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Observations on an enterprise IPv6 firewall and IDS

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Title: Observations on an enterprise IPv6 firewall and IDS


1
Observations onan enterprise IPv6firewall and
IDS
  • Tim Chown
  • tjc_at_ecs.soton.ac.uk

IETF 68, 19th March 2007 Prague
2
Talk outline
  • Scenario
  • IPv6 firewall and IDS deployment
  • Observations on firewall activity
  • Observations on IDS activity
  • Considerations for firewall management
  • Considerations for IDS developers

3
Scenario
  • Enterprise (academic) network
  • Approx 1,000 hosts/servers
  • Up to 2,000 users
  • Using various OSes and hardware
  • Running a dual-stack deployment
  • IPv6 pervasively on the wire
  • Most network services dual-stack (DNS, MX, web,
    etc)
  • Operational now for over three years
  • Partially done through 6NET project
    (www.6net.org)

4
Border firewall and IDS
  • Lacking a suitable commercial solution at this
    time, currently looking for unified IPv4/IPv6
    solutions
  • Currently use parallel paths into our site
  • Commercial IPv4 firewall
  • BSD pf for IPv6
  • Snort IDS for both
  • Dual-stack DMZs including wireless LAN

5
IPv6 firewall experience
  • Currently logging all pf blocked connections
  • Averaging around 20-30k entries per week
  • Very low compared to IPv4
  • Most logged filter events are between our IPv6
    DMZ and the internal IPv6 network
  • Similar level and protocols to existing IPv4 DMZ
    filtering
  • Around 500 or so miscellaneous entries per week
  • No real evidence of systematic port scans
  • Probing is to ports on publicly advertised
    systems, e.g. DNS servers, MX servers, Web
    servers, NTP servers

6
Miscellaneous filters
  • In the miscellaneous category
  • X11 traffic
  • http
  • Highlights ruleset inconsistencies between IP
    versions.
  • ftp
  • SubethaEdit (port 6942)
  • ssh
  • auth
  • microsoft-ds (port 445)

7
Microsoft-ds example
  • Log entries
  • 153318.038763 20028c6d14e78c6d14e7.51878 gt
    augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk.microsoft-ds S
    919595593919595593(0) win 8192 ltmss
    1220,nop,wscale 8,tcpgt
  • 153321.034973 20028c6d14e78c6d14e7.51878 gt
    augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk.microsoft-ds S
    919595593919595593(0) win 8192 ltmss
    1220,nop,wscale 8,tcpgt
  • 153327.028456 20028c6d14e78c6d14e7.51878 gt
    augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk.microsoft-ds S
    919595593919595593(0) win 8192 ltmss
    1220,nop,nop,sackOKgt
  • Target is a publicly advertised IPv6 node
  • The 2002/16 source prefix is 6to4
  • 8c 6d 14 e7 is 140.109.20.231
  • Apparent source
  • 231.20.109.140.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN PTR
    guppy.iis.sinica.edu.tw.

8
Malformed packets
  • An example sent towards our web server, perhaps
    looking to exploit an OS-specific bug/feature
  • 063510.825875 200104136e378012c069f8e96c
    gt augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk no next header
  • 063520.825276 200104136e378012c069f8e96c
    gt augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk no next header
  • 063549.824144 200104136e378012c069f8e96c
    gt augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk no next header

9
Rarer probing example
  • One host (in Thailand) checking presence/route to
    a number of publicly advertised systems
  • 200651.850661 2001f008.45821 gt
    augur.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim 1
  • 200703.935552 2001f008.45822 gt
    sixprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim 1
  • 200914.044278 2001f008.45824 gt
    seven.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim 1
  • 200923.785148 2001f008.45825 gt
    zepler.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim 1
  • 200933.249159 2001f008.45826 gt
    moorhen.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim1
  • 200943.009118 2001f008.45827 gt
    crow.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim1
  • 200952.503731 2001f008.45828 gt
    jackdaw.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim1
  • 201002.243615 2001f008.45829 gt
    coot.ecs.soton.ac.uk.33434 udp 16 hlim 1

10
Intrusion Detection Systems
  • We use Snort open source IDS/IPS
  • http//www.snort.org/
  • A patch is available for IPv6 transport
    inspection
  • Just looks at certain application layer
    signatures
  • Fuller support in release code soon
  • We expect a new test (beta) version any day now
  • Will include official IPv6 support for some
    features
  • Probably Stream5, HTTP Inspect, DCERPC and FTP
    Telnet preprocessors
  • New record type for IPv6 events
  • Will also need IPS IPv6 communication to firewall
  • To react to observed potential attacks

11
Observations on our IDS
  • Running on our external link path
  • Note Snort supports multiple probe points
  • In a recent weeks logs
  • Events logged from 26 different sources
  • Some from same /64 link, so its possible IPv6
    privacy addresses may mask true number of sources
  • Can check the signature IDs, e.g
  • http//www.snort.org/pub-bin/sigs.cgi?sid1042

12
Example IDS events seen
  • Logged events include
  • WEB-IIS view source via translate header
  • BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic
  • WEB-MISC backup access
  • WEB-MISC SSLv3 invalid data version attempt
  • IIS UNICODE CODEPOINT ENCODING
  • ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden
  • TCP Portsweep
  • DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK
  • OVERSIZE REQUEST-URI DIRECTORY
  • Similar to what we see for IPv4 IDS

13
Firewall management
  • Currently we have two firewall platforms
  • Could be managed via single interface/GUI
  • Need a consistent management interface for IPv4
    and IPv6 hosts
  • Allow dual-stack or multiaddressed nodes to be
    managed
  • Reduce management complexity
  • Avoid inconsistencies
  • Not the case for all platforms looked at to date
  • Also important to consider IPv6-enabled status of
    all services for an IPv6 DNS-advertised host

14
IDS considerations
  • The Snort weve used only examines application
    layer data for potential attacks
  • Uses the same signatures as IPv4
  • We need to understand IPv6-specific issues to
    detect in IPv6 IDS systems, e.g.
  • Excessive hop-by-hop headers/options
  • Routing Header usage
  • Header ordering
  • Malformed headers
  • Transition tool abuse
  • Snort wont see these issues today

15
Summary
  • IPv6 firewall activity light (but so is traffic
    level)
  • Probing activity targeted at advertised IPv6
    addresses
  • IPv6 IDS seeing IPv4-like attacks
  • But were only looking at the application not the
    IP layer
  • And no way to do IPS messaging over IPv6 yet
  • Need to consider how firewalls can be
    consistently managed for dual-stack IPv4/IPv6
    nodes
  • Need to discuss IPv6-specific IDS considerations
  • Testing new Snort version soon
  • Seeking people to help start an ID on this topic
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