anything ontologically dependent derives its
  existence eventually from something ontologically
  independent.
• its possible that there is an endless sequence
  of ontologically dependent beings.
• for instance, perhaps an endless sequence of
  bigger parts depend on for their existence on an
  endless sequence of ever smaller parts cf. an
  infinite series of integers.
• unless this possibility is entirely ruled out, we
  have no reason to accept p2.

14
vs. p3

• p3. if something ontologically independent
  exists, then God exists.
• this premise assumes that only God could play the
  role of an ontologically independent being.
• but its possible that something other than God
  a point-sized particle is ontologically
  independent.
• unless this possibility is entirely ruled out, we
  have no reason to accept p3.

15
teleological (design) arg

• p1. the universe exhibits machine-like structure
  on every scale of space and time.
• p2. the best explanation of the universe
  exhibiting machine-like structure on every scale
  of space and time is that the universe was
  intelligently designed.
• c1. so, probably the universe was intelligently
  designed.
• p3. if the universe was intelligently designed,
  then it was designed by God.
• c2. so, probably God exists.

16
vs. p1

• p1. the universe exhibits machine-like structure
  on every scale of space and time.
• this is plainly false.
• but this doesnt undermine the arg, since one
  could always change p1 to
• p1. the universe exhibits machine-like structure
  on many scales of space and time.
• the problem, however, is that this change
  concedes that theres aspects of the universe
  that dont show evidence of an intelligent
  designer.
• to the extent that this is so, our reason for
  accepting the other premises in the arg decreases
  dramatically.

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vs. p2

• p2. the best explanation of the universe
  exhibiting machine-like structure on every scale
  of space and time is that the universe was
  intelligently designed.
• natural laws explain the machine-like structure
  of the universe just as well as, and in a less
  remarkable (simpler and humbler) way than, the
  hypothesis that the universe was intelligently
  designed.
• perhaps the problem with natural laws is that
  they stand in need of explanation.
• but so does an intelligent designer
• the existence of an intelligent designer is not
  self-explanatory
• the existence of an intelligent designer does
  not avoid the need for explanation.
• or, if the existence of an intelligent designer
  does avoid the need for explanation, then why
  doesnt the existence of natural laws also avoid
  the need for explanation?

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vs. p3

• p3. if the universe was intelligently designed,
  then it was designed by God.
• any large building project in our experience has
  multiple designers who have limited knowledge and
  ability. The universe was the largest building
  project of them all, if it was created by design.
  So our experience would lead us to expect a huge
  team of limited designers for such a project
  (78).

19
ontological arg

• basically, the arg is that
• I can conceive of God, a perfect being.  But if
  God doesnt exist, then God isnt perfect.  So,
  God must exist.
• Im going to explain the arg in 3 steps.

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step 1 preliminaries

• God the greatest conceivable (possible) being. 
  
• imagine God.  if youre truly imagining God, then
  what youre imagining must be something entirely
  unsurpassable in greatness (perfection).  God, if
  she exists, is as excellent as anything possibly
  could be. 
• accordingly, our concept of God is a concept of
  the being than which none greater is possible.
• it would seem that we do in fact have such a
  concept.  but so what?  that by itself doesnt
  prove much of anything

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step 2 categories

• consider the following two categories
• now lets divide the possible things into two
  categories
• question  in which of these categories do we
  place God? 
• the arg tries to show that we must place God in
  the category on the left. for if we were to
  suppose that God goes in the category on the
  right, wed get a contradiction.  contradictions
  are necessarily false.  so, our assumption would
  entail something false.  but something true
  cannot entail something false. so, our assumption
  cannot be true it must be false.  so, God must
  go in the category on the left.

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step 3 the arg itself

• p1. God ( the being than which none greater is
  possible) is possible.
• p2. suppose that God does not exist.
• p3. for any x, if x is possible and x does not
  exist then x might have been greater.
• c1. so, God might have been greater.
• c2. so, the being than which none greater is
  possible is a being than which a greater is
  possible.
• but this is a contradiction, so one of the
  premises must be false our supposition, p2.
• c3. so, God exists.

