Recap

1
Re-cap

• Types of Religious experience
• 1. Experience of God/U.R. through a common,
  public sensory object
• 2. Experience of God/U.R. through an unusual,
  public sensory object
• 3. Experience of God/U.R. through a private
  sensation that can be described by appeal
  to normal sensory experience.
• 4. Experience of God/U.R. through a private
  sensation that cannot be described by
  appeal to normal sensory experience.
• 5. Experience of God/U.R. not through any
  sensations. One is directly and
  immediately aware of the divine presence, but is,
  strictly speaking, not having a sensation.
• James
• Religious experience as a special experience
  (feeling)
• Which of 1-5 is it?
• Arguments for it? (No science without
  phenomena to be explained. Similarly no
  religion with phenomena to be explained. Rel
  experience must be there and
  psychological study show us it is a
  feeling.)

2
Alston -- Religious Experience as Non-sensory
Perception

• Some terms
• i) experience of god direct
  experience/awareness of god
• ii) mystical experiencenonsensory experience
  of god
• iii) mystical perceptionform of perception
  involving M.E.
• We will use n.s. experience and n.s.
  perception
• Which of 1-5 does Alston advocate?

3
Initial Problems

• Why focus on direct experience? B/c then we
  know how to assess the claims.
• Why non-sensory? B/c God is non-sensory
• Is the notion of nonsensory experience
  incoherent? (pg. 46/47)
• Why would it be?
• Alstons response

4
Alstons View

• What is the structure of (ordinary) perception?
• Take, e.g I perceive a cat.
• There is
• 1. A perceiver (me)
• 2. Perceived object (the cat)
• 3. The phenomenon (the appearance of the cat)
• A is talking about perceptions un-mediated by
  concepts (Theory of Appearing)
• Argument for the Theory of Appearing
• Contrast Actually seeing a book vs. Thinking
  about a book
• Something missing when I think about the book --
  same concepts in play.
• Concepts can change perception, but there is
  still a perception there to be changed.
• When I look at my living room, the same
  objects present themselves to my visual
  awareness as when I first saw it. It is
  essential not to confuse what appears with what
  it appears as. (pg. 48)

5
Alstons View (cont.)

• Vs. James Mystical experience involves purely
  subjective feelings.
• Problem Misses a large number of cases where
  people describe it as perceptual.
• Alston does not deny the religious feeling
  account. He just thinks it overlooks a class of
  important (documented) cases.
• Why is the perceptual account overlooked?
• Because people question the existence of
  God.

6
Alstons View (cont.)

• But, the truth of the perceptual model is
  independent of the truth of Gods existence.
• Why?
• Distinguish Phenomenological Accnt. of
  Experience
• vs.
• Occurrence of a Veridical Perception
• Whats the difference?

7
Objections/Replies

• Objection 1 Ordinary perceptual experience is
  common, filled with information, and available to
  all, whereas religious experience is
  rare/unusual, dim/vague, and esoteric.
• So, it looks like religious/mystical experience
  cannot be captured on the perceptual model.

8
Objections/Replies (cont.)

• Reply All that is being claimed is that direct
  experience of God has the structure of an
  ordinary perception. (So, the same conditions
  for a veridical perception would apply to both.)
• To perceive X is for X to appear to me in a
  certain way.
• (Namely Perceiver, Object,
  Phenomenon)
• i) X must exist, ii) X must be making a
  causal contribution, and iii) X will
  tend to give rise to beliefs about X
  (the doxastic condition).

9
Objections (cont.)

• Objection 2 In ordinary perception, the
  perceived qualities are sensory. But, in
  mystical experience the perceived qualities are
  non-sensory. This would make a difference at the
  level of structure.
• The experience of the number 2. vs. The
  experience of looking at a cat.
• Similarly, The experience of God vs. The
  experience of looking at a cat.
• Experience of the number 2 is non-sensory.

10
Objections/Replies (cont.)

• Response
• Distinguish between
• Phenomenal qualities and Objective qualities
• Mystical and Ordinary perceptions have
  different phenomenal properties, but we express
  both using objective qualities -- (or comparative
  concepts -- mode of appearance in terms of the
  sort of objective thing that typically appears
  that way).
• So, the structure still seems to be the same.
• So, the experience of God is more like the
  experience of looking at a
• cat, just with different phenomenal properties.
  So, when we report
• religious experience we describe God under
  normal conditions.

11
Objections (cont.)

• Obj How are we supposed to know what God is like
  under normal conditions?
• We know what cats and trees are like under normal
  conditions, but what about God?

12
Objections/Replies (cont.)

• Reply We have some experiences with the
  properties of God in others. (So, its by
  extension.)
• Our subjects tell us that God presented Himself
  to their experience as a good, powerful,
  compassionate, forgiving being could be expected
  to appear.

