Title: United States v' E'I' Du Pont De Nemours
1United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co
(1956)
Basic Facts During period 1923-47, Dupont
controlled 75 of cellophane sold in U.S., which
accounted for 20 of all flexible packaging
products. Government contended Dupont had
illegal monopoly. What was issue regarding
relevant market? What factors did majority
consider? What factors did dissent rely
upon? Who would the post-Chicago analysts likely
side with?
2The Cellophane Fallacy
- Theory Firm with monopoly power will keep price
just below mark that will require mass to shift
to substitute products. So cross-elasticity of
demand for a product calculated on current price
only defines the outer-limit of the monopolists
punitive power. - SSNIP of 1992 merger guidelines requires that
cross-elasticity for substitute products be
measured after small, significant,
non-transitory increase in price. If it results
in critical mass move to substitutes, then all
alternatives are included in relevant market.
3Eastman Kodak Co v. Image Technical Services
(1992)
Basic Facts Kodak encouraged independent ISOs
to provide after-market service and repair for
its photocopying and micrographic equipment.
Kodak then decided to reclaim service business
and refused to sell parts to ISOs. ISOs sued
under Sherman 1 and 2. What was market issue
before court? Isnt a single brand always a
market unto itself? Is there a tort or a breach
of contract remedy available to ISOs? Is this
relevant to antitrust policy?
4Microsoft Warren-Boulton Testimony
- Operating system compatible with x/86 Pentium PCs
relevant market. - - Horizontal Merger Guidelines price
power of hypothetical monopolist. - - Fact that OS is separate product and
OEMs say they would not switch if - price raised show power over this market
segment. - - High cost to switch to other system.
- - OS cost small share of PC cost (2.5).
Gives price power. - Microsoft possess monopoly power.
- - Issue Power to raise market price above
competitive level or exclude - competition.
- - Market share very high over 95 OS
installations. - - High barriers to entry High scale
economies and sunk costs customers - locked-in, high switching costs
applications positive feedback barrier - high installed applications is barrier
IBM failure. - - Exclusionary conduct Willingness to
refuse business no regard for cost. - - High profitability, P/E ratio (twice
average) and ability to raise prices - above competitive level.
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5Microsoft Schmalensee Testimony
- Monopoly claim is red herring.
- Microsoft has no power over software
distribution. - Two approaches to monopoly power Structural
Behavioral. - Behavioral approach better when markets blurred
best in software - industry.
- Microsoft constrained by past, present, future.
- Wrong to define relevant market to exclude
potential new entrants and then - to measure power by how same new entrants
are excluded. - 7. Merger Guidelines bad approach here. Focus
only on short-run. For - software, long-term competition is of most
relevance. - 8. Long-term, Microsoft faces stiff
competition. - 9. Microsoft only 9 of U.S. software revenues.
This is most relevant. - 10. Monopoly power All successful software has
high market share superior - foresight, ingenuity is reason for success
OS prices relative to PC prices
irrelevant high net margin and PC ratios just
mean profitable in short-run Microsoft
does not raise prices higher because competition
exists. -
6U.S. v Microsoft (D.C. Cir. 2001) Market Power
- What was relevant market? Did it include MAC OS?
- What was Microsofts contradictory argument
regarding potential market threats? - How did the court treat the uniquely dynamic
software argument? - What was Courts view of short-term vs. long-term
in defining the relevant market?