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an aside

• the ontological argument is entirely a priori --
  its justified simply by reasoning alone.   
• in other words, to understand the argument, you
  dont need to go do experiments, collect data, or
  even leave your house. 
• all you need is the concept God.  Once you have
  that concept, you can just sit back in your arm
  chair and -- viola!  a proof!
• but is it a genuine proof?  that is, is the
  argument sound? 
• whether it works or not, regardless, the
  ontological argument must be considered one of
  the greatest achievements of the human
  intellect. 
• by pure reasoning alone, using a few more or less
  commonsensical premises, Anselm put together a
  powerful argument for Gods existence. 
• even if the argument is unsuccessful, it cannot
  be denied that this little piece of reasoning is
  worthy of respect.

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vs. p3

• p3. for any x, if x is possible and x does not
  exist then x might have been greater.
• this assumes two things (1) existence is a
  property things may or may not have, and (2) its
  better to have existence than not to have it.
• first, why suppose that existence is a property?
  (cf. an apple pie recipe)
• second, why suppose that its always better to
  exist?

25
objections strategies

• one way to object to an argument is to show that
  one (or more) premise is false.
• this isnt the only way you can also show that
  the reasoning used in the argument is invalid.
• to do this, you need to show that the same exact
  reasoning could be used to prove absurdities.

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guanilos objection

• p1. the Isle of the Blest ( the island than
  which none greater is possible) is possible.
• p2. suppose that the Isle of the Blest does not
  exist.
• p3. for any x, if x is possible and x does not
  exist then x might have been greater.
• c1. so, the Isle of the Blest might have been
  greater.
• c2. so, the island than which none greater is
  possible is an island than which a greater is
  possible.
• but this is a contradiction, so one of the
  premises must be false our supposition, p2.
• c3. so, the Isle of the Blest exists.

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3 arguments for atheism

• ATHEISM God (as conceived by TCG) does not exist.
• paradox of the stone
• problem of evil
• argument from non-belief

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is the concept of God incoherent?

• some have argued that the concept of God is
  incoherent.
• if thats right, then God definitely doesnt
  exist (cause she cant cf. a round square).
• for instance, some have said that omnipotence
  doesnt make sense its impossible for something
  to have maximal power.
• consider the paradox of the stone
• can God create a stone so heavy that she cant
  lift it?

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paradox of the stone

• p1. God is omnipotent.
• p2. either God can create a stone so heavy that
  she cant lift it or God cant create a stone so
  heavy that she cant lift it.
• p3. if God can create a stone so heavy that she
  cant lift it, then God cant perform the task of
  lifting the stone.
• p4. if God cant create a stone so heavy that
  she cant lift it, then God cant perform the
  task of creating the stone.
• c1. either way, there is at least one task that
  God cannot perform.
• p5. if x is omnipotent, then there is no task
  that x cant perform.
• c2. so, God is and is not omnipotent.

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vs. p3 (descartes)

• p3. if God can create a stone so heavy that she
  cant lift it, then God cant perform the task of
  lifting the stone.
• God can still lift the stone, even though its so
  heavy she cant lift it.
• problem with this objection it doesnt make any
  sense.

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vs. p4 (most sane theists)

• p4. if God cant create a stone so heavy that
  she cant lift it, then she cant perform the
  task of creating the stone.
• there is no such task as creating the stone.
• for if there was such a task, it would lead to a
  contradiction, as shown by the argument.
• its not a count against a beings power that it
  cant perform a task which isnt actually a task
  cf. creating a round square.
• problem with this objection there is such a task
  as x creating a stone so heavy that x cant lift
  it in fact, its a task that even I can perform!

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paradoxes

• when you find a paradox (contradiction), you have
  to reject one of the premises which one?
• p1. God is omnipotent.
• p2. either God can create a stone so heavy that
  she cant lift it or she cant create a stone so
  heavy that she cant lift it.
• p3. if she can create a stone so heavy that she
  cant lift it, then God cant perform the task of
  lifting the stone.
• p4. if God cant create a stone so heavy that
  she cant lift it, then she cant perform the
  task of creating the stone.
• p5. if x is omnipotent, then there is no task
  that x cant perform.
• p2 and p5 are true by definition, so they cant
  be rejected.
• theists typically attempt to reject p3 or p4.
• but its not clear that rejecting p3 or p4 is
  defensible.
• that leaves p1 should we reject that?