13
Objections/Replies (cont.)

• Obj But, this doesnt answer the question.
  Arent the properties we see in others -- e.g.
  goodness -- based in sense perception?
• We understand how good people act from sensory
  experience of good people acting.
• The normal conditions grow out of experience
  with the
• phenomenal properties.
• So, in order to know what God would be like
  under normal
• conditions, we have to have some
  antecedent idea of his
• phenomenal properties. (Any response? See
  end of lec.)

14
Objections/Replies (cont.)

• This raises another problem How can we check
  any claim to have had a direct experience with
  God?
• Ordinary perception I claim to have perceived
  a stain on G.W.s shirt. We can check with
  others, b/c they could confirm it.
• Perception of God I claim to have experienced
  God.
• Why is it hard to check that?

15
Proudfoot -- R.E. as Interpretation

• Consider different ways we can see
• I perceive a cat. What do we mean?
• Do we mean to say A cat exists?
• Case I perceive a cat. -- But, it was
  actually a trash bag.
• Then you didnt perceive a cat.
• Normal usage suggests that a perception implies
  that an object is there.

16
Proudfoot (cont.)

• But, then whether people have religious
  experience (perception) depends on whether God
  exists (Alstons view).
• This is too narrow. So, its not a perception.
• P. thinks religious experience should not be
  characterized independent of the concepts we
  bring to the experience.
• Contra James/Alston Religious experience is a
  highly conceptualized experience. We bring our
  belief system to the experience. Thats
  religious experience.
• Rel. Experience cannot be understood without
  reference to religious beliefs. (Pg. 59)

17
Proudfoot (cont.)

• For Proudfoot, what makes an experience a
  religious experience is that one takes the
  experience to be a rel. exp.
• The description contains an embedded claim that
  God exists.
• The explanation for the experience need not
  appeal to Gods exist..
• An experience is a genuine religious experience
  if it is the product of the individuals belief
  system (regardless of the external world).
• Religious experience is not an objective report
  -- its an expression of a theoretical commitment
  -- a way of seeing the world.

18
Objections

• According to Proudfoot, is it even possible to
  experience God?
• That is, our analysis of religious experience
  should not rule out the possibility that genuine
  religious experiences are direct experience with
  god (Alstons view).

19
Reply

• No its not possible to have direct experience of
  God in Alstons sense. Because you dont
  directly experience anything unmediated by
  concepts.
• Bear example (pg. 60)
• Both experiences assume explanations. The first
  is not a pure experience.

20
Proudfoot (cont.)

• So, how do we understand religious experience.
• We learn the concepts of a culture and the
  psychological and personal histories of
  individuals who have religious experiences.
• Once we understand that, we can understand the
  experience. We could, in some sense, see what
  they see.
• Also, that is all the is involved in explaining
  experience (Proudfoot rejects the causal theory
  of perception -- when I perceive, something out
  there causes it.)

21
Perceptual vs. Interpretive Accnts.

• Perceptual model We ask What caused the
  perception/appearance? If God/U.R., then it was
  genuine.
• If not, then some deception.
• Whats interesting about rel. exp. is the fact
  that, b/c its like perception, we could be
  directly experiencing God. ( We can assess such
  claims.)
• Interpretive model All appearance is mediated
  by concepts.
• We dont ask What (out there in the world)
  caused the appearance?, Instead we ask Why
  did so-and-so bring her religious beliefs to bear
  on this occasion or that occasion?
• Whats interesting about rel. exp. is not
  whether we are experiencing God, but why we take
  ourselves so often to experience God.

22
Martin and the Arg. Based on Rel. Exp.

• Can religious experience justify religious
  belief?
• Argument that it can pg. 67
• The fact that one has a religious experience is
  sometimes used to justify ones belief (that God
  exists, or other beliefs).
• On the feeling account, can experience justify
  belief?

23
Martin (cont.)

• Dilemma for the feeling account
• If religious experience is ineffable, then it
  cannot be used to ground religious belief.
  (Why?)
• If religious experience is s.t. it could ground
  religious belief, then it is not ineffable.
• (Why?)
• Maintaining that its ineffable is supposed to
  make it immune from rational criticism -- so it
  can be the basis for religious systems. But, the
  dilemma shows that you cannot have both.

24
Martin (cont.)

• On Proudfoots view, can religious experience
  justify religious belief?

25
Martin (cont.)

• No.
• Why not?
• The experience is constituted by the beliefs.
• The experience Of God is the experience of God
  Existing, but this requires that you bring a
  whole set of beliefs to your interpretation of
  the world.
• So, experience could not justify belief.

26
Martin (cont.)

• What about for Alston?
• Religious Experience is a type of perception.
• Can it justify belief?

