Title: National Depository for Securities KDPW Poland
1National Depository for Securities (KDPW)Poland
After the meltdown How CSDs are identifying,
measuring and managing risks now Radoslaw
Ignatowicz - CSD10, Budapest May 2009
2KDPW Background
- Role
- Central securities depository
- Clearing house for cash and derivatives markets
- Responsibilities
- Custody
- Securities clearing and settlement
- Risk management
- Clients
- Issuers
- Intermediaries (custodian banks brokers)
3Risk Management - all markets
4Risk Management derivatives market
5Guarantee Funds
- 4 guarantee funds managed by KDPW, of which
- 3 guarantee funds used to guarantee the
obligations of clearing members arising from
their positions in the regulated cash and
derivatives markets - KDPW operates a special clearing fund the ATS
guarantee fund - to guarantee the clearing of
transactions executed in the New Connect
alternative trading system - When the clearing members own assets are
insufficient to meet obligations, the guarantee
fund resources are used - When the guarantee fund resources are
insufficient to meet clearing member obligations,
the clearing members are obliged to make
additional contributions to the fund - KDPW does not guarantee with its own assets
clearing member obligations from transactions
secured by the guarantee fund.
6Downturn in Poland Share capitalisation
7Downturn in Poland Number and value of share
transactions (regulated market)
2006
2007
2008
2009
2006
2007
2008
2009
8Downturn in Poland Futures turnover (regulated
market)
9Exposure to the 2008 financial downturn
- Exposure to assets
- No exotic financial instruments traded, or
registered in KDPW - e.g. OTC derivatives, credit default swaps,
foreign complex debt - Foreign securities traded in the regulated
market only plain vanilla shares of mostly EU
dual-listed companies - THEREFORE No contagion from toxic assets
- Exposure to participants
- No meltdown victims were direct KDPW participants
-
- Stable financial standing of clearing members
- THEREFORE No contagion from toxic
participants, no participant default
experienced as a result of market turmoil
10KDPW response to the 2008 financial meltdown
- KDPW actions following the increased volatility
in the derivatives market in Autumn 2008 - Meetings with participants in order to discuss
lessons from high market volatility and the need
for increased intra-day margin calls - Setting up new transaction limit usage
pre-advice level to inform participants regarding
potential intraday margin calls in advance - Scoring system for participants - clearing
members breaching transaction limits can be
requested to make extra contributions to the
guarantee fund - Changes to the calculation of maintenance margins
in response to market requests aimed at limiting
the need of intraday margin calls (higher during
volatility, lower during stabilization)
11(No Transcript)
12KDPW response to the 2008 financial
meltdown
- Default procedures review
- Default scenario analysis
- Default risk factors/ triggers
- Default declaration
- Legal aspects of a participants default
- Liquidation of open positions
- Internal procedures update
- Risk Committee responsibilities
- Allocation of duties
- Default participants position liquidation
- Use of deposits/ guarantee funds assets
- Tests of communication channels with Warsaw Stock
Exchange to assure streamlined default procedure
execution.
13KDPW response to the 2008 financial meltdown
- Other issues
- Stress testing frequency set up to monthly mode
with possibility of launching ad hoc stress tests
if needed - Deposits / Guarantee funds assets management
policy review - Providers diversification
- Shortening of investment horizon
- Special set ups with National Bank of Poland
- Position concentration on derivatives market
- Individual position monitoring and disclosure
- High concentration risk analysis
- Amending the KDPW Rules to introduce possibility
of individual margin requirements for highly
concentrated positions
14Thank You For Your Attention
www.kdpw.pl