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problem of evil

• necessary evil the existence and degree of the
  pain is needed to serve an overall good purpose.
• unnecessary evil the existence and degree of the
  pain is not needed to serve an overall good
  purpose
• p1. if God existed, he would prevent unnecessary
  pain and suffering.
• p2. probably there exists unnecessary pain and
  suffering.
• c. so, probably God does not exist.

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vs. p2

• p2. probably there exists unnecessary pain and
  suffering.
• God gave us free will that was necessary to
  serve an overall good purpose.
• we cause pain and suffering through our free
  will.
• since free will is necessary, so is that pain and
  suffering since the only way to avoid it would
  be to take away our free will.

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vs. p2

• p2. probably there exists unnecessary pain and
  suffering.
• all pain and suffering serves the purpose of
  soul-building we need it to learn lessons,
  become good, etc.
• if we didnt have exactly the amount of pain and
  suffering that we do, we couldnt build our
  souls.

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two types of evil

• natural evil pain and suffering caused by
  natural forces that arent within the control of
  a moral agent.
• moral evil pain and suffering caused by a moral
  agent.
• since both types of evil exist, one cannot
  respond to the problem of evil by invoking free
  will the necessity of free will cannot account
  for natural evils, which are not due to our free
  will.
• many natural evils are never discovered how,
  then, could they help us build our souls?
• finally, to admit that the creator could not have
  created a world in which we could build our
  souls with just a little less pain and suffering
  seems to admit that the creator is not
  all-powerful (or not all-knowing, or not
  all-good).

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saint worlds

• saint worlds are worlds in which everyone has
  free will and there is no unnecessary pain or
  suffering.
• saint worlds seem possible
• example choosing to mow my lawn
• the objections to the problem of evil deny the
  possibility of saint worlds
• if they were possible, then God could have
  created one, avoiding unnecessary evil
• since this isnt a saint world, either God
  doesnt exist OR God couldnt have created one
  (b/c theyre impossible).
• so, these objections say that something which is
  possible is impossible.
• thats bad.

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mysterianism

• many say there is a reason for all pain and
  suffering, only they dont know it. so, they
  conclude that theyre justified in believing that
  the problem of evil isnt really a problem.
• imagine that your friend is convicted of murder.
  although there is clearly evidence that he
  committed the murder, you strongly believe that
  he didnt do it. and so you tell everyone that he
  didnt do it. you cant give a reason for them to
  think that your friend didnt do it. but, you
  assure them that theres some reason why this is
  so its just that you dont know it.
• just as youre not justified in believing that
  your friend didnt commit the murder unless you
  have a reason to think that he didnt commit the
  murder, youre not justified in believing that
  all pain and suffering is necessary unless you
  have you have a reason to think that all pain and
  suffering is necessary.

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arg from non-belief

• reasonable non-belief a failure to believe in God
  for which the non-believer is not to blame.
• p1. if God existed, then she would dispel all
  reasonable non-belief.
• p2. there exists reasonable non-belief.
• c. so, God does not exist.

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vs. p1

• p1. if God existed, then she would dispel all
  reasonable non-belief.
• free will
• character-building

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vs. p2

• p2. there exists reasonable non-belief.
• those who fail to believe in God are doing
  something wrong.
• they need to try harder.
• for more on the arg from non-belief, see
• Howard-Snyder Moser Introduction Divine
  Hiddenness
• Drange Non-belief as Support for Atheism

42
what about god?

• TCG
• FIDEISM (blind faith) and its troubles
• args for theism
• cosmological argument
• first cause arg
• dependence arg
• teleological (design) argument
• ontological argument
• args for atheism
• paradox of the stone
• problem of evil
• argument from non-belief

43
taking stock

• all of the args for theism that weve discussed
  are interesting, but they face substantial
  objections.
• those for atheism are powerful, but not
  conclusive.
• for one, its always possible to accept them if
  youre a theist
• all you have to do is say that God is not
  omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent
• to say this is to reject TCG God is not
  entirely perfect.
• so, perhaps we ought to view both sides as
  presenting a challenge, and the rational thing to
  do is to suspend judgment until we can meet this
  challenge.
• CHALLENGE refute your opponents arguments