27
Martin (cont.)

• In principle, yes.
• Just as we use our ordinary perceptual
  experiences to justify our ordinary beliefs about
  the external world, we could use our religious
  experiences (if they are best understood as
  perceptions) to justify religious beliefs, IF the
  supernatural explanation is the best one.
• I see a dog in the park.
• Im justified in believing that there is a dog in
  the park, as long as I have no reason to think
  that somethings not working right or Im being
  tricked, etc.
• I see God.etc

28
Martin (cont.)

• Objection to the perceptual model
• We could be mistaken about our religious
  experience.
• Response?
• Leads to The Principle of Credulity
• (PC) When it seems (epistemically) to a subject
  S that x is present, then probably x is
  present.
• Only deny what they say if there are mitigating
  considerations.

29
Martin (cont.)

• The burden of proof is on the one who claims that
  the experience is not genuine.
• So, if religious experience is a type of
  perception, then we should take it to provide
  good grounds for the belief that God exists.
  Unless there are mitigating circumstances.
• If Alston is right, religious experience provides
  prima facie evidence for the existence of God.

30
Martin (cont.)

• How to argue against the Alston-inspired view.
• Point to mitigating considerations in each case.
• Reject the principle of credulity in the
  religious case.
• Martin adopts the second approach.
• The first is difficult. (see pg. 74)

31
Martin (cont.)

• Since experiences of God are good grounds for
  the existence of God, are not experiences of the
  absence of God good grounds for the nonexistence
  of God?
• Negative Principle of Credulity
• (NPC) If it seems (epistemically) to a subject S
  that x is absent, then probably x is absent.
• If it seems like a chair is not present, then a
  chair is probably not present.

32
Martin (cont.)

• Many people have tried to see God, but do not.
  What these people see is his absence.
• Assuming that many people claim to perceive God
  and that many people claim to perceive his
  absence, where does this leave us?
• At most, the claims of Gods absence (based on
  experience) and his existence (based on
  experience) are on equal footing.
• So, people like Alston seem vindicated.
• Writing assignment What do you think
  Swinburnes argument in response is? Evaluate the
  argument. (see pg. 75)

33
Martin (cont.)

• For Martin, we should take religious experience
  as unreliable.
• Because of the common perception of Gods
  absence.
• Because of the conflicting perceptions of God.
  (Why?)
• Regarding the second argument The fact of
  differing reports is not enough to generate an
  argument against the reliability of religious
  experience.
• Two people standing in front of a piece of art
  or architecture, might see different things.
  But, that does not make us question the existence
  of the painting or building.
• The reports must be conflicting.
• Even there, though, the conflicts may not cause
  a problem if there is a way to determine which
  claims are more reliable (some may be more
  coherent).

34
Further Objections

• Further objection 1
• In order to make justified claims based on
  perceptual experience, the experience must be
  verifiable.
• Ordinary perception is verifiable.
• Religious experience (God visited me at 3 a.m.
  9/14/2006) is not.
• Why wouldnt it be?

35
Further objections (cont.)

• Response The claims are not verifiable in a
  straightforward way, but thats because
  perception of God is like a perception of a
  person.
• We perceive people in different ways One of us
  might find Bob warm and funny, another one might
  find him meek and awkward.
• We cant require everyone to experience God in
  the same way. So, the verifiability requirement
  is altered a bit in the case of Gods qualities.
• Further there are checks/tests on religious
  experience natural theology (various arguments
  about Gods existence) can help us tell which
  experiences are more likely veridical.

36
Objections (cont.)

• Objection The tests of religious experience
  will be more indirect than the tests of normal
  perception.
• I perceive this white board.
• How do I test/check that?
• I reach out and touch it.
• Then I look at it again, etc

37
Objections (cont.)

• Response Is that really how we test sensory
  perceptions?
• If so, then there is a big problem
• If the first perception is unreliable, why arent
  all the others?
• If we have to check things this way, then we have
  an infinite regress problem (each check will
  require a check, but then that check will require
  a check, on and on and on.)
• The way out of this problem We have a
  background belief system that we use to help
  confirm our experiences. That system is based in
  experience, but there is no independent check
  (just the framework of beliefs, what other people
  say and our past experiences). Can work this way
  for religion too.

38
Further objections (cont.)

• Objection 2 Relgious experiences/perceptions are
  claimed to be indubitable. But, then, this turns
  the claims into claims about appearances and not
  about the thing perceived.
• I perceive a white board.
• Whats indubitable there?
• The appearance, not the existence of the board.

39
Objections

• The perceptual model aims to make religious
  experience more like ordinary perceptual
  experience.
• So, the indubitability that God exists, will not
  come from the experience. (Maybe from a claim
  about conceptual necessity.)
• Rather, the experience gives us good prima facie
  evidence for our beliefs. Its just as good as
  the exp. of ordinary objects.

40
Convinced?

• So, the appeal to religious experience (on the
  perceptual model) can at least put belief in God
  on the same footing as belief in the external
  world.
• Is the perceptual model the best one?
• Is the above conclusion justified?